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3“Education is the most powerful weapon which you can
use to change the world.”
Nelson Mandela
“Il n’y a aucune connaissance de la terre qui ne commence
par l’imagination. Lorsqu’elle disparaît, lorsque se brise la
création par l’imaginaire, la curiosité s’évanouit avec elle et
le savoir s’épuise.”
Francesco Alberoni
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7Abstract
The design of circuits to operate at critical environments, such as those used in control-
command systems at nuclear power plants, is becoming a great challenge with the technol-
ogy scaling. These circuits have to pass through a number of tests and analysis procedures
in order to be qualified to operate. In case of nuclear power plants, safety is considered as
a very high priority constraint, and circuits designed to operate under such critical envi-
ronment must be in accordance with several technical standards such as the IEC 62566,
the IEC 60987, and the IEC 61513. In such standards, reliability is treated as a main con-
sideration, and methods to analyze and improve the circuit reliability are highly required.
The present dissertation introduces some methods to analyze and to improve the reli-
ability of circuits in order to facilitate their qualification according to the aforementioned
technical standards. Concerning reliability analysis, we first present a fault-injection based
tool used to assess the reliability of digital circuits. Next, we introduce a method to evalu-
ate the reliability of circuits taking into account the ability of a given application to tolerate
errors. Concerning reliability improvement techniques, first two different strategies to se-
lectively harden a circuit are proposed. The first one is based on the assumption that some
output bits of a circuit may be more important for a given application than the others.
Then, the proposed technique drives the reliability improvement effort to those bits. The
other technique uses a cost function in order to automatically select the best candidates
to be hardened. Finally, a method to automatically partition a TMR design based on a
given reliability requirement is introduced.
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9French Summary
Introduction
Depuis l’avènement de la micro-électronique, ce domaine n’a pas cessé de prendre de
l’ampleur. Les technologies de fabrication ont vécu une évolution exponentielle comme
prévu par la Loi de Moore [1, 2]. Comme résultat, les dispositifs électroniques deviennent
de plus en plus petits, plus performants et moins chers.
Afin de continuer l’évolution de la micro-électronique même après l’arrivée des dimen-
sions submicroniques, les chercheurs doivent surpasser des défis comme la considération des
phénomènes physiques qui auparavant étaient négligeables et maintenant sont prépondé-
rants, comme les forces de Casimir et de Van Der Waals [3]. De plus, les systèmes d’inter-
connections sont devenus très complexes avec l’arrivée du schéma de connexion 3-D [4]. En
fait, l’augmentation de la quantité de composants dans la même puce et l’augmentation de
la complexité des interconnections font croître la probabilité de défaillance des composants.
En même temps, l’augmentation des fréquences d’opération augmente la probabilité des
erreurs de synchronisation [5]. En conséquence, une réduction du rendement de fabrication
aussi bien que de la fiabilité des circuits intégrés est attendue [6–10].
Avec l’augmentation de la probabilité de fautes dans les circuits numériques, les sys-
tèmes développés pour les environnements critiques comme les centrales nucléaires, les
avions et les applications spatiales doivent être certifiés selon des normes industrielles.
Cette thèse est un résultat d’une coopération CIFRE entre l’entreprise Électricité de France
(EDF) R&D et Télécom Paristech. EDF est l’un des plus gros producteurs d’énergie au
monde et possède de nombreuses centrales nucléaires. Les systèmes de contrôle-commande
utilisé dans les centrales sont basés sur des dispositifs électroniques, qui doivent être cer-
tifiés selon des normes industrielles comme la CEI 62566 [11], la CEI 60987 [12] et la CEI
61513 [13] à cause de la criticité de l’environnement nucléaire. En particulier, l’utilisation
des dispositifs programmables comme les FPGAs peut être considérée comme un défi du
fait que la fonctionnalité du dispositif est définie par le concepteur seulement après sa
conception physique. Le travail présenté dans ce mémoire porte sur la conception de nou-
velles méthodes d’analyse de la fiabilité aussi bien que des méthodes d’amélioration de la
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fiabilité d’un circuit numérique.
La fiabilité dans les circuits numériques
Un circuit électronique peut être vu comme l’assemblage d’un certain nombre de com-
posants électroniques de telle façon qu’il produit une fonctionnalité souhaité. Cette fonc-
tionnalité peut être garantie si on considère que les composants sont exempts de fautes.
Malheureusement les dispositifs électroniques sont susceptibles de défaillances occasion-
nées par des mécanismes naturels comme les impuretés dans les matériaux et les variations
de paramètres, entre autres. Pour être précis, il y a une certaine probabilité qu’un cir-
cuit numérique va fournir la fonctionnalité souhaitée pendant un période de temps. Cette
probabilité est connue comme fiabilité et peut être définie comme suit : la fiabilité est l’ap-
titude d’un dispositif à accomplir une fonction requise dans des conditions données pour
une période de temps donnée [14].
La fiabilité d’un circuit électronique peut être calculée selon (1). Son comportement
par rapport au temps peut être divisé en 3 phases (voir Figure 1) :
1. Taux de défaillance décroissant → Cette phase de vie est aussi appelée période de
jeunesse.
2. Taux de défaillance sensiblement constant → C’est aussi appelé période de vie utile
du dispositif.
3. Taux de défaillance croissant → Correspond à la période de vieillissement du circuit
R(t) = e−
∫ t
0 λ(x)dx (1)
//
λ(t)
t
//
Decreasing Failure
Rate Region
Constant Failure
Rate Region
Increasing Failure
Rate Region
Figure 1 – Courbe en baignoire
Parmi les types de fautes qui peuvent occasionner une défaillance du système électro-
nique, les fautes transitoires sont particulièrement une menace à cause de leur comporte-
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ment aléatoire et leur grande probabilité d’occurrence. Les fautes transitoires peuvent être
occasionnées par différents phénomènes physiques comme par exemple les particules alpha,
les rayons cosmiques et les interférences électromagnétiques. De plus, la susceptibilité des
circuits électroniques à ces types de phénomènes augmente avec la réduction de la taille
des composants. Pour faire face à ces erreurs, les concepteurs peuvent utiliser des méthodes
de durcissement d’un circuit intégré. Cela représente toujours un surcoût en surface, en
consommation ou en vitesse. Ainsi, les méthodes d’analyse de la fiabilité d’un circuit intégré
deviennent de plus en plus importantes avec l’évolution de la technologie. C’est grâce à ce
type d’analyse que les concepteurs peuvent identifier les zones de défaillance potentielles,
la nécessité d’ajout de redondance, la nécessité d’un système de sauvegarde, etc. De plus,
les méthodes d’analyse de la fiabilité peuvent être utilisées comme un outil pour mesurer
la performance de différentes stratégies de durcissement d’un circuit intégré.
Plusieurs méthodes d’analyse de la fiabilité d’un circuit ont été reportées dans la lit-
térature. C’est bien connu qu’une analyse optimale doit prendre en considération autant
d’information que possible du circuit lui-même aussi bien que de l’application cible. En dé-
pit de cela, la plupart de méthodes d’analyse de fiabilité considère quelques simplifications
dans les modèles mathématiques comme la considération de fautes simples, de signaux non
corrélés, etc. En outre, peu de travaux sur l’analyse de la fiabilité ont été effectués tenant
en compte l’importance des résultats du circuit pour l’application cible. En fait, beaucoup
d’applications présentent la capacité de tolérer un certain nombre et certains types d’er-
reurs. En considérant cette information, un concepteur peut mieux contrôler l’ajout de
redondance afin d’éviter un surcoût trop élevé. La première contribution de ce travail est
une technique nommée « effective reliability » qui prend en considération la tolérance aux
erreurs d’une application pour évaluer la fiabilité du circuit.
Effective Reliability
L’augmentation considérable du nombre d’erreurs attendue dans les circuits avec l’évo-
lution de la technologie a inspiré les discussions sur la tolérance aux erreurs depuis la sortie
du « 2001 International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors (ITRS) ». Le concept
de tolérance aux erreurs a été introduit comme un paradigme orienté à l’application pour
faire face aux variations du processus, aux défauts et au bruit [7]. L’idée principale est de
que certaines applications présentent la capacité de tolérer un certain nombre et certains
types d’erreurs à condition qu’ils soient limités à un certain niveau de sévérité défini par
l’application. En effet, plusieurs applications multimédia présentent cette caractéristique
grâce au fonctionnement des sens humains comme la vue, l’audition et l’odorat, qui ne
peuvent pas s’apercevoir de la présence de certains types d’erreurs. Ce mémoire se réfère
à ce type de phénomène comme les masquages des erreurs par l’application et introduit la
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classification d’erreurs suivante :
– Erreurs critiques → Ce sont les erreurs qui peuvent occasionner un grand impact
dans les résultats produits par un circuit ;
– Erreurs non-critiques → Ce sont les erreurs qui sont masquées par l’application.
Cette classification des erreurs prend en considération l’usage des résultats produits
par un circuit. Par conséquence, un facteur très important qui affecte ce type de classifica-
tion est l’approche de codification utilisée pour représenter l’information dans la sortie du
circuit. En fait, l’impact d’une inversion d’un bit de sortie du circuit dépend directement
de son poids, c’est-à-dire de sa signifiance relative par rapport au mot de sortie. En dépit
de cela, le concept traditionnel de fiabilité d’un circuit (appelé fiabilité nominale dans ce
mémoire) est basée sur le paradigme de passer ou échouer, c’est-à-dire il ne prend pas en
considération l’importance d’un bit de sortie comme décrit en (2).
Rnom =
M−1∏
i=0
qi (2)
Pour faire face à ces problèmes, nous proposons le concept de « effective reliability »
comme décrit par (3) et (4). Dans ce cas, le terme Rack représente la probabilité qu’une
erreur soit masquée par l’application cible. Cela veut dire que le terme Rack prend en
considération les erreurs qui sont classées comme non-critiques alors que le terme Rack
considère les erreurs critiques. La classification d’une erreur en critique ou non-critique
prend en compte des métriques de qualité qui sont considérées pertinentes par rapport à
l’application cible. Ce mémoire introduit aussi deux métriques de qualité différentes basées
d’importance d’un bit (voir (5) et (6)) et d’erreur relative (voir (7) et (8)).
Reff = Rnom +Rack (3)
Reff = 1−Rack (4)
Reff =
M−1∏
i=0
qi +
T+1∑
k=1
CT+1k∑
r=1
γk,r (5)
Reff = 1−
T+1∑
k=1
CMk∑
r=CT+1k +1
γk,r −
M∑
k=T+2
CMk∑
r=1
γk,r (6)
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Table 1 – Valeurs de la fiabilité de chaque bit de sortie de l’APPR8
Sortie Fiabilité (qi)
b0 99.80%
b1 99.48%
b2 99.31%
b3 99.24%
b4 99.20%
b5 99.18%
b6 99.17%
b7 99.16%
b8(retenue) 99.36%
Reff =
M−1∏
i=0
qi +
2H−1∑
a=0
p(a)
kmax∑
k=1
CMk∑
r=1
γk,r.u (δmax − δ(k, r, a)) (7)
Reff = 1−
2H−1∑
a=0
p(a)
kmax∑
k=1
CMk∑
r=1
γk,r.u (δ(k, r, a)− δmax) (8)
Résultats
Prenons comme exemple un additionneur parallèle à propagation retenue de 8 bit
(APPR8), construit à partir de 8 additionneurs de 1 bit en chaîne, dans lequel la probabi-
lité de défaillance de chaque porte logique est égale à 99.9%. Supposons que la contrainte
de fiabilité minimale de l’APPR8 soit Rmin = 95% et que l’application cible présente la
capacité de tolérer des erreurs aussi grandes que 2% du résultat correct (δmax = 2%).
La fiabilité de chaque bit de sortie du APPR8 a été évaluée en utilisant la méthode SPR-
MP [15], et les résultats sont illustrés dans le Tableau 1. La concept de fiabilité nominale
peut donc être calculée selon (9). En analysant le résultat pour la fiabilité nominale un
concepteur ira conclure que l’APPR8 ne respecte pas la contrainte de fiabilité minimale
et que le circuit a besoin d’être durci. En considérant la méthode TMR (Triple Modular
Redundancy) pour réaliser cette procédure, l’architecture durcie avec moins de surface mais
qui encore respecte la contrainte de fiabilité minimale cause un surcoût en surface de 75%.
R =
8∏
i=0
qi = 94.06% (9)
Rappelons que l’application cible présente la capacité de tolérer des erreurs s’ils ne
dépassent pas la contrainte d’erreur relative δmax = 2%. Prenons donc le concept de «
effective reliability » pour analyser la fiabilité du circuit. Dans ce cas, la fiabilité du circuit
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Table 2 – Valeurs de Reff pour différentes tolérances aux erreurs (APPR8)
Erreur Relative (δmax) Fiabilité
0.5% 94.23%
1.0% 94.64%
1.5% 94.96%
2.0% 95.22%
2.5% 95.44%
3.0% 95.62%
3.5% 95.77%
4.0% 95.92%
4.5% 96.05%
5.0% 96.16%
dépend de la capacité de l’application cible de tolérer des erreurs (voir Tableau 2). C’est
bien noté qu’en considérant une capacité de tolérance d’erreurs δmax = 2% la fiabilité
du circuit pour cette application est égale à 95.22%, c’est-à-dire la contrainte de fiabilité
minimale est déjà respectée et en fait il n’y a pas besoin d’ajout de redondance.
Le concept de « effective reliability » est très intéressant pour les applications dans
lesquelles un certain nombre d’erreurs peut être toléré. Par contre, dans les applications
appelées critiques comme les centrales nucléaires, les avions et les satellites, l’occurrence
d’une seule erreur peut causer des conséquences sévères. En fait, les circuits développés
pour ces environnements ont besoin d’une couverture de test qui s’approche de 100%.
Pour faire face à ces problèmes, la deuxième contribution de ce travail est un outil basée
sur Verilog appelé FIFA (Fault-Injection-Fault-Analysis) développé pour accélérer les tests
exhaustifs dans les circuits intégrés.
L’outil FIFA
C’est déjà bien connu que l’injection de fautes est une approche intéressant pour ana-
lyser le fonctionnement des circuits intégrés en présence de fautes. L’idée principale est
d’injecter des fautes dans le circuit de forme aléatoire ou contrôlée et analyser si la faute
est propagée jusqu’à la sortie. Comme les circuits intégrés deviennent de plus en plus com-
plexes avec l’évolution de la technologie, le temps nécessaire pour atteindre un niveau élevé
de couverture de test est très important, voire prohibitif. Cela devient un problème pour
les applications qui ont besoin de tel niveau de couverture, et de ce fait le développement
des nouvelles méthodes que puissent accélérer la procédure d’injection de fautes devient
nécessaire. La deuxième contribution de ce travail est un outil appelé FIFA (Fault-Injection-
Faut-Analysis) qui a été développé comme un « hardware IP » pour accélérer l’analyse de
fiabilité basée sur l’injection de fautes. Cet outil est adapté à différents modèles de fautes
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et à des fautes multiples.
L’architecture de mise en œuvre de l’outil FIFA est illustrée dans la Figure 2. Nous
pouvons noter qu’il y a deux versions du dispositif sous test (dut). Le module «dut ref»
correspond à une version idéale du dispositif sous test, tandis que le module appelé «dut
faulty» est une copie du «dut ref» dans laquelle des saboteurs ont été ajoutés . Un
saboteur est un dispositif électronique capable de changer la valeur logique d’un nœud
du circuit. Le saboteur qui a été développé pour l’outil FIFA supporte quatre types de
fautes différentes : les inversions de bit, les collages à zéro, les collages à un, et les hautes
impédances. Son schéma est illustré dans la Figure 3.
Figure 2 – Schéma général de l’outil proposé
Node j
ej
m1
m0
Node je
00
01
10
11
Saboteur “j”
0
1
Z sel[s1:s0]
Figure 3 – Schéma général d’un saboteur
L’évaluation de la fiabilité d’un circuit à partir des résultats fournis par l’outil FIFA
est basée sur la méthode PBR [16]. Le module «fault generator» a été développé pour
générer des erreurs en ordre croissante de multiplicité, de sorte que le concepteur peut
limiter le nombre de tests à effectuer s’il connaît le nombre maximal de fautes simultanées.
Afin d’analyser la performance et la quantité de ressources utilisées par l’outil FIFA,
nous l’avons comparé avec une plateforme reportée dans la littérature nommée FuSE [17].
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Table 3 – Plate-forme Fuse vs. outil FIFA
Fuse [17] FIFA
ALUTs 2157 817
Registres 694 467
Fréquence maximale 75.1MHz 109.87MHz
L’implémentation a été faite dans un stratix ii ep2s180f1508c3 et il a été considéré
un circuit avec N = 10 saboteurs et P = Z = 32 entrées et sorties. Les résultats de
comparaison peuvent être analysés dans le Tableau 3. Les résultats de synthèse de l’outil
FIFA sont présentés dans la Figure 4.
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Figure 4 – Résultats de la synthèse de l’outil (jusqu’à N erreurs simultanées) : (a) nombre
d’éléments logiques nécessaires dans le FPGA (b) fréquence maximale d’injection de fautes
Magré la bonne performance de l’outil FIFA, l’analyse de la fiabilité de circuits com-
plexes reste très coûteuse en temps. Pour surmonter ce problème, nous proposons d’utiliser
la technique de parallélisme. La Figure 5 illustre une architecture parallèle très simple
pour l’outil FIFA. Le problème avec cette approche est la grande surface additionnelle qui
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Figure 5 – Une simple architecture parallèle pour la FIFA
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Figure 6 – L’architecture en parallèle proposée pour la FIFA
devient nécessaire à cause de la réplication des modules «stimuli generator», «dut
faulty» et «dut ref». En fait, les modules «dut ref» et «dut faulty» répliqués re-
quièrent une surface qui peut être significative par rapport à celles des autres modules.
Une architecture qui évite la réplication de «dut ref» est illustrée dans la Figure 6.
Dans ce cas il est nécessaire de répliquer seulement les modules «dut faulty» et «fault
generator».
Afin d’implémenter correctement l’architecture illustrée dans la Figure 6, il faut bien
distribuer la génération de vecteurs de fautes entre les N modules «fault generator».
C’est important de remarquer que la génération de fautes est faite en ordre croissante
concernant le nombre de fautes simultanées. En conséquence, il faut développer un al-
gorithme pour calculer les vecteurs de fautes qui iront initialiser chaque module «fault
generator». Cet algorithme a été developpé en utilisant quelques régularités numériques
comme décrit dans le Chapitre 2. Les résultats, présentés dans la Figure 7, prouvent la
bonne distribution de la génération de vecteurs de fautes.
Jusqu’à ce point il a été introduit deux méthodes pour analyser la fiabilité d’un circuit
numérique. Cette analyse est généralement utilisée pour certifier le fonctionnement correct
du circuit pendant sa période de vie utile. Si sa fiabilité ne respecte pas la contrainte de
fiabilité minimale, les concepteurs peuvent réaliser le durcissement du circuit. Générale-
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Figure 7 – Performance de l’architecture en parallèle proposée pour la FIFA
ment, la protection partiale d’un circuit contre défaillances est suffisante pour la plupart
des applications. Ainsi, le développement des nouvelles méthodes basée sur une procédure
de durcissement sélectif devient nécessaire. La troisième contribution de ce travail concerne
le développement de deux techniques pour identifier les portes logiques les plus critiques
et ainsi permettre de réaliser le durcissement sélectif d’un circuit.
Durcissement Sélectif
Les techniques de durcissement sélectif d’un circuit offrent un bon compromis entre
l’augmentation de sa fiabilité et le surcoût correspondant. Ces techniques consistent fonda-
mentalement de deux étapes : les portes ou blocs logiques sont analysés et ordonnés selon
leur susceptibilité aux fautes et la probabilité que ces fautes produisent une défaillance
du système ; ensuite, les portes ou blocs logiques les plus critiques sont protégés en uti-
lisant une technique de durcissement choisie par le concepteur. La difficulté de mise en
œuvre du durcissement sélectif réside dans l’identification des portes ou blocs logiques les
plus critiques pour une application. La première technique proposée dans ce travail consi-
dère l’utilisation des résultats produits par un circuit comme le facteur déterminant de la
criticité d’un bloc logique.
Évitement des erreurs critiques dans les circuits intégrés
Un problème présent dans la plupart des méthodes de durcissement sélectif est négliger
le profil d’utilisation des résultats d’un circuit par l’application cible. En fait, le concept
de fiabilité nominale ne prend pas en compte la quantité d’information que chaque bit de
sortie contient pour évaluer la fiabilité d’un circuit. Ce fait peut être illustré en considérant
3 architectures d’un circuit additionneur de 4 bits. La fiabilité de chaque bit de sortie
(y = b3b2b1b0) de ces 3 architectures est donnée dans le Tableau 4. La fiabilité nominale
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Table 4 – Fiabilité pour les bits de sortie de 3 architectures différentes d’un additionneur
de 4-bit
Architecture b3 b2 b1 b0 Rnominal Rpractical
1 99% 99% 99% 95% 92.18% 97.63%
2 95% 99% 99% 99% 92.18% 94.17%
3 98% 99% 99% 95% 91.25% 96.64%
peut être calculée selon (10), et les résultats correspondants sont aussi disponibles dans
le Tableau 4. Concernant les valeurs pour la fiabilité nominale de ces architectures, un
concepteur conclura que les architectures 1 et 2 sont également fiables. Cependant, en
analysant la fiabilité de chaque bit de sortie pour ces architectures, il est évident que
l’architecture 1 fournit des résultats plus en conformité avec l’application que l’architecture
2.
Rnominal =
M−1∏
i=0
Ri (10)
Pour faire face à ce problème, ce travail propose le concept de fiabilité pratique. Ba-
sée sur le fait que chaque bit de sortie d’un circuit peut avoir une importance différente
pour une certaine application, la fiabilité pratique utilise un facteur ki pour déterminer la
sévérité d’une erreur dans un bit de sortie spécifique (voir (11)). Par exemple, dans le cas
d’utilisation d’une codification binaire, la valeur de ki est calculée selon (12). Ce concept
corrige le problème décrit par l’exemple du additionneur 4 bits comme illustré dans le
Tableau 4
Rpractical =
M−1∏
i=0
Rkii (11)
ki =
1
2(M−1)−i
(12)
L’utilisation de la fiabilité pratique dans le processus de durcissement sélectif d’un
circuit est illustrée avec l’additionneur de 4-bit de la Figure 8. Dans ce cas, la première
étape consiste à identifier les portes logiques les plus critiques selon le modèle de fiabilité
pratique. Les résultats sont présentés dans le Tableau 5. La méthode [18] a été aussi
implémentée et les résultats ont été comparés avec la méthode proposée en considérant la
même contrainte de surface (voir Tableau 6).
Les résultats présents dans le Tableau 6 prouvent l’efficacité de la méthode proposée.
En fait, il peut être noté que le gain en fiabilité est plus marqué pour les bits les plus
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significatifs du circuit (les plus critiques). En conséquence, le circuit durcit par la méthode
proposée exhibe la plus grande fiabilité pratique.
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Figure 8 – Schéma en portes logiques du circuit 74283
L’utilisation d’une fonction de coût pour déterminer les portes critiques
La méthode décrite dans les paragraphes précédents ne s’applique pas à toutes les
applications. En fait, plusieurs applications ne présentent pas une différence d’importance
entre les bits de sortie du circuit. Pour ces applications, ce travail propose aussi une méthode
basée sur des fonctions de coût pour automatiser le processus d’identification des portes
logiques critiques. Cette méthode utilise le modèle SPR pour évaluer la fiabilité d’un circuit
et déterminer les blocs logiques offrant la meilleure relation entre gain en fiabilité et coût.
Prenons un circuit composé de K portes logiques [gi · · · gk] pour lesquelles les fiabilités
sont représentées par [qi · · · qk] et la fiabilité total du circuit par R. Donc, en considérant
un gain en fiabilité dans la porte logique gi, la fiabilité total du circuit devient R∗i . Dans ce
cas, deux portes logiques gi et gj peuvent contribuer différemment pour la fiabilité totale
du circuit (R∗i et R
∗
j ). Il faut définir donc un paramètre pour qu’une fonction de coût puisse
être utilisée. Dans ce travail, nous proposons un paramètre appelé « hardware affinity »
(Chai) qui peut être lié à n’importe quelle contrainte du circuit. Par exemple, le Tableau 7
utilise la surface des portes logiques obtenue par une synthèse basée sur la bibliothèque
de Synopsis [19]. Il faut noter que le durcissement des portes logiques avec une valeur de
Chai plus grande sera prioritaire. Une fonction de coût Ci peut donc être exprimée comme
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Table 5 – Classification pour les portes logiques du circuit 74283
gi S0 S0w S1 S1w S2 S2w S3 S3w S4 S4w
∑
ew CritFac
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 384 3072 192 3072 6144 36
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 384 3072 320 5120 8192 38
2 0 0 0 0 384 1536 192 1536 96 1536 4608 33
3 0 0 0 0 384 1536 320 2560 160 2560 6656 37
4 0 0 384 768 192 768 96 768 48 768 3072 25
5 0 0 384 768 320 1280 160 1280 80 1280 4608 32
6 384 384 192 384 96 384 48 384 24 384 1920 14
7 384 384 320 640 160 640 80 640 40 640 2944 23
8 512 512 256 512 128 512 64 512 32 512 2560 22
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 320 5120 5120 35
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 288 4608 4608 34
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 272 4352 4352 31
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 264 4224 4224 29
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 272 4352 4352 31
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 512 4096 0 0 4096 27
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 384 3072 0 0 3072 24
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 320 2560 0 0 2560 21
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 288 2304 0 0 2304 20
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 272 2176 0 0 2176 18
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 288 2304 0 0 2304 20
20 0 0 0 0 512 2048 0 0 0 0 2048 17
21 0 0 0 0 384 1536 0 0 0 0 1536 13
22 0 0 0 0 320 1280 0 0 0 0 1280 12
23 0 0 0 0 288 1152 0 0 0 0 1152 10
24 0 0 0 0 320 1280 0 0 0 0 1280 12
25 0 0 512 1024 0 0 0 0 0 0 1024 7
26 0 0 384 768 0 0 0 0 0 0 768 6
27 0 0 320 640 0 0 0 0 0 0 640 4
28 0 0 384 768 0 0 0 0 0 0 768 6
29 512 512 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 512 2
30 384 384 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 384 0
31 512 512 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 512 1
32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 512 8192 8192 39
33 0 0 0 0 0 0 512 4096 0 0 4096 27
34 0 0 0 0 512 2048 0 0 0 0 2048 15
35 0 0 512 1024 0 0 0 0 0 0 1024 8
36 0 0 0 0 0 0 512 4096 0 0 4096 28
37 0 0 0 0 512 2048 0 0 0 0 2048 16
38 0 0 512 1024 0 0 0 0 0 0 1024 9
39 512 512 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 512 3
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Table 6 – Analyse de fiabilité du circuit 74283
Fiabilité Sans durcissement Méthode en [18] Méthode proposée
S0 94.07% 94.97% 94.07%
S1 92.39% 93.26% 92.39%
S2 91.80% 92.65% 92.43%
S3 91.33% 92.17% 93.07%
S4 94.60% 95.51% 97.15%
Rnominal 68.93% 72.24% 72.63%
Rpractical 87.29% 88.89% 90.65%
en (13).
Table 7 – Paramètre Chai pour quelques cellules logiques
Cellule Surface (µm2) Chai
INVX0 5.5296 1
NAND2X0 5.5296 1
NOR2X0 5.5296 1
AND2X1 7.3728 0.75
OR4X1 10.1376 0.55
XOR3X1 22.1184 0.25
Rgi = R
∗
i −R
Ci = Rgi/Chai (13)
La méthode proposée évalue la fiabilité du circuit et identifie les portes logiques qui
seront durcies jusqu’à ce qu’un niveau minimal de fiabilité ‘T’ soit atteint. En utilisant
cette méthodologie pour les circuits du benchmark ISCAS [20], deux profils pour la fonction
de coût ont été obtenus (voir Figure 9 et 10). Le premier présente une décroissance très
marquée juste après le début de la courbe, et le deuxième présente la formation des plateaux
jusqu’à la fin de l’évaluation.
A partir de ce constat, ce travail propose aussi deux heuristiques pour trouver un point
d’arrêt pour la méthode. Le premier est appelé l’heuristique de la somme des éléments
et est calculé selon (14). Dans ce cas, C0 représente la valeur de la fonction de coût du
meilleur candidat pour le durcissement, et K est une contrainte empirique choisie par le
concepteur. Le deuxième s’appelle l’heuristique basée sur le pourcentage et utilise un point
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Figure 9 – Profil de la fonction de coût pour le circuit c432
Figure 10 – Profil de la fonction de coût pour le circuit c499
d’arrêt pour l’algorithme égal à X% du valeur de C0. L’utilisation des deux heuristiques
peut être analysée dans la Figure 11.
j∑
i=2
Ci ≤ K × C0 (14)
Les deux heuristiques ont été utilisées pour réaliser le durcissement de plusieurs circuits
du benchmark ISCAS. Les résultats de cette utilisation sont indiqués dans les Tableaux 8
et 9.
Le durcissement sélectif peut offrir un bon compromis entre le gain en fiabilité du
système et l’ajout de redondance nécessaire. Cela est une caractéristique fondamentale
pour la plupart des circuits. Cependant, il y a des applications qui requièrent un niveau de
fiabilité très élevé. Pour ces applications un durcissement sélectif peut ne pas être suffisant
et l’utilisation de méthodes offrant un niveau de protection plus haut est intéressante,
même au pris d’un surcoût significatif de surface. La quatrième contribution de ce travail
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Table 8 – Résultats pour l’heuristique de la somme des éléments, K = 10
Circuit Nombre Surface Portes Surface Surcoût
de portes original (µm2) durcit durcit (µm2) en surface
c17 6 33.1776 6 99.5328 200%
74283 40 306.5096 20 547.9688 78.7%
c432 160 1134.4672 33 1541.4208 35.8%
c499 202 2155.1680 12 2414.1504 12.0%
c1355 546 3194.7328 11 3316.3840 3.8%
c1908 880 5273.7488 13 5417.5184 2.7%
c2670 1269 8018.0632 19 8233.7176 2.6%
c3540 1669 10855.1824 25 11177.7424 2.9%
c5315 2307 15293.5992 20 15518.4696 1.4%
Table 9 – Résultats pour l’heuristique basée sur la pourcentage, X = 50%
Circuit Nombre Surface Portes Suface Surcoût
de portes original (µm2) durcit durcit (µm2) en surface
c17 6 33.1776 5 88.4736 166.6%
74283 40 306.5096 9 406.0424 32.5%
c432 160 1134.4672 2 1187.5264 4.6%
c499 202 2155.1680 41 2854.6752 32.4%
c1355 546 3194.7328 201 5647.1232 76.7%
c1908 880 5273.7488 119 6611.912 25.3%
c2670 1269 8018.0632 10 8128.6552 1.4%
c3540 1669 10855.1824 8 10963.9312 1.2%
c5315 2307 15293.5992 15 15459.4872 1.1%
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Figure 11 – L’utilisation des deux heuristiques dans le circuit c1355
est une méthode pour optimiser la procédure de partitionnement d’un circuit TMR de telle
façon que un niveau de fiabilité très élevé soit assuré.
Optimisation du placement des arbitres dans un circuit TMR
La méthode TMR est souvent utilisée pour réaliser le durcissement d’un circuit intégré.
L’idée générale est très simple : trois répliques du circuit fournissent les résultats pour un
arbitre qui juge quel est la sortie exacte en utilisant normalement le critère de majorité
(voir Figure 12). Dans ce cas, même avec la présence d’une erreur dans la sortie d’un
module, l’arbitre peut fournir la sortie exacte. Donc, la fiabilité totale du circuit initial
(Rm) devient Rcir comme illustré dans (15).
Module
Module
Module
Majority
Input Output
Figure 12 – Schéma en blocs de la méthode TMR
Rcir = R
3
m + 3R
2
m(1−Rm)
Rcir = 3R
2
m − 2R3m (15)
En dépit de sa simplicité, la méthode TMR offre un bon niveau de protection contre
défaillances. Si une application requiert un niveau de fiabilité plus élevé que celui fourni
par le TMR, il est possible de réaliser un partitionnement du circuit de telle façon qu’il
soit composé par ‘m’ modules et sa fiabilité soit donnée par (16). En considérant que
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chaque module est protégé par TMR (voir Figure 13), la fiabilité total du circuit peut
être déterminée selon (17).
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(a) Schéma TMR utilisant des partitions
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Figure 13 – Circuit protégé par des partitions TMR
RC1 =
n∏
k=1
(Rmk) (16)
RC1TMR =
n∏
k=1
(3R2mk − 2R3mk) (17)
L’approche de partitionnement d’un circuit TMR peut offrir un niveau très élevé de
fiabilité qui dépend de deux facteurs principaux : la quantité ‘n’ des modules et le placement
des arbitres pour ces modules. Donc, une question qui devient intéressante est comment
déterminer ces deux facteurs d’une façon optimale pour qu’un niveau de fiabilité minimale
Rmin soit atteint.
Ce problème peut être divisé en deux parties. En considérant une quantité ‘n’ de par-
titions, il faut évaluer la valeur de la fiabilité de chaque module Rmk pour que la fiabilité
totale RC1TMR soit maximisée. Cela peut être obtenu avec la méthode des multiplicateurs
de Lagrange appliquée dans les équations (16) et (17) conforme décrit en (18).
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g(Rmn , Rmn−1 , · · · , λ) =
n∏
k=1
(3R2mk − 2R3mk)− λ(
n∏
k=1
(Rmk)−RC1) (18)
La résolution de ce problème implique une série de dérivées partielles comme décrit
ci-après :

∂
∂Rm1
g = (6Rm1 − 6R2m1)
∏n
k=2(3R
2
mk
− 2R3mk)− λ
∏n
k=2(Rmk) = 0
∂
∂Rm2
g = (6Rm2 − 6R2m2)(3R2m1 − 2R3m1)
∏n
k=3(3R
2
mk
− 2R3mk)− λRm1
∏n
k=3(Rmk) = 0
∂
∂Rm3
g = (6Rm3 − 6R2m3)
∏2
k=1(3R
2
mk
− 2R3mk)
∏n
k=4(3R
2
mk
− 2R3mk)− λRm1Rm2
∏n
k=4(Rmk) = 0
...
...
...
...
...
∂
∂Rmn
g = (6Rmn − 6R2mn)
∏n−1
k=1(3R
2
mk
− 2R3mk)− λ
∏n−1
k=1(Rmk) = 0
Par inspection, il peut être déterminé qu’une solution qui maximise la valeur de RC1TMR
en considérant l’utilisation de ‘n’ modules est Rm1 = Rm2 = · · · = Rmn = R1/nC1 . C’est-à-
dire, le circuit doit être partitionné en modules de fiabilités aussi identiques que possible. En
utilisant ce résultat, l’équation (17) devient (19). De plus, ce résultat permet l’évaluation
du nombre de modules ‘n’ qui doivent être utilisés pour qu’un niveau de fiabilité minimale
Rmin soit atteint.
RC1TMR = (3R
2/n
C1
− 2R3/nC1 )n (19)
La littérature ne reporte pas l’existence d’outils permettant la mise en œuvre automa-
tique de la procédure de partitionnement d’un circuit TMR. Pour faire face à ce problème,
nous proposons une méthode basée sur une idée très simple. D’abord, il faut visualiser
l’évolution de la fiabilité du signal par rapport aux niveaux logiques comme illustré dans
la Figure 14. Dans ce cas, un niveau logique est défini comme un nœud qui présente la
capacité de devenir la frontière d’un module.
Si un arbitre est inséré dans un niveau aléatoire d’un circuit, une augmentation de la
fiabilité est attendue dans ce même niveau (voir Figure 15). En fait, le gain en fiabilité
est obtenu à cause de la capacité que possède l’arbitre de corriger des erreurs simples.
C’est bien connu que le gain en fiabilité obtenu par l’utilisation de la méthode TMR
dépend de la fiabilité du module Rm comme illustré par (15). En même temps, la réduction
de la fiabilité du signal illustrée dans la Figure 14 est aussi proportionnelle à Rm. Donc,
la limitation de la réduction de la fiabilité du signal d’un circuit génère la création des
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Reliability
Levels
Figure 14 – Comportement de la fiabilité du signal d’un circuit par rapport aux nombre
de niveaux
Reliability
Levels
Majority Voter
Figure 15 – L’insertion d’un arbitre dans un niveau aléatoire du circuit
blocs logiques de fiabilités aussi égales que possible. Cela est la première conclusion pour
obtenir une solution optimale. Si ce seuil est défini par la fiabilité minimale du circuit, le
résultat sera un nombre des modules ‘n’ très proche de la valeur optimale. Cette procédure
est illustrée dans la Figure 16.
Reliability
Levels
Reliability
Requirement
(Rmin)
Level 5 Level 9 Level 12
Figure 16 – Circuit TMR utilisant une distribution du processus de vote
Ce résultat peut être mieux analysé en considérant un circuit simple comprenant 10000
inverseurs logiques identiques (même fiabilité Rm = 99.99%) connectés dans une structure
en cascade (voir Figure 17).
La fiabilité totale du circuit Rc peut être évaluée à l’aide de l’outil SPR (Rc =
56.7654%). En admettant que la contrainte de fiabilité minimale est Rmin = 99.9%, la
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m = 10000
Figure 17 – Inverseurs logiques en cascade
méthode proposée insère 1000 arbitres. Tous les modules ont la même quantité de compo-
sants (N=10) sauf le premier (N=11) et le dernier (N=9). Il résulte de (19) que la quantité
minimale de modules pour attendre le valeur de Rmin est égal à 961. Cependant, cela vou-
drais dire que chaque partition devrait avoir 10.4058 inverseurs ce qui est impossible. La
solution la plus proche possible sera l’utilisation de 10 inverseurs par module, ce qui cor-
respond à la quantité de 1000 arbitres insérés, la même obtenue par la méthode proposée.
La Figure 18 illustre le comportement de la méthode proposée en considérant plusieurs
valeurs de Rmin. Il peut être observé que les résultats sont proches des résultats optimaux
pour tous les valeurs de Rmin considérés.
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Figure 18 – Nombre d’arbitres insérés par la méthode proposée
Conclusion
Avec l’évolution technologique, la fiabilité joue un rôle de plus en plus important dans
la conception des circuits intégrés. L’analyse de fiabilité doit être utilisée dans le flot de
conception du circuit pour identifier le besoin d’utilisation des techniques de durcissement.
Dans la littérature il y a plusieurs techniques d’analyse et de durcissement d’un circuit
intégré. Cependant, ces téchinques présentent des limitations du fait de la complexité
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d’analyse. En conséquence, le développement des nouvelles méthodes d’analyse aussi bien
que des techniques de durcissement deviennent nécessaires. Dans cette thèse, plusieurs
méthodes et outils d’analyse et durcissement ont été proposés.
Concernant l’analyse de fiabilité, la métrique mathématique «effective reliability» per-
met la prise en considération de la tolérance aux erreurs de l’application cible pour évaluer
la fiabilité du circuit, alors que l’outil FIFA a été développé pour accélérer le processus
d’analyse de fiabilité basée sur l’injection de fautes.
Dans le domaine de durcissement d’un circuit, deux techniques ont été développées pour
identifier les portes logiques les plus critiques d’un circuit. Cela est une étape fondamentale
pour l’application d’un processus de durcissement sélectif. Pour les applications qui ont
besoin d’un niveau de fiabilité très élevé, un méthode automatique de partitionnement
d’un circuit TMR a été élaborée. La performance optimale de cette méthode a été prouvée
mathématiquement aussi bien que par simulation.
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Symbols and Abbreviations
q Gate reliability
1− q Gate unreliability
qi Reliability of bit i
λ, λ(t) Failure rate
Chai Hardening affinity parameter
R(t), Rˆ(t) Reliability function
Ri Reliability of bit i
u(t) Step function
Rack Probability of errors being masked according to the application
Rnom Nominal reliability
Reff Effective reliability
Rpractical Practical reliability
ALM Adaptive logic module
ASMBL Advanced silicon modular block
AUED All-unidirectional error detecting code
BUED Burst unidirectional error detecing code
CCC Clock conditioning circuit
CD Code distance
CLB Configurable logic block
CMOS Complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor
CMT Clock management tile
DCM Digital clock management
DMA Direct memory access
DRAM Dynamic random-access memory
DUT Device under test
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ECC Error correcting code
EDC Error detecting code
EDF Électricité de France
EEPROM Electrically erasable programmable read-only memory
EMI Electromagnetic interference
EPROM Erasable programmable read only memory
FA Full Adder
FIT Failures in time
FPGA Field-programmable gate array
HALT Highly accelerated life test
HD Hamming distance
IEC, CEI International electrotechnical commission
IP Intellectual property
ITM Ideal transfer matrix
ITRS International technology roadmap for semiconductors
JEDEC Joint electron devices engineering council
JTAG Joint test action group
LAB Logic array block
LE Logic element
LET Linear energy transfer
LSB Least significant bit
LUT Look-up table
MBU Multiple-bit upset
MCU Multiple-cell upset
MOSFET Metal-oxide-semiconductor field-effect transistor
MSB Most significant bit
MTBF Mean-time-between-failures
MTTF Mean-time-to-failure
NMR N-modular redundancy
OTP One time programmable
PBR Probabilistic binomial reliability model
PIP Programmable interconnect point
PLL Phase-locked loop
PTM Probabilistic transfer matrix
RAM Random-access memory
RTL Register transfer level
SBD Soft breakdown
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SEE Single-event effect
SEFI Single-event functional interrupt
SEL Single-event latch-up
SER Soft error rate
SET Single-event transient
SEU Single-event upset
SPICE Simulation program with integrated circuit emphasis
SPR Signal probability reliability model
SPR-MP SPR multi-path model
SRAM Static random-access memory
STMR Selective triple modular redundancy
TMR Triple modular redundancy
TSC Totally self-checking
t-UED t-unidirectional error detecting code
ULA Ultra-low alpha
VHDL Very high speed integrated circuit hardware description language
VLSI Very-large-scale integration
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Introduction
The first electronic computer was built in Antanasoff’s Iowa State College in 1942 [22]
and used rather unreliable components. Improve the system reliability was a major concern
and techniques such as duplexing with comparison, triplication with voting, control codes,
among others, were proposed. Indeed, important researches were done by J. Von Neumann,
E. F. Moore and C. E. Shannon using redundancy as a mean to build reliable systems from
less reliable components [23,24].
Since then, the integrated circuit technology has underwent an exponential evolution
as predicted by the Moore’s law [1, 2]. Nowadays devices are shrinking into the deca-
nanometer range, allowing the fabrication of chips containing billions of transistors, and
operating at very high speeds (multiple GHz). In such scale, new physical phenomena, such
as Van Der Waals and Casimir forces, appear leading to new fabrication methodologies
and affecting the components reliability [3]. Further, interconnect systems are becoming
very complex, particularly with the introduction of the 3-D die integration scheme [4]. In
fact, the higher density of integrated circuits together with the higher complexity of the
interconnections lead to a higher probability of erroneous components in a die. Meanwhile,
the higher frequencies pose strict limits to timing, thus also increasing the probability of
timing errors [5]. In other words, a reduction in manufacturing yield is expected, as well
as in the overall circuit reliability [6–10].
Consequently, faults have become more and more likely to occur in deep-submicron
technologies. Permanent faults can be significantly reduced by performing deep investi-
gations during oﬄine testing [25]. On contrary to that, transient faults depend on envi-
ronmental conditions, and therefore they randomly occur during circuit operation. In the
past, these faults used to be a concern only on the design of memories. However, the tech-
nology scaling has increased the susceptibility of combinational blocks to thermal bit-flips,
radiation events, among others, so that their resulting error rates are approaching those of
memories [26, 27]. This is a serious menace to circuits designed to operate under critical
environments such as nuclear power plants, avionics, among others, and therefore solutions
to construct fault-tolerant circuits are necessary.
This dissertation is a result of a CIFRE partnership between EDF R&D and Télécom
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Paristech. The motivations for this work can be explained as follows. EDF is one of
the world’s largest producers of electricity with main activity in nuclear power. EDF’s
control-command systems are based on electronics devices/circuits. Nuclear power plants
consider safety as a very high priority in their systems, and electronic circuits must be in
accordance to several technical standards such as the IEC 62566 [11], the IEC 60987 [12],
and the IEC 61513 [13] in order to be qualified to operate in such critical environments.
Particularly, the use of programmable devices poses a great challenge to be qualified since
the functionality of the IC is not defined by the founder of the physical component, but by
the designer of the application. Further, the technical standard IEC 62566 states that the
benefits accomplished by the use of redundancy in an electronic circuit must be balanced
with the corresponding increase in the system complexity as well as in the fault coverage.
Because of that, methods to analyze and to improve the reliability of electronic circuits to
be used in nuclear power plants are a major concern.
The main objective of the current work is to propose methods to analyze and to im-
prove the reliability of circuits in order to facilitate their qualification according to the
aforementioned technical standards. Therefore, different strategies that allows both to
achieve a very high level of reliability in a circuit and to control the amount of redundancy
adding are required. These methods must be developed in such a way that they can be
used to construct circuits using programmable devices as well as for circuits tailored for a
specific function, e.g. ASICs. Also, the proposed solutions must be able to be appended
to traditional design flows of integrated circuits.
A fault-tolerant integrated circuit is generally obtained by the properly use of redun-
dancy, whether it be temporal or spatial. The addition of redundancy, however, directly
affects some attributes of the circuit, such as performance and surface, thus increasing the
overall system cost and complexity. Because of that, the choice of which fault tolerant
approach to use for a given scenario involves a multi-criteria optimization problem, taking
into account all the specified design constraints. Therefore, whether a circuit is intended
to mission critical applications or in the case reliability can be relaxed in order to avoid the
increase in the complexity of the circuit, reliability analysis plays a crucial role in its design
flow. Methodologies to assess the reliability of circuits have been extensively researched
over the last years. As a matter of fact, an optimal reliability analysis lies on the use of
as much information as possible about the circuit itself as well as about the target appli-
cation. However, most of the existing techniques assume simplifications on mathematical
models such as single faults, uncorrelated signals, among others. Further, not much has
been done in order to consider the usage profile of the circuits’ results when calculating its
reliability. In spite of that, many applications exhibit the ability to tolerate some kinds of
errors. By considering such ability, a designer can obtain more accurate results, which can
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avoid unnecessary over costs.
Based on that fact, the current work proposes a technique to cope with such problem.
The proposed technique, named effective reliability, can take into account the masking
effect provided by the target application in order to evaluate its reliability. This technique
works alongside quality metrics such that it is possible to differentiate critical from non-
critical errors. In this case, an error is said to be non-critical if it can be tolerated by the
target application. Two possible quality metrics are also proposed in the current work.
Effective reliability is of great use for applications in which some errors can be tolerated.
However, mission critical applications demand a high-degree of confidence, and they have
low or no interest in accepting any kind of error. Indeed, these circuits usually require
deep investigations to predict its behavior considering the occurrence of faults, so that the
reliability of its results can be asserted. Generally, such circuits demand a test coverage
approaching 100%, and therefore methods to accelerate exhaustive testing are necessary.
In order to cope with this problem, this work also proposes a Verilog-based platform
to exhaustively analyze the behavior of a logical circuit considering the occurrence of
faults. The proposed platform, named FIFA (Fault-Injection-Fault-Analysis), is based on
the Probabilistic Binomial Reliability model (PBR), which can evaluate the reliability of
a circuit based on its logical masking ability. One of the great advantages of the FIFA
platform is that it is easily customized. Further, it supports several fault models as well as
the ability to inject single and multiple simultaneous faults. It is important to highlight
that the fault pattern generation as well as the fault injection can be performed without the
need of any device reconfiguration. Also, the proposed platform allows the evaluation of
approximated reliability values by considering a maximum number of simultaneous faults
to be injected. In order to allow that, the platform generates the fault patterns in an
ascending order regarding the number of simultaneous faults. The flip side of the coin is
that such fault pattern generation sequence imposes strict difficulties to be parallelized. In
order to address this problem, the current work also proposes a solution based on number
patterns to elaborate a parallel design for the FIFA platform, which can significantly reduce
the required computing time.
Although reliability analysis plays an important role during the design phase of an
integrated circuit, methods to improve its reliability are more and more desired in deep-
submicron technologies. Partial fault tolerant designs are usually enough for some appli-
cations, and therefore methods based on selective hardening are very suitable.
Based on that fact, this work proposes two methods to identify the critical gates of a
circuit in order to apply selective hardening. The first one is based on the criticality of the
output bits regarding the usage profile of the results. In other words, it drives the reliability
improvement effort to better protect the output bits that are considered more critical to
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the target application. By doing that, the proposed methodology can automatically select
a set of gates, based on an area overhead constraint, such that the probability of occurrence
of critical errors is minimized. The second one uses a parameter similar to a hardening cost
in order to drive the methodology using accurate cost values for hardening each gate. In
addition, two heuristics are introduced as a means to determine when selective hardening
is no longer feasible.
Although partial fault tolerance techniques are good solutions for some applications,
this is not the case for mission critical ones. Indeed, most of the time such applications
demand the most reliable system possible. In such context, Triple Modular Redundancy
(TMR) is a fault-tolerant technique often used despite its huge area overhead. This is
because TMR has proven to be a very simple, effective solution to the correction of single
faults. Further, several tools were developed in order to automatically apply TMR to a
circuit, which simplifies the whole process of circuit hardening. However, as the dimensions
of integrated circuits continue to shrink, the probability of occurrence of MBUs increases
as well. Therefore, methods that can deal with multiple simultaneous faults are highly
desired.
One possible solution to that is the use of other modular redundancy techniques such
as 5MR, 7MR, etc., but the area overhead is generally prohibitive. On the other hand, the
heart of TMR is the majority voter block, responsible to mask the faults occurring in the
circuit. Indeed, this block can correct any single fault or detect any double faults occurring
in the circuit. Delegate the majority decision to several modules across the circuit has been
proved to be a great cost-effective solution to correct multiple simultaneous faults. This
technique, known as partitioned TMR, can increase the fault tolerance of a traditional
TMR system by slightly increasing the corresponding area overhead. However, determine
the number of majority voters to be used and their corresponding placements are not trivial
tasks. Indeed, the voter insertion process directly affects the timing performance, the area,
and the reliability of the obtained circuit. This problem is yet more complicated in case of
FPGAs because certain nets are not allowed to be cut by voters, or this is not desirable.
Finally, the current work proposes an algorithm to tackle this problem. Given a reli-
ability requirement, the proposed algorithm can automatically detect the best amount of
voters as well as their placements in order to partition a TMR design. Further, the reliabil-
ity gains achieved by the proposed method approach those obtained with an optimal TMR
partitioning. Indeed, by using this method, only the first and last partitions do not always
have optimal sizes. Last but not least, the method was developed in order to be applied
in both VLSI and FPGA circuits by analyzing gate and primitive netlists, respectively.
The current work is organized as follows. First, some basics on reliability analysis and
reliability improvement techniques are presented in Chapter 1. Next, Chapter 2 introduces
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a fault-injection tool developed during this thesis as a means to analyze and validate a fault
tolerant design. Chapter 3 introduces the concept of effective reliability of an integrated
circuit. Chapter 4 presents two techniques to selectively harden a circuit. The first is based
on the usage results of the output, while the latter uses heuristics and a hardening cost
function in order to automatically select the best candidates to be protected. Chapter 5
presents a technique to automatically insert partitioning voters into a TMR design. Finally,
a review of other methods existent in the literature to improve the reliability of a circuit
is presented in Appendix A, and a review of some popular technologies and architectures
of FPGAs is available in Appendix B.
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Chapter 1
Background on Reliability
1.1 Introduction
Until the sixties, the consumer expectation when buying something was to receive a
product that performed well its functionality at the time it left the manufacturer. This
expectation evolved over the years, and the product bought today must perform the re-
quired function free of failures for a specified period of time [28]. This brings the concept of
reliability of a product, which can be defined as the probability of a given item to perform
its required function under stated conditions for a stated time interval [14].
Since then, reliability has become a very important attribute for most of industrial
products. In case of electronic circuits, reliability is a main consideration when designing
nanoscale devices. Indeed, factors associated to technology scaling such as manufactur-
ing precision limitations, devices parametric variations, supply voltage reduction, among
others, are increasing the likelihood of faults in electronic circuits, thus decreasing their
reliabilities. Therefore, methods that can analyze the reliability of a circuit in order to
provide feedback for the elaboration of robust designs are highly desired.
This chapter presents some basics on reliability. First, Section 1.2 introduces some
important concepts on reliability prediction. Next, techniques to improve the reliability of
a circuit based on modular redundacy are discussed in Section 1.3.
1.2 Reliability analysis
An electronic circuit is composed of a set of electronic components interconnected in
such a way that a given functionality, described by a circuit specification, is provided.
Assuming that a circuit is well specified and that it contains only fault-free elements, the
desired functionality can be always guaranteed. However, electronic devices are susceptible
to some natural and human-made mechanisms, e.g. impurities in materials, device param-
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eters variations, errors in the specification of a circuit, among others, which can affect the
state of individual electronic components. These mechanisms, here called faults, are of
great importance for reliability engineering because they are responsible for the occurrence
of errors in electronic circuits. However, not every error will succeed to propagate to the
output of a circuit and then affect the final results. As a matter of fact, the propagation
of errors depends on the interaction among the electronic components of a design. If an
error succeeds to reach the final output of a circuit, it will lead to the occurrence of results
that are not in accordance with the circuit specification, also know as failures. Otherwise,
it is said that the error was masked. This abnormal behavior is becoming more and more
likely to happen with the downscaling of electronics. Because of that, reliability analysis
has become an important step on the design flow of integrated circuits.
Reliability analysis can be performed in several phases of the circuit development. How-
ever, the most effective way is to perform the analysis while still on its design phase [29,30].
This is because the correction of a design can be performed before physically fabricating
it, thus reducing the time-to-market and the cost of the circuit in case of the validation
process fails. In order to do that, it is important to deeply understand the possible causes
of failures, so that they can be anticipated and prevented. Therefore, one of the most
common forms of reliability analysis is the reliability prediction. It refers to the estimation
of the failure rate of electronic components and of the overall system. This prediction
contributes to define the initial, maintenance and total system costs, for example. By pre-
dicting the reliability of a circuit, designers can evaluate the feasibility of a given design,
revealing potential failure areas and the need for environmental control systems. They
can also determine the need of redundant systems, back-up systems, among others. Fur-
ther, reliability analysis can be used as a tool to compare the performance of different
fault-tolerant strategies, measuring the reliability improvement achieved by using a given
technique and the corresponding overhead in terms of area and/or timing [31].
In order to estimate the failure rate of a given circuit, let us first assume that it is
composed of n statistical identical and independent parts that were put into operation
at time t = 0. Then, the number of parts of this circuit that did not yet fail at time t
can be represented by a continuous decreasing step function u(t) as shown in Figure 1.1.
Based on this curve, the empirical reliability of a circuit can be obtained by (1.1). A
direct application of the law of large numbers (n → ∞) yields that Rˆ(t) converges to the
reliability function R(t) [28].
Rˆ(t) =
u(t)
n
(1.1)
Let us now define λˆ(t) as the empirical failure rate given by (1.2). Then, it can be shown
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Figure 1.1: Number of parts of a circuit that not yet failed at time t
that this equation converges to the failure rate expressed in (1.3) for n → ∞, δt → 0 and
nδt → 0 [28].
λˆ(t) =
u(t)− u(t+ δt)
u(t)δt
λˆ(t) =
Rˆ(t)− Rˆ(t+ δt)
δtRˆ(t)
(1.2)
λ(t) =
−dR(t)dt
R(t)
(1.3)
Considering that the circuit operates perfectly at time t = 0, that is R(0) = 1, the
reliability function can be expressed as shown in (1.4).
R(t) = e−
∫ t
0 λ(x)dx (1.4)
Equation (1.4) shows that the reliability function depends on the behavior of the failure
rate λ(t), which has a typical shape as represented in Figure 1.2. Due to its shape, this
curve is denominated bathtub curve, and it can be split into three different regions:
– Decreasing Failure Rate: corresponds to the failures that occur when the circuit is
first introduced as a result of momentary weakness in materials or in the production
process. During this period, λ(t) can also oscillate [28]. In order to reduce the infant
mortality occurring during this phase, manufacturers use stress tests (often called
burn-in) to accelerate the aging of the devices in such a way that they can reach
their useful life before going to the market.
– Constant Failure Rate: during this period, λ(t) can be approximated by a constant.
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Figure 1.2: Bathtub curve representing the typical shape of the failure rate of a circuit
This region corresponds to the useful life of the circuit.
– Increasing Failure Rate: this part represents the end of the circuit’s lifetime due to
wear out and aging.
The failure rate of an integrated circuit is often expressed in terms of failures in time
(FIT), where 1 FIT means 1 failure in 109 device hours. Considering that a circuit is
composed of k different components, the failure rate is expressed as shown in (1.5), where
Nk stands for the number of components of type k. Notice that manufacturers generally
use highly accelerated life tests (HALT) in order to estimate the failure rate of their inte-
grated circuits. More details about HALT procedures can be seen in [32], in the JEDEC
JESD74A [33], and in the MIL-STD-883H [34].
λcircuit =
k∑
1
Nkλk (1.5)
Since the failure rate of a circuit is constant during its useful life, the reliability ex-
pression (1.4) becomes (1.6). It can be seen that the reliability of a circuit is a measure
that depends on the time of the circuit operation, which is not very practical. Because of
that, another useful metric is also available to analyze the behavior of integrated circuits
considering the occurrence of failures. This metric, called Mean-Time-Between-Failures
(MTBF), can be evaluated by expression (1.7). Notice that MTBF is used to systems that
are repaired after the occurrence of a failure. In case a circuit is replaced after a failure,
the metric Mean-Time-To-Failure (MTTF) is often used instead of MTBF. More details
about metrics to analyze the reliability of a system can be seen in the book of David J.
Smith [35].
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R(t) = e−λt (1.6)
MTBF =
∫ ∞
0
R(t)dt =
∫ ∞
0
e−λtdt
MTBF =
1
λ
(1.7)
As a matter of fact, a number of reliability analysis methods are available in the liter-
ature. Basically, these methods are used to analyze either the functional reliability, which
is the probability that a given circuit will perform its specified function, or the signal re-
liability, which stands for the probability that the output data is correct [8]. The current
work considers the latter analysis, which generally takes into account the logical masking
ability of a design.
Reliability analysis plays an important role in the design process of a circuit. In order
to develop a product with a stated reliability requirement, appropriate investigations of
failure rate and failure mode must be done. The results produced by these investigations
lead to the evaluation of the reliability of the product. However, due to uncertainties
such as simplifications in mathematical modeling, inaccuracies in the investigations of the
failure rate, among others, these results present a limited precision [28]. Moreover, an
investigation of the required functionality, the types of faults that are likely to occur, and
the environmental conditions in which the circuit will perform its task, should be carried
out. Indeed, in order to design high-reliable systems, we should consider as many aspects
as possible during the reliability analysis phase. Then, let us start by reviewing the types
of faults that affect VLSI systems in Section 1.2.1.
1.2.1 Faults in VLSI circuits
The reliability of a VLSI circuit is related to its capacity to correctly operate considering
the occurrence of faults [8]. Regarding their persistence, these faults can be classified into
three categories:
– Permanent Faults: represent irreversible physical changes in the device, which per-
manently affect the specified logic function. They generally occur due to imperfec-
tions on the design process, and therefore they can be significantly reduced during
oﬄine testing [25]. However, permanent faults may also appear during the useful life
of a circuit due to different reasons such as aging and wear out, for example. In this
case, they are generally preceded by the occurrence of intermittent faults [36].
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– Intermittent Faults: manifest themselves as random physical changes, caused gen-
erally by unstable or marginal hardware [37]. For example, due to minor changes
in temperature, vibrations, among others, a borderline electrical connection may
become an intermittent connection.
– Transient Faults: generally caused by environmental conditions such as electromag-
netic interference (EMI) and ionizing radiation. Because of that, they randomly
occur during circuit operation.
It is important to notice that intermittent and transient faults manifest themselves very
similarly. However, as stated above, intermittent faults reflect the existence of unstable or
marginal hardware, and therefore they tend to occur in bursts and at the same location.
Besides that, intermittent faults can be mitigated by the repair of the faulty circuit [37].
The effects of intermittent faults on the reliability of integrated circuits was deeply
analyzed by Constatinescu in [37–40]. In such works, he stated that several phenomena
are capable to produce intermittent faults in deep-submicron technologies. For instance,
due to the reduction in dimensions of integrated circuits, electromigration may increase the
resistance of narrower sections in the devices, thus leading to the occurrence of delay faults.
Besides, if in the past larger transistors could handle small amounts of manufacturing
residues, this is not anymore true in deep-submicron technologies. Indeed, these small
quantities of residues may now lead to the occurrence of intermittent contacts. For example,
by performing a series of experiments in data servers in [40], Constatinescu have noticed
a memory exhibiting such problem (see Figure 1.3). Also, due to soft breakdown (SBD)
effects present in ultrathin gate oxides, fluctuating current leakages are expected to increase
and may exhibit the same characteristics of intermittent faults [37]. In other words, the
work of Constatinescu have shown that the rate of intermittent faults in electronics circuits
tend to increase with the downscaling of electronics. However, he has also shown that
techniques developed to mitigate transient faults can also reduce the number of intermittent
faults [40].
Transient faults, also known as soft errors, are a major concern for the design of elec-
tronic circuits because of their random nature. They are responsible for one of the highest
error rates in electronic circuits. Because of that, the current work is focused on the relia-
bility of VLSI circuits to soft errors, with a special attention to the susceptibility of FPGAs
to this kind of errors.
Transient faults are caused by several different physical phenomena such as alpha par-
ticles, cosmic rays, interconnect noise, electromagnetic interference, among others. For
instance, the reduction of the supply voltage coupled with a higher VLSI integration have
led to a great increase on the susceptibility of integrated circuits to energetic particles. In
past technologies, these errors used to be a concern only in dense radiation environments
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Figure 1.3: Residue induced intermittent fault in a DRAM chip [40]
such as space. However, newer technologies are making the devices susceptible to such
particles even at ground level. Indeed, radiation-induced soft errors have the potential to
become the most severe cause of failures in electronic devices if not mitigated [41]. In order
to deal with such threat, it’s important to understand how electronic circuits behave in
the presence of such particles.
1.2.1.1 Sources of ionizing radiation
Radiation particles that can cause soft errors in electronic devices are mainly generated
by two different mechanisms at the terrestrial environment: alpha particles and cosmic
rays. When one of such energetic particles hits a semiconductor device, specially if near
the reverse-biased junction (the most sensitive part of a circuit to radiation particles), it
interacts with the electrons in the material during its passage until it loses all of its kinetic
energy. The result is the appearance of a cylindrical track of electron holes, with a very
high carrier concentration. The higher the energy of the particle, the longer is the distance
it travels. Such phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 1.4(a). When this ionization track
is close to the depletion region, the carriers are fast collected by the electric field, thus
generating a high current/voltage transient at the corresponding node, which can persist
approximately one nanosecond (see Figure 1.4(b)) [41]. Next, a phase where the charges
are collected by diffusion begins, generating a low-current pulse as shown in Figure 1.4(c).
If the collected charge exceeds the critical charge, it can cause the well known single-event
effect (SEE).
Single-event effects can take many forms depending on the magnitude of the disturbance
generated by the hitting particle, which relies on its linear energy transfer (LET), and
on which component of the circuit it occurred. If the SEE generates enough of charge
disturbance that the state of a bit in a register, flip-flop, latch, or memory cell, is flipped,
it causes a single-event upset (SEU). Since nodes of circuits are close to each other, an
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Figure 1.4: Effects of a high-energy ion hitting a semiconductor device [41]. (a) particle
hitting the device - (b) charges being rapidly collected by the electric field - (c) charge
collection by diffusion
SEE may propagate through several paths, thus sharing the charge effect of the particle
among different nodes. If the corresponding particle is of very-high energy, the state of
several bits in a circuit may be reversed, thus causing a multiple-cell upset (MCU). If
these faulty bits are located in the same word, it is called a multiple-bit upset (MBU).
SEEs occurring in combinational logic generates a single-event transient (SET), which can
propagate through the logic and, if latched by a memory element, will become an SEU.
Other kinds of soft errors may still occur due to single-event effects. If critical bits of a
system, such as those of the configuration memory of an FPGA device are affected by
an SEE, it may directly lead the device to malfunction. In this case, the error is called
a single-event functional interrupt (SEFI). Last but not least, an SEE may turn on the
CMOS parasitic bipolar transistors between well and substrate, thus generating a single-
event latch-up (SEL). With so many threats generated by a radiation event, let us analyze
how the main mechanisms responsible for generating ionizing particles behave at ground
level.
Alpha particles used to be the main cause of radiation-induced soft errors in silicon
devices in late 1970s. In fact, impurities presented in the package materials have the
potential to emit a high rate of alpha particles, which can produce a high number of soft
errors. However, with the improvement of the fabrication process of electronic circuits,
materials can be highly purified and the rate of alpha particles emissions can be well
controlled. This does not mean that the problem of alpha particles is completely solved.
This problem was significantly reduced in current technologies, but it still plays a special
role in VLSI and FPGA reliability [42]. For the sake of comparison, the rate of alpha
particles emission went from a level of 100α/cm2/h in older technologies to levels below
0.001α/cm2/h in current technologies [41]. Indeed, devices that have a rate of alpha
particles emissions below 0.002α/cm2/h are said to be ultra low alpha (ULA). Normally
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direct alpha counting techniques must be employed in order to guarantee that an electronic
device is ULA. In this context, one of the main challenges in future technologies regarding
alpha particles is to verify if all materials reaches or exceeds the ULA grade [41].
Cosmic rays are particles generated by interactions of galactic cosmic rays with the
Earth’s atmosphere. As a matter of fact, the Earth’s atmosphere is constantly hit by
high-energy particles originated from galactic cosmic rays. The flux of such particles is
modulated by some mechanisms such as solar wind and the earth’s magnetic field. This
generates a flux that depends on the latitude, longitude, altitude and solar activity of a
location. Neutrons are one of the main resulting particles of such interactions, and since
they can have a high amount of energy, they are the most likely cause of radiation-induced
soft errors due to cosmic rays. In order to be aware of the intensity of the neutron flux in
a given city/location, the Joint Electron Device Engineering Council (JEDEC) developed
some models based on the actual flux occurring at sea level in New York City (JEDEC
Standard 89A). It is important to notice that neutrons cannot directly generate ionization
in silicon, but they can react with chip materials so that such phenomenon is generated.
In fact, neutrons hits produce a series of elastic and inelastic reactions so that a burst
of smaller particles are created. The higher the energy of the neutron, the higher is the
probability of occurrence of high-energy bursts. And since the energy (LET) of such bursts
are significantly higher than that of alpha particles, neutrons exhibit a higher probability
to cause an SEU. Indeed, the occurrence of MCU and SEL are mainly due to high-energy
neutron effects [41,43]. Another interesting, not to say challenging, characteristic of cosmic
neutron flux is that they cannot be significantly reduced at the chip level by the use of
shielding, keep-out zones, or high purity materials [41]. For instance, concrete has proved
to reduce the high-energy portion (E>10 MeV) of the cosmic-ray neutron spectrum at a
rate of 2.3× per foot of concrete thickness, while the total neutron flux is reduced at a
rate of 1.6× [44]. Therefore, although the Soft Error Rate (SER) generated by cosmic rays
can, for example, be reduced in a nuclear plant surrounded by many feet of concrete, for
domestic use very little can be done. Because of that, the use of design hardening is an
attractive solution against soft errors caused by cosmic rays.
Soft errors are yet more challenging in FPGAs devices because of their memory cells.
Section 1.2.2 deals with radiation-induced soft errors in FPGAs devices.
1.2.2 Reliability issues in FPGAs
Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are integrated circuits very flexible in the
context that they can be customized after manufacturing. They are composed of pro-
grammable logic blocks and interconnects that can be configured to implement basically
any kind of digital logic, and programmable input/output blocks which allow the configu-
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ration of most of industrial communication standards. Further, circuits can be described
by using general hardware languages such as Verilog and VHDL. By doing that, a given
circuit can be easily used in different projects and FPGAs, thus increasing the flexibility
of such devices.
Several technologies are available to construct the programmable blocks of FPGAs.
Basically, they can be classified into two types: One Time Programmable (OTP) and Re-
programmable. The programmable interconnections available in OTP devices operate in
such a way that, once programmed, they are physically wired and therefore cannot be
changed anymore. However, in case of reprogrammable devices, the configurable inter-
connections are made of memory elements which enables the reprogrammable capability.
Then, reprogrammable devices contains two types of memory:
– User memory : responsible to keep the data required for the application.
– Configuration memory : responsible for defining the configuration logic (interconnec-
tions and logic functions) of the implemented circuit.
The most important technologies used in FPGAs are: SRAM, Antifuse, and Flash.
Table 1.1 summarizes the major characteristics of such technologies. It is important to note
that an ideal technology would be a nonvolatile, reprogrammable, providing low resistance
and parasitic capacitances, and using a standard CMOS process. None of the existent
technologies can satisfy such requirements.
Table 1.1: Programming technology properties summary [45]
SRAM Flash Antifuse
Volatile Yes No No
Reprogrammable Yes Yes No
Storage Element Size High Moderate Low
Manufacturing Process Standard CMOS Flash Process Special Antifuse Process
In-System Programmable Yes Yes No
Switch Resistance ∼500 – 1000Ω ∼500 – 1000Ω ∼20 – 100Ω
Switch Capacitance ∼1 – 2 fF ∼1 – 2 fF < 1 fF
Programmable Yield 100% 100% > 90%
1.2.2.1 Susceptibility of FPGA technologies to radiation
FPGAs’ technologies play an important role regarding the susceptibility of such devices
to radiation events. For instance, antifuse-based devices are relatively immune to soft errors
due to radiation. The main reason is that once an antifuse is programmable, a particle
can not change its state [46, 47]. However, antifuse devices still have user memory which
is susceptible to soft errors. Therefore, techniques to mitigate transient errors in antifuse
devices may yet be required for critical applications.
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SRAM-based FPGAs are of special concern because they are one of the most used
FPGAs on the market, and yet one of the most susceptible devices to radiation. The
foremost reason is that SRAM-FPGAs, as the name implies, are mainly composed of
SRAM cells, one of the most vulnerable elements to soft errors [48]. The sensitivity of a
memory device to radiation particles depends on several factors such as the capacitance of
the node, the operating voltage, the volume of the depletion region, and the strength of the
feedback transistors. In the past, SRAM devices were very robust to soft errors due to the
use of higher operating voltages and stronger transistors, therefore requiring a very high-
energy charge in order to reach the switching threshold and produce a soft error. Further,
in case of SRAM cells, the speed in which the circuit can react also plays a major role.
Indeed, the speed of an SRAM cell directly affects the time in which the feedback circuit
can restore the corrupted node. Generally, considering the same technology, the slower is
the speed of the cell, the more robust that cell is to radiation. However, the technology
scaling has reduced the dimensions of transistors, the node capacitance and the operating
voltage, which increased the sensitivity of SRAM cells to radiation particles. Further,
the operation frequency of SRAM devices is rapidly increasing with technology scaling.
In spite of that, these factors have been counterbalanced by the evolution of the process
technology in deep-submicron devices (< 0.25µm), which lowered the junction collection
efficiency and maintained the sensitivity of a single-bit SRAM cell almost constant [41,49].
It is important to notice that, despite this fact, the exponential growth in the amount of
SRAM required in current electronic devices has led to a higher probability of occurrence
of SEUs in current SRAM-based FPGAs.
Flash-based FPGAs are alternatives to SRAM-based devices that can provide the same
reconfiguration capability while still presenting a nonvolatile storage capability. In order
to do that, a flash memory cell contains a floating gate, located between the control gate
and the MOSFET structure, encased in a very good dielectric [49]. The floating gate is
used to store the bit value, and writing and erasing operations are performed by applying
a relatively high voltage for a few milliseconds. Because of that, flash-based devices are
more robust to radiation than SRAM-based ones. Further, unlike mainstream flash-based
devices that are conceived focusing on speed and size, flash cells built to provide the
reconfiguration mechanism to FPGAs feature a far more robust construction. Indeed, they
can be considered very robust to particles originating from cosmic rays [50].
1.2.2.2 Faults in FPGA devices
The most common faults occurring in FPGA devices due to radiation particles are SETs
and SEUs. As explained in Section 1.2.1.1, single-event transients are transient voltage
pulses that can be propagated through the circuit and then generate errors. Notice that
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SETs can occur in several elements such as combinatorial logic, PLLs, and charge pumps,
among others. On the other hand, a single-event upset represents a change/flip in the state
of a memory element (a bit-flip). SEUs in FPGAs can occur either in the block memory
or in the configuration memory. In the former case, the SEU will affect data bits required
by the application, and they are generally mitigated by the use of error correcting codes
and/or scrubbing. The last case is generally restricted to SRAM-based devices, and it can
generate a Single-Event Functional Interrupt (SEFI).
SEFIs are of great concern for the reliability of electronic circuits due to their severity.
In fact, an SEFI changes the state of a programmable interconnect, and therefore it can
affect the functionality of the device. Because of that, some manufacturers, e.g. Xilinx,
use larger and more robust transistors for the configuration memory in order to reduce the
occurrence of SEFIs [51]. Generally, an SEFI can cause one of the following symptoms:
– Changing the functionality of a logic module or embedded block;
– Shorting of a signal to power or ground;
– Bridging of two signals;
– Changing the direction or standard of an I/O;
– Breaking of a routing connection.
In spite of that, FPGAs contain millions of configurations’ bits as a means to cover with
all the interconnection/logical function possibilities that a design may require. Therefore,
only a small fraction (generally 10% to 30% [49]) of the configuration memory is actually
used in most of FPGA’s designs.
Now that the susceptibility of integrated circuits to the different types of faults was
explained, let us analyze in Section 1.2.3 some methods stated in the literature to evaluate
the reliability of a circuit.
1.2.3 Prior works on reliability analysis
Over the years, many works have been proposed to study the behavior of logic circuits
in the presence of different types of faults [15,16,52–55]. The first model used to represent
faults in logic circuits was the “stuck-at” model [52]. This model considers that most of
the failures in a circuit are due to permanent faults, and that they manifest themselves by
driving a logical signal level in a circuit node/line to stuck at a constant value, i.e., 0 or 1.
Although it has been proved that most of short-circuit type faults or bridging faults can be
covered by this model [53], efficient algorithms for this purpose were not easily conceived.
In order to tackle this problem, Ogus proposed a probabilistic model of logic circuits in
which he introduced the concept of signal reliability [54].
The signal reliability of the output of a circuit is defined as the probability that this
output is correct. As stated in [54], the proposed model allows to evaluate the reliability
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of a circuit by performing straightforward operations so that it can be easily automated.
The idea is to inject into the circuit one fault pattern each time, whether it be a single
fault or a multiple fault, and analyze the presence of errors at the output. The procedure
of fault injection is shown in Figure 1.5. Notice that two versions of the Device Under Test
(DUT) are available, one fault-free and one fault-prone. In this case, stuck-at faults are
injected in the fault-prone copy B and its output is compared with the fault-free version
A.
A
B
Xnor
x
errors
Figure 1.5: Fault simulation approach proposed in [54]
The probabilistic model presented in [54] deals only with stuck-at faults, and therefore
it can not be used to model bit-flips, which is of major concern for the analysis of Single
Event Effects (SEEs). Further, it does not take into account the individual contribution of
the circuit gates for the final reliability value, which could provide additional information
in order to harden the desired circuit [8].
A method that can deal with soft errors produced by SEEs was proposed in [55]. The
proposed method, named Probabilistic Transfer Matrix (PTM), is based on probabilistic
matrices that correlates the inputs and outputs of logic circuits. In order to do that, the
topology of the logic circuit as well as the individual reliability of its logic gates must be
taken into consideration.
The PTM model is based on a very simple idea: the operation of an error-free logic
circuit can be defined by its truth table, that is its behavior is deterministic. However, if a
circuit is composed of fault-prone components, its output can present different results for
the same input sequence due to the occurrence of errors. Taking this fact into consideration,
the PTM model modifies the truth table of a logic circuit in order to behave as a non-
deterministic function. This means that a probability of occurrence of an error, denoted
by p, is now considered. By doing that, the truth table of an AND gate, for example,
becomes the one shown in Figure 1.6.
Using the probabilistic matrices, the authors have then defined a set of basic operations
that must be performed to interconnect different logic elements. This is shown in Figure 1.7.
The PTM model can be directly applied to analyze soft and permanent errors induced
by bit-flips or stuck-at faults, for example. However, the size of the probabilistic matrices
grows exponentially with the bit width associated with the input and the output of a
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With less drastic means of tolerating errors in mind, our
work focuses on circuits with faulty gates. In particular,
we point out that technology-specific faults in logic gates
can be modeled probabilistically: for a given input, every
output can be observed with a certain probability. Such
models capture not only soft errors, but also manufactur-
ing defects that are equally likely to occur in any gate of
a given type. Our work shows that the probability of erro-
neous output depends not only on the faultiness of gates,
but also on circuit structure. Related logic optimization
would require a reliable way to evaluate the error proba-
bility of a circuit. The main contribution of this work is
an analytical technique for this task. This technique fun-
damentally differs from existing architectural [1, 4] and
empirical approaches. We also point out a surprising con-
nection between the evaluation of circuit error probability
and numerical simulation of quantum circuits.
The remaining part of this manuscript is organized as
follows. We introduce probabilistic gate-level fault mo-
dels in Section 2 where we also compute error-properties
of logic circuits with one-bit output. In Section 3 we
show that multi-output circuits can achieve better fault-
tolerance. Similarities of the error-probability computa-
tion to the simulation of quantum circuits are covered in
Section 4. Conclusions and on-going work are discussed
in Section 5.
2 Basic Methodology
Below we first introduce gate-level fault models and then
explain how error properties of a logic circuit can be mod-
eled in terms of those models. An example is given.
2.1 Probabilistic Gate-Level Fault Models
In error-free operation the function of a combinational
logic circuit or gate can be represented by a truth table,
which is a deterministic mapping of input values to out-
put values. For example, the truth table for an AND gate
maps the input value 01 to the output value 0. However,
in the presence of soft errors or manufacturing defects this
input may occasionally lead to a 1 at the output of the gate.
If we know how often this is likely happen, we can model
this behavior using a probabilistic transfer matrix. In this
matrix, column indices represent input values, and row in-
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Figure 1: Probabilistic transfer matrices used for noisy
logic gates: (a) AND, (b) NOT, and (c) OR. The variable
p denotes the probability the gate will give an incorrect
output. Note matrices a and c are rotated.
dices represent output values, while matrix elements cap-
ture pair-wise transition probabilities.
For example, consider the possible probabilistic trans-
fer matrices shown in Figure 1 for the the standard AND,
NOT and OR gates. In these examples the gates give
the incorrect output value with probability p. In gen-
eral, we could use any fixed probability distribution for
the columns of the matrices. For example, if we knew
that the AND gate was twice as likely to give the incor-
rect output for inputs 01 and 10 versus for inputs 00 and
11, we could reflect this is the matrix: 1  p 1 2p 1 2p p
p 2p 2p 1  p
 
.
The only requirement is that each column sums to 1, since
we assume that some value is always seen at the output.
The number of rows and columns are exponential in the
number of gate inputs and outputs respectively.
2.2 Derivation of Circuit Properties
The concept of the probabilistic transfer matrix is not re-
stricted to gates. It can also represent the function of a
noisy circuit. The element in the i-th row and j-th column
represents the probability that the i-th output value will
be observed when the j-th input value is given to the cir-
cuit. Now for convenience we also define the ideal trans-
fer matrix. This is the probabilistic transfer matrix when
there are no errors. Each column of this matrix contains
Figure 1.6: PTM representation for an AND gate [55]
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Figure 2: Basic ways to interconnect circuit compo-
nents and the corresponding operation on the probabilistic
transfer matrices. (a) serial (b) parallel (c) fanout
exactly one 1 with the remaining elements being 0. Now
if we know the probability distribution of input values that
will be given to the circuit, that is, if we know that the i-th
input value will be given to the circuit with probability pi,
then we can calculate the error probability of the circuit
from the ideal and probabilistic transfer matricesC and P:
2n 1
∑
i=0
pi ∑
j:C( j,i)=0
P[ j,i],
where P[i, j] denotes the element in the i-th row and j-th
column of matrix P. For the noisy AND gate in Figure 1a
this calculation gives a probability p that the gate will give
an incorrect output.
Therefore, if we can construct the probabilistic trans-
fer matrix for a circuit, then we can calculate its error
probability. Now we show that if we assume that gate
errors occur independently and we know the probabilistic
transfer matrices of the gates in the circuit, then by per-
forming operations on these we can obtain the probabilis-
tic transfer matrix of the circuit. The basic method is as
follows: we construct the circuit by connecting together
gates into sub-circuits then connecting together these sub-
circuits; each time we connect two components, we derive
the probabilistic transfer matrix of the combined circuit
from those of the components.
There are three basic ways in which components in a
well-formed circuit are combined: serially, in parallel,
and through fanout. These are illustrated in Figure 2. We
now show how each of these operations affects the prob-
abilistic transfer matrices.
Serial Composition is the most straightforward. This
occurs when a component acts on the outputs of another
component. The probabilistic transfer matrix of the result
is given by the product of those of the components.
For example, consider the serially connected compo-
nents shown in Figure 2a. Suppose A and B denote the
probabilistic transfer matrices of the two components. Let
componentA have n inputs andm outputs, and component
B have m inputs and l outputs. Let us calculate the proba-
bility that when an input i is given to the first component,
we observe an output j. This is by definition the element
in the j-th row and i-th column of the overall error trans-
fer matrix. If an input i is given to the first component, the
probability distribution of the outputs of the first compo-
nent are given by the i-th column of A. The vector with
the probabilities that each of the possible inputs to the sec-
ond component give an output j is given by the j row of
B. Therefore, the probability that the output of the second
component will be j, given that i is input to the first com-
ponent, is equal to the inner product of the i-th column of
A and the j-th row of B. Thus, the overall probabilistic
transfer matrix is given by B ·A.
Parallel Composition involves two or more circuit
components acting on disjoint sets of bits. The corre-
sponding matrix operation is the tensor product of the
probabilistic transfer matrices of the components.
Consider the example shown in Figure 2b. Suppose
A and B denote the probabilistic transfer matrices of the
two components. Let component A have n inputs and m
outputs and let component B have l inputs and k outputs.
Consider an input i to the overall circuit, which can be par-
titioned into inputs iA and iB to the respective components
A and B. Since the two components are independent, the
probability distribution of the outputs for the first compo-
nent are given by the iA-th column of A and those of the
second component are given by the iB-th column of B. So
the probability that an output j = ( jA jB) is observed is
given by the product
A[ jA,iA] ·B[ jB,iB],
which is the element in the i-th row and j-th column of
the combined probabilistic transfer matrix. Writing out
the entire matrix we have26664
A[0,0] ·B A[0,1] ·B · · · A[0,n] ·B
A[1,0] ·B A[1,1] ·B · · · A[1,n] ·B
... ...
A[m,0] ·B A[m,1] ·B · · · A[m,n] ·B
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Figure 1.7: Basic interconne tion models: (a) serial - (b) parallel - (c) fanout
circuit. This leads to intra table computation times and huge memory storage needs in
order to analyze the reliability of large circuits. In order to deal with such drawbacks,
the Signal Probability Reliability (SPR) model was prop sed in [15]. The SPR model is
based on the signal reliability concept, and therefore it assumes that the cumulative effects
of multiple faults in a circuit can be used to ev luate the probability th t t output is
correct [8].
The SPR model relies on the consideration that a logic signal can take four different
values: correct 0 (0c), incorrect 0 (0i), correct 1 (1c), and incorrect 1 (1i). The probabilities
of a signal x to take one of these four values are organized in a 2 × 2 matrix as shown in
(1.8). The reliability of a signal can then be obtained by adding the values corresponding
to the correct operation of the circuit (0c and 1c). By convenience, the SPR model uses
probabilistic transfer matrices (PTMs) and ideal transfer matrices (ITMs) to represent the
fault-prone and the fault-free behavior of the logic c mponents [8].
Signal =
[
P (x = 0c) P (x = 1i)
P (x = 0i) P (x = 1c)
]
(1.8)
The SPR matrix representing the output of a logic element gi can be evaluated by
performing matrices operations as shown in (1.9). In this case, the INPUTgi matrix can
be obtained by calculating the Kronecker product of the SPR matrices of the inputs of gi.
For the sake of illustration, Figure 1.8 illustrates this operation for a 2-input OR gate for
which the inputs are uniformly distributed.
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Figure 1.8: SPR matrix for the output of a 2-input OR gate
SPRouti = ITM
′
gi × (INPUTgi × PTMgi) (1.9)
The evaluation of the signal reliability for the output of a circuit can be performed
by the propagation of the signal matrices as shown in Figure 1.9. In this example, the
inputs are assumed as being equiprobable, that is, a uniform probability distribution is
considered.
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Figure 1.9: Propagation of the SPR matrices through a circuit [8]
It can be noted that the complexity of the SPR algorithm is linear regarding the number
of logic elements in the circuit. However, the SPR method cannot deal with reconvergent
fanouts due to the presence of signal correlations. In order to tackle this problem, a multi-
path version of the signal probability reliability model named SPR-MP was also proposed
in [15]. In this case, the method evaluates the contribution of each element of the SPR
matrix representing the reconvergent fanout node. Because of that, the complexity of the
algorithm grows from a linear complexity to 4N , where N is the number of reconvergent
fanouts in the circuit.
Based on the idea of signal reliability, the PBR (Probabilistic Binomial Reliability)
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model was proposed. This is a probabilistic model that analyzes the reliability of combina-
tional circuits using a probabilistic binomial distribution [16]. Although both the proba-
bilistic model proposed in [54] and the PBR model use fault injection simulation/emulation
in order to evaluate the signal reliability of the output, the last one uses the binomial model
as a means to represent SEEs in combinational circuits. Indeed, the PBR model considers
that an error in a given gate results in an inversion of the output signal (a bit-flip).
In order to understand the PBR approach, let us consider a generic logic circuit C1 with
input and output vectors x and y, respectively. Let us also consider that C1 is composed
of w fault-prone elementary gates and m inputs, and that the probability of failure of a
gate is represented by 1− q. Then, the probability of occurrence of k simultaneous errors
in C1 can be evaluated as shown in (1.10).
f(q) = (1− q)kqw−k (1.10)
In the PBR model, an error pattern is represented as a vector e of w bits where the
bit ei = 1 indicates a bit-flip in the gate gi. By using that, the number of 1’s in the vector
e represents the number of injected errors in a given moment. Let us now denote the
set of vectors e containing k simultaneous errors as ew:k. Then, the error-free situation
is represented by ew:0, and the number of errors patterns associated with the occurrence
of k simultaneous errors is given by Cwk =
w!
(w−k)!k! . Therefore, for a given error pattern
ew:k(l) and a given input xj , the boolean expression (1.11) represents the occurrence of
error masking in the output y.
y(xj , ew:0)⊕ y(xj , ew:k(l)) = 1 (1.11)
Considering a uniform probability distribution for the input vectors, the signal reliabil-
ity for the output y can be evaluated by (1.12), where ck is a masking coefficient obtained
by (1.13)
R =
1
2m
w∑
k=0
f(q)ck (1.12)
ck =
Cwk∑
l=1
2m−1∑
j=0
y(xj , ew:0)⊕ y(xj , ew:k(l)) (1.13)
Notice that (1.12) evaluates an accurate value for the signal reliability of the output
based on the aforementioned assumptions. It can be noted that in order to do that, an
exhaustive calculation must be performed since all the possible Cwk error configurations
must be considered, which is very time consuming. Nevertheless, a high number of si-
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multaneous errors are not always likely to happen. Therefore, an approximate value for
the signal reliability of the output can be obtained by limiting the number k of injected
errors. This can speed up the evaluation process in the detriment of accuracy. Further,
the PBR approach separates the logical masking calculation from the statical analysis of
the circuit. By doing that, once a given circuit architecture has its logical masking ability
characterized by fault injection, the reliability can be evaluated for different technologies
without the need of re-performing the fault injection analysis. Indeed, what need to be
done is to re-evaluate Equation (1.12) by considering a different value of ‘q’.
As a matter of fact, fault injection has been considered very useful to analyze the
behavior of digital circuits in the presence of faults. Many fault-injection platforms have
been proposed over the years. For instance, FuSE is a platform proposed in [17] that
supports both emulation and simulation-based fault injection campaigns, and therefore it
provides a good flexibility. On the flip side of the coin, the collection of data is performed
by reading text files that tends to be big and difficult to interpret. THESIC+ is another
fault-injection platform conceived as a means to characterize radiation-induced faults in
digital architectures [56]. Although this platform has been used to different purposes such
as reproduce the results of radiation ground testing for microprocessors [57], and analyze
the robustness of TMR systems implemented in FPGAs [58], it focuses on the effects of
single-event upsets occurring in the memory elements of a design. One interesting and
recently proposed approach to deal with SET effects is the AMUSE platform [59]. This
platform emulates the effects of transient faults by considering a multilevel approach for
fault injection. Indeed, the fault injection is performed at gate level in order to provide
delay accuracy, and the fault propagation is performed at RTL level in order to speed up
the process.
As can be seen, many methods to analyze the reliability of digital circuits are available
in the literature, each with its pros and cons. The choice of which technique to use depends
on some factors such as the purpose of the reliability analysis, the type of faults are
expected to occur, among others. In the current work, the reliability analysis is performed
focusing on a fabless manufacturing, for which a designer will elaborate a reliable circuit
by modifying its architecture. Moreover, the design of reliable circuits is performed in such
a way that its robustness will be as technology independent as possible. Therefore, the
target is to improve the reliability of a circuit by maximizing its logical masking ability.
Because of that, techniques to characterize the reliability of a circuit based on its logical
masking ability are highly required. In this thesis two methods were develop in order to
cope with that. The first one is a fault injection tool based on the PBR approach, while
the second one is an implementation of the SPR algorithm. Both methods are explained
in Appendix 2.
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1.3 Reliability improvement of integrated circuits
As the expected number of errors and defects increases with the technology scaling,
fault-tolerance techniques are more and more required. It is well known that the reliability
of a circuit can be improved through the properly use of redundant components [23,60–62].
Basically, redundancy techniques can be classified as follows [63]:
– Modular Redundancy or Fault Masking → redundant components are used to mask
the effect of a fault so that it will not reach the primary output of a system. The most
used modular redundancy technique is the TMR (Triple Modular Redundancy), in
which a system is triplicated and the output is obtained through a voting process.
This technique was applied in important scientific programs over the years. As an
example, the TMR technique was applied in the Saturn V [64], a rocket used by
NASA’s Apollo and Skylab programs from 1967 until 1973.
– Fault Detection and Correction → this mechanism is based on two steps: fault de-
tection and corrective action. Fault detection can be classified as concurrent and
periodic [63]. In the first one, the fault detection procedure must be executed con-
currently with the system operation. A traditional technique that uses this principle
is to duplicate a system and check if any output mismatch exists. In the other one,
a diagnosis routine is carried out to search for errors. If any error is encountered in
the circuit, a corrective action is executed. As an example, a routine to reconfigure
the fault area of the circuit can be performed in order to correct it.
– Hybrid Redundancy → this method benefits from both mechanisms presented above.
It can use a modular redundancy technique to detect and mask errors and a fault
detection redundancy technique to provide additional corrective actions.
Although many techniques to improve the reliability of an integrated circuit are avail-
able in the literature, this thesis focus on the modular redundancy approach. This is
because, despite its simplicity, this technique can provide a great performance as will be
shown in Section 1.3.1. A review of other methods to improve the reliability of a circuit
can be found in Appendix A.
1.3.1 Modular redundancy
The concept of triple modular redundancy (TMR) was originally envisaged by Von
Neumann in his work "Probabilistic Logics and the Synthesis of Reliable Organisms from
Unreliable Components" [23]. This concept is based on three identical modules and a
majority voter that will compute the output of the circuit, as shown in Figure 1.10.
Considering the majority voter does not fail, i.e., it is a perfect voter, the output of the
circuit will be correct if at most one of the three redundant modules fails. Therefore, the
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Figure 1.10: TMR concept envisaged by Von Neumann
reliability of the circuit presented in Figure 1.10 can be evaluated by (5.1), where RM is
the reliability of one module.
RTMR = R
3
M + 3R
2
M (1−RM )
RTMR = 3R
2
M − 2R3M (1.14)
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Figure 1.11: TMR performance regarding reliability improvement
Analyzing (1.14), it can be noted that the TMR technique does not improve the relia-
bility of a circuit if the reliability of each module is less than 0.5. Moreover, the behavior
of this function, illustrated in Figure 1.11, shows us that the gain obtained with TMR has
second-order effect when the reliability of each module is very near unity. Thus, the size
of each module is a crucial role for TMR performance regarding reliability improvement
since when we increase the size of a circuit, generally the reliability decreases. Further
mathematical details regarding TMR performance can be found in [60,65].
The system architecture shown in Figure 1.10 takes into account that the majority
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voter does not fail. However, considering the majority voter as an imperfect voting circuit,
the TMR performance is compromised. A single error presented in the majority voter will
result in an erroneous output. In order to minimize this problem, a different architecture,
proposed by Cohn [66] and shown in Figure 1.12, may be utilized . In this case, if a single
majority voter fails, the output is still considered correct.
Module
Module
Module
Majority
Majority
Majority
Input
Output
Output
Output
Figure 1.12: TMR with three majority voters
Despite the widely use of TMR regarding reliability improvement, we must deal with
some constraints. The area penalty required by this technique is higher than three times
the area of a circuit. Therefore, before applying TMR architecture to a circuit, we must
investigate its pros and cons. The work presented in [67] analyzes area and performance
penalty whether to use TMR or Hamming Code in different digital modules. The re-
sults have shown that TMR is more appropriated for modules using single registers and
Hamming Codes for groups of registers.
Regarding the robustness of TMR in SRAM-Based FPGAs, the work in [68] have
shown that TMR is not able to effectively protect the circuit against SEUs affecting the
configuration memory. According to their results, the percentage of faults that escape
TMR could reach 13% for the analyzed architectures. However, the adoption of a smart
floorplan that isolates the three modules can significantly reduce the number of faults that
escapes TMR. The work in [58] analyzed the weakness of the TMR strategy implemented
in SRAM-based FPGAs . They performed a series of radiation tests in a Xilinx Virtex-
II device in which a cryptocore application was used as a device under test (DUT). The
results have shown that the voter may not be able to detect some single faults occurred on
the configuration bits. In 2010, a method to protect different modules against short-effects
of SEUs by separating two routed nodes from each other by at least two programmable
interconnect points (PIPs) was proposed in [69]. Using the proposed approach, a TMR
system is isolated in such a way that an SEU cannot affect two modules. At the same year,
an algorithm to improve the reliability of TMR designs in SRAM-based FPGAs against
multiple cell upsets was introduced in [70]. The algorithm, called PHAM (Placement
Hardening Algorithm for Multiple cell upsets), takes into account the FPGA physical
layout to determine the best locations for each block of a TMR system. The results have
shown that circuits using the proposed algorithm can achieve 34 times better robustness
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than the ones using the standard TMR approach.
The intrinsic capability to mask erroneous results is an attractive characteristic to use
TMR in fault-tolerant systems. This capability is provided by the voting process, making
it an essential part of a TMR system. Therefore, let us review some important voting
strategies proposed over the years in Section 1.3.2.
1.3.2 Voting strategies
The most used voting process is the Majority Voter, proposed by John von Neumann
in 1965 [23]. This approach evaluates the system output based on a majority rule. Thus,
considering a TMR system, a 2-out-of-3 rule is used.
Despite its frequently use, the majority process presents some limitations such as the
fact that it does not consider common-mode failures, i.e., failures that affect more than
one module of the system. In order to take these failures into consideration, an alternative
voter process named Word-Voter was proposed in [21]. The word-voter is applicable to
TMR systems with a multiple-bit output. A diagram of a 2-bit word-voter is shown in
Figure 1.13. It compares the output word from each module and if at least two of them
are equal, the system will produce a correct output. If all the output words are different,
it is a signal that multiple errors have occurred and the system output is compromised.
Thus, an error signal is activated and corrective procedures are carried out.
Module 1
Module 2
Module 3
Word-Voter
Input
(b1b0)
Output
Error
(b1b0)1
(b1b0)2
(b1b0)3
Figure 1.13: Word-Voter proposed in [21]
The concept of TMR can be generalized by using the term N-Modular Redundancy
(NMR). For instance, a 5MR technique based on a majority process would use a 3-out-of-5
rule. However, when using a higher numbers of modules than TMR, it may be acceptable
to use a more relaxed rule to evaluate the system output. As an example, it may be
acceptable to use a 2-out-of-5 rule for a 5MR system. This voting process is named Plurality
Voter [71]. Obviously, this strategy cannot be used in case of a bit-based voter, but it is
perfectly usable if a word voter is available.
Several other voting techniques are available in the literature. For instance, theWeighted
Voter [72] uses the outputs of the modules to evaluate the mean value considering that
each module output has a weight. Notice that the system output can be distinct from all
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the module results. The Generalized Median Voter [73] supposes that the output space
is a metric space. Then, it analyzes the outputs of the modules and discards the pairs
with maximum reciprocal distance. Finally, the median result is used as the system out-
put. A theoretical investigation of the aforementioned voter strategies regarding redundant
systems is available in [73].
The voting techniques discussed above do not take into account the historical behavior
of each module to judge what is the correct output. As a matter of fact, the presence of
a permanent error in one of the three modules will increase the likelihood that a transient
fault in one of the other two will affect the final result. In order to tackle this problem,
several history-based voters were proposed over the years [74–76]. In 1999 an approach
based on the inexact majority voting was proposed in [74]. It uses the history of correct
computations to select the most reliable module in case of agreement. Later in 2001,
a voter based on weighted voting was introduced in [75]. This voter uses the history
information to modify the weights of each module in order to use the most reliable results
when evaluating the system output. An alternative approach regarding the exact majority
organ was proposed in [76]. The main idea is to identify the reliability of each module
based on its temporal behavior. In order to do that, Dotan proposed the use of indices to
represent the historical behavior of the modules. Indeed, each module has an index that
is incremented each time the corresponding module computes a correct output. Then, the
most reliable module is the one selected to transmit its computation as the output of the
system.
With so many voting procedures existent in literature, we need to compare and evaluate
theirs pros and cons. The work in [77] analyzed seven different voting strategies in their
work entitled “Experimental Comparison of Voting Algorithms in Cases of Disagreement”.
They used several simulated scenarios and a software error-injection tool to analyze the
robustness of the following voters: majority, plurality, median, weighted average, linear
prediction, first order prediction and three domain. Among them, the majority and plural-
ity voters produced the lowest number of catastrophic errors. The median voter produced
the largest number of correct results. However, it produced the largest number of catas-
trophic errors as well. The three domain voter showed a compromise providing relatively
low number of catastrophic errors while keeping the number of correct results large.
1.3.3 Selective Hardening
As discussed earlier, soft errors have become a serious concern in deep-submicron tech-
nologies. These faults used to be a concern only in the design of memories, but with the
downscaling of electronics, it is expected that the number of soft errors in combinational
circuits will exceed those occurring in unprotected memories [78]. A number of hardening
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techniques have been proposed over the years in order to reduce the probability of transient
errors in logical circuits. These techniques are based on adding redundancy, whether it
be spatial or temporal, which increases some attributes of the design such as cost, power
consumption, and performance, among others. With the decrease in the feature size, the
number of logic gates is usually very large, and protecting every gate in a circuit may not
be a good solution to mainstream devices. Therefore, cost-effective solutions based on pro-
tecting only the most critical gates of a design, also known as selective hardening, have been
considered a promising solution to limit the protection cost of such techniques [18,78–84].
Therefore, selective hardening is based on two steps: first, gates are analyzed and
ranked according to their susceptibility to soft errors and to cause a circuit malfunction;
next, the most critical gates of a circuit are protected. The difficultness to implement a
selective hardening technique is to define which is the best subset of gates/blocks that must
be protected in order to meet a given reliability requirement, and because of that, many
methods have been proposed to perform such selection procedure [18, 78–84]. In [18], a
method to selectively apply triple modular redundancy (STMR) into FPGAs was proposed.
The idea is to calculate the sensitivity of the gates of a circuit based on their input proba-
bilities, and then select subcircuits to be protected by analyzing the longest cascade chain
of sensitive gates starting from the primary outputs and backtracking through the circuit.
Although the method does not guarantee 100% protection against single-faults, the sav-
ings in area overhead reached 65% for some circuits when compared to a traditional TMR
technique. In [80], a strategy based on the gate-level information was proposed in order
to deal with this problem. The proposed method does not take into account any low-level
electrical or timing information as a means to select the critical gates of a design while still
on its early design phase. The basic idea is to define a factor c such that the probability of
an erroneous system output perr is reduced to c× perr, considering perrmin < c < 1. This
calculation is performed based on a static logical masking estimation of a circuit, which is
independent of the circuit technology. Although the selection procedure does not take into
account other masking phenomena such as electrical and latching window, simulations of
the hardened circuit considering these phenomena were performed and the results suggest
that these masking mechanisms have little influence when selecting critical nodes in a cir-
cuit. Later in [83], the authors have evaluated the validity of choosing critical nodes of a
circuit based only on its logical masking ability and have come to the same conclusion.
Thus, considering logical masking, the main idea is to classify the composing blocks
(i.e., standard cells) of a circuit according to their relative significance with respect to the
reliability of the circuit. With the classified list of blocks it is possible to apply selective
hardening either by using hardening by design techniques or by more generic fault tolerance
techniques like Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR). By using an additional hardening
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affinity parameter, a trade-off between the hardening cost of a block and the reliability
gain is then clearly established. Chapter 4 will introduce a method that can take that into
consideration and uses some heuristics in order to automatically select the best candidates
to be protected.
Selective hardening can also be applied based on the error tolerance concept. As shown
in [83, 85, 86], some applications have the ability to tolerate some kind of errors, and
therefore just a subset of them should be mitigated. Chapter 3 introduces a method
to evaluate the reliability of a circuit taking into account the error tolerance of a given
application, and chapter 4 proposes two techniques to selectively harden a circuit. The
first one selects the most critical gates of a circuit based on the impact of an error in the
output of a system, while the next one uses a cost function parameter and two different
heuristics to automatically select the best candidates to be protected.
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Chapter 2
FIFA Tool
2.1 Introduction
It is well-known that the increased density of circuitry associated with a reduction
in the supply voltage have decreased the effects of electrical and temporal masking, thus
increasing the likelihood of transient and multiple faults in integrated circuits [87]. For
this reason, the prediction of circuit behavior when exposed to faults is becoming more
and more important in deep submicron technologies [4].
This chapter introduces a fault-injection based tool developed during this thesis to
analyze the robustness of integrated circuits against faults. The proposed tool, named
FIFA, is used as a means to validate the construction of fault-tolerant designs along the
current work.
2.2 FIFA Tool
Fault injection has been considered very useful to evaluate the behavior of computing
systems in the presence of faults [17]. The basic idea of such approach is to produce or
simulate faults during system operation, and then observe whether they produce a device
failure. Several methodologies can be used in order to inject faults in a circuit. Basically,
they can be classified into two types: software or hardware.
Software-based approaches are normally performed as a device simulation by using
a netlist description such as SPICE and VHDL/Verilog. If the number of fault-prone
components or test vectors considered for fault injection is too high, the required time to
perform the simulation procedure can become prohibitive [59]. Hardware-based approaches
are a good solution to accelerate the testing procedures. In this case, the testing procedure
is executed by emulating the target circuit, and therefore it requires a physical device [57].
The aim of the current work is to build reliable systems by improving their logical
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masking ability. Based on that, this Section presents a new tool designed as a hardware
IP to accelerate the Fault Injection and Fault masking Analysis (FIFA) approach. The
proposed tool was implemented on FPGA, and the analysis is performed at register trans-
fer level (RTL). The FIFA tool is fully parameterizable, allowing the designer to adapt it
for analysis of practically any digital circuit. In addition, this IP can help the designer
to establish efficient trade-offs between cost (time, amount of FPGA resources) and com-
pleteness of the analysis. Unlike previous works, the FIFA tool deals with several fault
models and no FPGA reconfiguration is necessary to simulate different fault patterns for
the same circuit [88].
The FIFA tool has shown a great performance for generating different fault patterns.
However, if multiple simultaneous faults are considered, that is, if several gates may fail
at the same time t (fault multiplicity k > 1), the number of tests for exhaustive analysis
in large circuits may become prohibitive. Indeed, although the hardware implementation
provides a reasonable calculation speed, the reliability evaluation is still intractable in such
case.
In order to diminish this drawback, two possible solutions can be taken into considera-
tion: first, the occurrence of multiple simultaneous faults in an integrated circuit depends
on some of its properties as well as on certain characteristics of the environment in which
the circuit is supposed to operate. A good solution is then to limit the number of simul-
taneous faults to be injected based on such characteristics. This can significantly reduce
the required computing time and yet provide great approximated results. Based on that
fact, the FIFA tool uses the PBR model as a means to evaluate the reliability of a circuit.
This model can provide approximate values for the reliability of a circuit by considering a
maximum number of simultaneous errors to be injected. On the flip side of the coin, this
feature requires that the fault generation sequence be performed in an ascending order re-
garding the number of simultaneous faults, that is, first all single faults are generated, then
the double faults, and so on. This poses strict difficulties to perform the second solution
to reduce the computing time: efficiently parallelize the calculation. As a matter of fact,
an optimal parallel implementation relies on a balance of the circuit operations among the
parallel modules. However, for the fault pattern generation sequence explained above, this
requirement is not easily fulfilled. This is because of the difficulties to calculate which is
the zth generated fault pattern on this sequence.
Section 2.2.4 makes use of number patterns to tackle this problem. It introduces an
efficient algorithm that can calculate which is the zth generated fault pattern using simple
operations. In addition, this algorithm is used to conceive a parallel architecture for the
FIFA tool. Results have shown that the proposed architecture can optimize the parallel
computation while keeping the area overhead as low as possible. This is done as a means
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to increase the number of parallel copies that can be synthesized in a given FPGA support.
2.2.1 FIFA Architecture
As stated above, the FIFA tool is a hardware IP developed to accelerate the fault
injection and fault masking analysis approach. In order to understand the functioning of
such tool, let us first consider a digital circuit dut for which we are interested in analyzing
its robustness against faults. The basic idea behind the proposed tool is to inject faults
in dut and observe whether this internal fault will produce a device failure. Therefore,
some kind of mechanism is required in order to allow the injection of faults during circuit
runtime. The fault injection mechanism available in the FIFA tool is based on saboteurs.
A saboteur comprises a small set of components which provides the capability to alter the
values contained in a circuit node. Thus, appending such components to the nodes of dut
allows the injection of single or multiple faults.
The FIFA tool contains, among other items, two versions of the dut: one fault-free
(dut ref) and one fault-prone (dut faulty). The analysis of the robustness against a
specific fault f1 in the dut takes two steps: first, we inject the internal fault f1 in dut
faulty by enabling the corresponding saboteur(s); next, we compare the outputs of both
circuits in order to detect any mismatch. Notice that this procedure is done considering a
given input i for both circuits, dut ref and dut faulty. If the injection of f1 doesn’t
modify the circuit’s output, we can say that the circuit is robust to such fault, that is, f1
was masked.
Let us now define a test configuration of dut as a couple comprising a given input
and a given fault. For a specific set of test configurations, the proposed tool analyses the
error masking capabilities of dut, and determines its corresponding masking coefficient.
The masking coefficient of a circuit represents the number of test configurations for which
it generates correct outputs. Thus, this coefficient is directly related to the robustness of
a circuit. In our case, we classify the error masking coefficient according to the number k
of simultaneous faults injected. Then, we define ck as the masking coefficient representing
the robustness of dut regarding the occurrence of k simultaneous faults.
2.2.1.1 Defining the components of the FIFA tool
Figure 2.1 shows the proposed tool which comprises the following modules:
– dut ref – A fault-free version of dut.
– dut faulty – A faulty version of the device under test. Programmable saboteurs
are appended to the nodes of dut for which we would like to inject faults. These pro-
grammable saboteurs support four different fault models: bit-flip (Single Event Upset
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Figure 2.1: General scheme of the proposed tool
or Multiple Bits Upset), stuck-at-0, stuck-at-1, and open circuit (high impedance).
In order to emulate a fault in a node j, the corresponding saboteur must be activated
(see Figure 2.2). This is done by a control signal (bit ej in bus e). If ej = 0, the
node j is supposed to be fault-free. If ej = 1, the node j is supposed to be faulty.
The fault model to be used is selected by the signal m[m1 : m0].
– stimuli generation – Generates the data inputs for dut ref and dut faulty
(bus x).
– fault injection – Generates the control signals to activate/deactivate the saboteurs
in dut faulty (bits ej of bus e). This module was implemented according to the
work presented in [89]. We took into account the second algorithm presented in
this work, which can generate all the possible CNk vectors e for a given number of
simultaneous faults kmin ≤ k ≤ kmax. This algorithm is explained in Section 2.2.1.3
– masking analysis – Compares the outputs provided by dut ref (bus yref ) and
dut faulty (bus y) in order to evaluate the masking coefficients (ck values).
– supervisor – Manages the communication signals among modules (m, req, k, kmin
and kmax).
Node j
ej
m1
m0
Node je
00
01
10
11
Saboteur “j”
0
1
Z sel[s1:s0]
Figure 2.2: General scheme of a saboteur
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2.2.1.2 Explaining the communication signals
The FIFA tool is a synchronous circuit operating on the rising edges of a clock signal
(clk). In order to better understand the functioning of the proposed tool, it is a prime
concern to comprehend the purpose of the communications signals used during operation
(see Figure 2.1).
First of all, signal ka represents the number of simultaneous faults to be used in the
current test configuration. Considering a dut faulty containing N saboteurs, the fault
injection module generates the set of CNka =
(
N
ka
)
different e vectors corresponding to
all possible occurrences of ka errors. In other words, each vector e = [eN−1 : e0] contains
exactly ka bits at logic value 1 as a means to activate the desired ka saboteurs. Signals
kmin and kmax indicate the minimum and maximum number of simultaneous errors to be
considered, respectively. The tool considers fault multiplicity in ascending order. It means
that the test configuration starts with ka = kmin and concludes with ka = kmax.
Initialization is done with the asynchronous signal rst, which is active at logic level 0.
Indeed, when rst = 0, signals fl, ack, and all bits of buses e, x and ck are set to zero.
Signal req is used to indicate a reliability analysis request. If req = 1, both stim-
uli generation and fault injection modules are enabled. The first one generates all
the possible values of x in ascending order: 0 ≤ x ≤ (2Z − 1), where Z represents the
width of the bit-vector x. The second one generates the bit-vector e responsible to acti-
vate/deactivate the desired saboteurs. When the last x value is generated, the stimuli
generation module sends a signal ini = 1 to the fault injection module. This signal
enables the corresponding module to generate the next bit-vector e and to reinitialize the
bit-vector x (i.e. x = 0).
Signal fl enables the masking analysis to compare yref and y in order to evaluate
the masking coefficients ck.
Signal ack indicates that the analysis is finished (ack = 1), that is, all masking coef-
ficients ck are now available. Then, if we want to retrieve a specific ck value, we can use
the input k and the output ck from the masking analysis module.
Figure 2.3 shows a timing diagram with the tool signals. It considers a circuit in which
N nodes may fail. Notice that the masking analysis module requires the simultaneous
activation of both signals, rst and fl, in order to start its functioning.
2.2.1.3 Fault Injection Module
As stated above, the Fault Injection Module is responsible to control the activa-
tion/deactivation of the saboteurs presented in dut faulty. Considering the presence of
N saboteurs, each fault pattern is represented by a vector e = [eN−1eN−2 · · · e1e0], where
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Figure 2.3: Timing diagram of communication signals in the tool (MAX = 2N −2N−kmax)
ei = 1 activates the saboteur i. Therefore, given a number of simultaneous errors k, the
Fault Injection Module generates the set of CNk vectors e containing exactly k bits
equal to 1.
This fault pattern generation is done based on an algorithm proposed in [89] comprising
4 tasks:
– Task 1 - Set ei = 1 for all 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, and ei = 0 for all k ≤ i ≤ N − 1. This
task is performed only once for each value of k
– Task 2 - Perform a search from LSB towards MSB in order to find the position m
of the first bit 0 after a bit 1 in the previous vector
– Task 3 - Create a temporary vector t = [tN−1 · · · t0] by flipping the bits em and
em−1 of vector e
– Task 4 - Permutate bits ti and tm−2−i of vector t for all 0 ≤ i ≤ m− 2
In order to generate all the possible vectors e considering a range of simultaneous errors
kmin ≤ k ≤ kmax, Algorithm 1 is performed.
Algorithm 1 Fault Pattern Generation
1: k ← kmin
2: for k ≤ kmax do
3: ek1 ← Task1(N, k)
4: j ← 2
5: for j ≤ CkN do
6: m← Task2(ekj−1)
7: t← Task3(ekj−1,m)
8: ekj ← Task4(t,m)
9: j ← j + 1
10: end for
11: end for
In an effort to better understand Algorithm 1 realization, let us consider the generation
of the whole set of vectors e = [e2e1e0] for kmax = 2. In this case, the step by step execution
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is shown in Figure 2.4.
TASK1 TASK2 TASK3 TASK4 OUTPUT
001 001
001 010 010 010
010 100 100 100
011 011
011 101 101 101
101 101 110 110
Figure 2.4: Example of a step by step execution of Algorithm 1 considering N = 3 and
kmax = 2
2.2.2 Reliability Assessment
The main purpose of the FIFA tool is to characterize the logical masking ability of a
given circuit architecture. This ability can be used in order to evaluate its reliability by
using the PBR model [16] explained in Chapter 1. According to such model, the reliability
of a circuit can be calculated by (2.1), where:
– N is the number of gates that may fail.
– q represents the reliability of a gate, that is, the probability that it doesn’t fail. We
consider all gates in a circuit as having the same reliability value.
– f(k) = (1− q)kqN−k denotes the probability that k gates fail simultaneously. Notice
that more complex models can also be used to evaluate this term as shown in [16].
– ck denotes a coefficient related to the masking of k simultaneous errors in a circuit.
Considering that the target circuit has Z input bits, it can be calculated using (2.2).
R =
N∑
k=0
f(k)ck (2.1)
ck =
2Z−1∑
j=0
p(xj)
CNk∑
l=1
y(xj , eN :0)⊕ y(xj , eN :k(l))
 (2.2)
The exact reliability value can be calculated by considering all the possible input vectors
and fault patterns as shown in (2.1). However, an approximated value of the reliability can
be obtained if a maximum number of simultaneous errors kmax < w is considered, which
significantly reduce the required computing time. Indeed, for most of real world systems,
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w simultaneous faults are not likely to happen.
2.2.3 Synthesis Results
We have implemented a full parameterizable HDL description of the proposed tool.
Indeed, parameters such as the number of fault-prone gates (N), the number of stimuli
data bits (Z), and the number of output bits (P ) can be selected in order to match a target
design dut.
In order to evaluate the implementation cost of the proposed tool, we have synthesized
several versions of the IP using a STRATIX II EP2S180F1508C3 FPGA from Altera R©.
Each implemented version has considered a different number of fault-prone gates (N).
Even though the implementations have considered the same number of input/output bits
(Z = 5, P = 3), the proposed IP can deal with any value of Z and P .
The synthesis results are shown in Figure 2.5. Only the main components of the
FIFA tool are taken into consideration. They are: the stimuli generation, the fault
injection, and the masking analysis modules, which are responsible for fault injection
and fault masking analysis.
When N = 6, the tool implementation requires less than 0.1% of the FPGA resources
(NLE = 144) and fmax = 215.98MHz. Even if we consider a large number of fault-
prone nodes, the proposed IP remains very compact. For example, with N = 40, the tool
implementation requires only 2% (NLE = 3555) of the available LEs in the target FPGA.
In the case of N = 40, more than 80 millions test configurations can be generated in every
second (fmax = 82.41MHz).
We compare the performance of the FIFA tool with the FuSE HDL platform proposed
in [17]. The comparison in terms of resource requirements and performance is shown in
Table 2.1. Both implementations have considered N = 10 and P = Z = 32. Notice that
the Fuse platform only deals with single faults, while the FIFA tool deals with single and
multiple faults (kmax = N). Nevertheless, the proposed IP is more efficient in terms of
time and resource requirements. If the occurrence of several simultaneous faults (large
values of ka) is not probable, we can still optimize the IP implementation by reducing the
width of the buses ck, kmin, kmax, ka and k.
Other tools, such as those presented in [90] and [91], have a temporal cost that grows
with the complexity of the fault model. Instead of this, the FIFA tool presents a fault
model which has no significant impact on its performance.
The tool presented in [92] only supports permanent stuck-at faults, and the tools [17]
and [93] only deal with single faults. Unlike those works, FIFA tool deals with single
and multiple faults, and it supports permanent and transient faults as described in Sec-
tion 2.2.1.1.
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Figure 2.5: Synthesis results of the tool (up to N simultaneous errors): (a) number of logic
elements required in the FPGA (b) maximum frequency for error generation
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Table 2.1: Fuse platform vs. FIFA tool
Fuse [17] FIFA
ALUTs 2157 817
Registers 694 467
Maximum Frequency 75.1MHz 109.87MHz
As the fault injection approach can become very time-consuming for large circuits,
a dedicated hardware may be used as a means to accelerate calculations [94]. Despite
this solution have been used in [88], each test configuration requires reprogramming the
FPGA. This significantly reduces the efficiency, even if partial reconfiguration is used. The
proposed tool is composed in such a way that it avoids reprogramming the FPGA during
the analysis of a given circuit. Indeed, using the available control signals we can select not
only in which nodes we would like to inject faults, but also the fault model(s) to be used.
The FIFA tool was implemented from scratch without benefiting from any proprietary
libraries. Thus, all the required functions together with the memory control access (DMA
- Direct Memory Access) were implemented using standard cells, making the FIFA tool
widely flexible to be used with any FPGA. The modifications should be restricted to the
supervisor module, where we need to specify the communication interface between the tool
and the computer according to availability in the target FPGA. Furthermore, the FIFA
tool allows the designer to control the time complexity as well as the pertinence of the test
configurations. Although such tool has shown to be capable to inject faults in a circuit in a
reasonable speed, the reliability evaluation may be still intractable in case of large circuits.
In order to reduce this drawback, a parallel approach for the FIFA tool is presented in
next Section.
2.2.4 Parallelizing the FIFA Fault Generation
As a matter of fact, the performance of the FIFA tool can be improved by using parallel
computation. A very simple parallel architecture for this tool is shown in Figure 2.6.
In this case, each stimuli generator is responsible for generating a different set of
inputs. Theoretically, this approach can reduce the computing time by a factor of Tcomp/N .
Nevertheless, the area overhead is extremely high, thus limiting the number N of parallel
copies that can be synthesized in an FPGA device. Indeed, since N input vectors are
being generated each time, N fault-free DUTs are needed in order to enable the output
comparison performed by the masking analysis block. One solution to that would be
to save all the fault-free output values in a memory, but the required amount of resources
may become prohibitive.
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Figure 2.6: A simple parallel architecture for FIFA
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Figure 2.7: The proposed parallel architecture for FIFA
We propose another architecture to parallelize the FIFA tool, shown in Figure 2.7. In
this case, the tool synthesizes N fault generators, each one responsible for generating
a different set of fault patterns. This approach avoids the duplication of the fault-free
DUT, thus reducing the area overhead compared to the previous solution.
The parallel computation can be optimized if the fault generators produce the
same number of fault patterns, that is, if they are well balanced. In order to do that,
each fault generator must be initialized by two main parameters: the number of fault
patterns to be generated, and the initial vector e. As the fault pattern generation sequence
is done for k = {1, 2, · · · , w}, the calculation of the initial vector e is not a trivial task.
Indeed, the difficultness to implement the architecture shown in Figure 2.7 lies on this
calculation, for which a solution is proposed in Section 2.2.4.1.
2.2.4.1 Calculating the initial vectors
Let us consider the fault pattern generation sequence for a 6-bit vector e shown in
Figure 2.8. The aim is to find an algorithm that, based on this generation sequence, can
find which is the zth fault pattern e.
In order to do that, let us explore some number pattern in this sequence. First, let us
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IDX k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6
0 000001 000011 000111 001111 011111 111111
1 000010 000101 001011 010111 101111
2 000100 000110 001101 011011 110111
3 001000 001001 001110 011101 111011
4 010000 001010 010011 011110 111101
5 100000 001100 010101 100111 111110
6 010001 010110 101011
7 010010 011001 101101
8 010100 011010 101110
9 011000 011100 110011
10 100001 100011 110101
11 100010 100101 110110
12 100100 100110 111001
13 101000 101001 111010
14 110000 101010 111100
15 101100
16 110001
17 110010
18 110100
19 111000
Figure 2.8: Example of a fault pattern generation sequence
analyze the behavior of left-shifting the left-most bit ‘1’ in the first vector of each column.
This is represented by the bold vectors shown in Figure 2.8. Extrapolating the fault-
pattern generation for a w-bit vector e, we obtain the following sequences representing the
indices of the bold vectors:
– k = 1 → {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, · · · }
– k = 2 → {1, 3, 6, 10, 15, · · · }
– k = 3 → {1, 4, 10, 20, 35, · · · }
– k = 4 → {1, 5, 15, 35, 70, · · · }
– k = 5 → {1, 6, 21, 56, 126, · · · }
Notice that the number pattern shown above corresponds to the columns of the Pas-
cal’s triangle illustrated in Figure 2.9. Therefore, for a given k, the nth element of the
corresponding sequence can be evaluated by (2.3). This allows us to obtain any bold vec-
tor by performing left-shifting operations on the left-most bit ‘1’ in the first vector of a
column. For example, in order to obtain the vector in column k = 2 with index 10, we
should perform four left-shift operations (e(1) = 000011 → e(10) = 100001) because 10
is the fourth element in the corresponding sequence (elem42 = 10).
elemnk =
n(n+ 1) · · · (n+ k − 1)
k!
(2.3)
Let us now explore some other number pattern to allow the evaluation of non-bold
vectors. First of all, let us denote Φjk as the set of vectors in a column k for which the left-
most bit ‘1’ is located at the position j of e = (ewew−1 · · · e1). For example, in Figure 2.8 we
have Φ42 = {001001, 001010, 001100}. Notice that the elements of Φjk show an interesting
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Figure 2.9: Pascal’s triangle
behavior: they differ from each other only by the bits {ej−1 · · · e1} shown in bold. Further,
these bits are generated in the same sequence as the vectors in the column k − 1. This
pattern holds true for any two successive columns in Figure 2.8.
We can then explore this number pattern in order to elaborate a recursive algorithm to
evaluate the zth vector in a column k. First, let us consider the following case of study: the
63 fault patterns shown in Figure 2.8 have to be produced by two fault generators. In
this case, the first module is responsible for generating the first 32 vectors, and the second
one for generating the other 31. Because of that, we have to find the 33th vector e in order
to initialize the second fault generator.
The first step of the proposed algorithm is to find the column of Figure 2.8 that contains
the 33th fault pattern e. This can be easily obtained by using combinatorial functions,
which indicates that this vector belongs to the third column (C61 +C62 < 33 < C61 +C62 +C63 ).
Further, it can be seen that it corresponds to the 12th vector e in the column k = 3 because
33− (C61 + C62 ) = 12.
Since the indices of the elements in Figure 2.8 start from 0, the first step is to use
(2.3) to find which is the highest value of n such that elemn3 ≤ 11. In this case, this
corresponds to n = 3 → elem33 = 10. Then, repeating the same procedure for k = 2 such
that elemn2 ≤ (11− 10), it can be found n = 1 → elem12 = 1. Notice that this recursive
procedure is repeated until the sum of the elements elemnk equals the index of the target
vector. From these results, we can extract the amount of left-shift operations that must
be performed for each bit ‘1’. In this case, we have to perform n left-shift operations in
e3 (n = 3 → e = 100011) and e2 (n = 1 → e = 100101). Therefore, the 33th vector in
Figure 2.8 is 100101. Algorithm 2 illustrates the steps of calculating the zth generated
fault pattern.
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Algorithm 2 Evaluating the zth generated fault pat-
tern
1: k ← 1;
2: SumCombination← Cwk ;
3: while SumCombination ≤ z do
4: k ← k + 1;
5: SumCombination← SumCombination + Cwk ;
6: end while
7: Index = z − SumCombination;
8: for i = 1; i ≤ k; i = i+ 1 do
9: biti = 1 (i− 1);
10: end for
11: for i = k; k > 0; i = i− 1 do
12: kn← 1;
13: Calculate elemikn ;
14: while elemikn ≤ Index do
15: biti = biti  (1);
16: kn = kn+ 1;
17: Calculate elemikn ;
18: end while
19: Index = Index− elemikn−1 ;
20: if Index == 0 then
21: break;
22: end if
23: end for
24: FinalVector = 0;
25: for i = 1; i ≤ k; i = i+ 1 do
26: FinalVector = FinalVector ∨ biti;
27: end for
2.2.5 Results
The implementation cost of the proposed architecture was analyzed with a 74283 fast
adder, using a DE2 FPGA board from Altera. For each implementation, a different number
of parallel modules was considered, from 1 up to 8 copies. This is the maximum number
of copies that could be synthesized on this device. The amount of resources used by these
implementations is shown in Figure 2.10. It can be noted that the resources grow in an
almost linear rate with respect to the number of copies of the dut. Further, the amount
of logic elements doubles only for N = 5, i.e. only about 20% of area overhead is necessary
to add a parallel module for this case.
The performance of the FIFA parallel implementation was analyzed regarding the num-
ber of clock cycles required to evaluate the reliability of the 74283 fast adder. The effect of
up to 5 simultaneous bit-flips into the circuit was considered. The simulation results are
shown in Figure 2.11. Notice that the computation time is reduced by a factor very close
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to the theoretically value of 1/N , what shows the efficiency of the proposed architecture.
2.2.6 Conclusion
This chapter presented a new tool based on fault injection for fault robustness anal-
ysis of digital circuits. The proposed tool, named FIFA, allows the designer to establish
trade-offs between complexity and completeness of the analysis. The developed IP is fully
parameterizable. Synthesis results have shown that it exceeds those reported in the litera-
ture in terms of area efficiency and performance. The FIFA tool deals with single/multiple
simultaneous faults as well as permanent/transient faults. Moreover, if high fault multi-
plicity (ka > kmax) is unlikely, all fault injections and tests related to ka > kmax can be
avoided without diminishing accuracy in the analysis process.
In addition, an elaborate algorithm that calculates the zth element in the fault pattern
generation sequence was introduced. The corresponding sequence is of great interest for
fault-injection tools because it can be used to inject faults according to their multiplicity.
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The proposed algorithm was used to conceive a new parallel architecture for the FIFA
tool. The algorithm is required in order to balance the amount of fault patterns among the
parallel fault generators, a must for optimal parallel implementations. This architecture
can reduce the calculation time by a factor of 1/N , where N is the number of parallel
modules. This shows that the parallel modules are well balanced, what is highly desired. At
the same time, replications of fault-free DUTs are avoided, thus keeping the area overhead
as low as possible. Indeed, extrapolating for very large circuits, the area overhead will
converge to close to 50% of the original area per additional module.
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Chapter 3
Effective Reliability
3.1 Introduction
As stated in Section 1.2, the reliability of a logic circuit is emerging as an important
concern that may limit the benefits of technology scaling in nanometric dimensions [95–97].
The reliability of a circuit is a measure of its susceptibility to permanent, intermittent and
transient faults [15]. Faults in integrated circuits can produce errors, but an error will not
necessarily propagate to the final output of a circuit and produce a failure. Basically, three
different kinds of masking effect can avoid the propagation of an error:
– Logical masking : occurs when the propagation of a fault is blocked by a subsequent
logical gate whose output is completely determined by the other input. An example
of logical masking can be seen in Figure 3.1.
– Electrical masking : occurs when a fault is attenuated during its propagation so that
it does not have enough duration/amplitude to affect the result of the circuit.
– Temporal masking or latching-window masking : occurs when the current/voltage
transient generated by a fault reaches the input of a synchronous cell outside its
storage window (not at the clock transition).
These three mechanisms are directly related to the capacity of a circuit to tolerate
faults. However, the downscaling of electronics is reducing both its electrical and temporal
masking abilities [95, 98]. On the other hand, the technology scaling is not affecting the
logical masking ability because it depends only on the topology of the logical circuit [8].
Indeed, several fault-tolerant approaches are based on increasing the logical masking ability
of a circuit so that a fault will not reach its final output. These fault-tolerance techniques
generally bring some design penalties such as area, cost, and performance. In spite of that,
other potentially fault masking capabilities can be derived from the target application and
were not extensively explored. In fact, the error impact on a circuit output is conditioned
by the usage of its results. This can lead to the existence of errors that can be accept-
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able/bearable for a specified application. In other words, certain applications can tolerate
small errors, and we can explore this fact to improve the resulting design. In the rest of
the current work, this phenomenon will be referred as application masking of errors,
which is closely related to the concept of error tolerance.
Figure 3.1: Example of a logical masking. Notice that when F assumes the value ‘0’ and
occurs a SET in E, the output H rests unchanged and is not affected by this error.
3.2 Error tolerance
The drastically increase in the number of soft and permanent faults expected with
technology scaling has inspired the discussion about error tolerance since the release of the
2001 International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors (ITRS). This report states
that: “Relaxing the requirement of 100% correctness for devices and interconnects may
dramatically reduce costs of manufacturing, verification, and test. Such a paradigm shift is
likely forced in any case by technology scaling, which leads to more transient and permanent
failures of signals, logic values, devices, and interconnects.” [99]. This is done as a means to
reduce the cost of the final design since this has been the greatest threat to the continuation
of the semiconductor roadmap. This menace continues to be true in the ITRS 2011, and
it’s the principal message of the last ITRS Design Report [4].
The error tolerance concept was first introduced as an application-oriented paradigm
to deal with process variations, defects, and noise in [7]. The main idea is that some
applications such as audio and video, have the ability to tolerate certain types of errors as
long as they are restricted to a certain level of error severity given by the target application.
For instance, most of multimedia applications inherently have this ability because of the
functioning of human’s senses such as sight, hearing, and smell, which can mask the effect
of some errors.
Application masking of errors, also called application-level resilience by [83], has been
extensively researched over the past years [7, 83, 86, 100]. For instance, a methodology
to analyze the error tolerance of applications was proposed in [100]. In this work, the
authors have analyzed the impact of errors in the quality of the audio signal provided by a
digital telephone-answering device. Then, they have investigated the correlation between
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the position of an erroneous output bit and the corresponding impact on speech quality.
The results have shown that the contribution of each output bit can be different, and that
errors below a specified threshold are acceptable. A study of the resilience of a JPEG
compressor to errors was carried out in [86]. In this study they proposed some models
to calculate the error severity to the JPEG compressor as well as a method to selectively
harden such circuit.
Another element that can influence the error tolerance of a given application is the
approach of coding used to represent the desired information. As a matter of fact, the
impact of an erroneous output bit also depends on its weight, i.e. its significance relative
to the output word. In order to demonstrate that, let us consider the output of an audio
signal in which an SEU occurred in a sample as shown in Figure 3.2(a) [101]. It can be noted
that the error has a pulse characteristic in time domain, and that the amplitude of such
pulse depends on the bit position. Consequently, a bit-flip presents a white noise behavior
in the frequency domain, and its power also depends on the erroneous bit position as shown
in Figure 3.2(b). This means that the amount of white noise added by the occurrence of
a bit-flip depends on the bit position, and since the addition of a small quantity of noise
can be masked by the human hearing, some errors can be acceptable/bearable for an audio
application. In fact, the most significant bits carry more information about the signal,
therefore they deserve special attention. Errors presented in the less significant bits may
be even acceptable.
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Figure 3.2: Bit-flip occurrence in a sine wave representing an output of a circuit
In spite of that, most of testing and reliability evaluation techniques analyze the output
of a circuit in a pass versus fail paradigm. By doing that, they ignore the real impact of
an error on the final result, which can lead to the conception of suboptimal designs.
This chapter introduces a new model for reliability calculation named effective reli-
ability [101, 102]. Unlike the traditional concept for reliability evaluation, effective relia-
bility takes into consideration application-specific characteristics to give us a fairly value
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for the reliability of a circuit. Indeed, using pertinent quality metrics, it can evaluate the
reliability of a circuit considering that errors below a specified threshold are acceptable.
Therefore, effective reliability is not based only on fault tolerance, but also makes use of
the error tolerance concept [7]. In addition, two metrics are proposed in order to calculate
the effective reliability of a circuit based on bit significance and relative error rules.
3.3 Effective reliability
Let yi = bM−1bM−2 · · · b1b0 be defined as a vector of M bits that represents the output
of a circuit. In this case, bit b0 stands for the LSB (Least Significant Bit). Also, let us
define the reliability of bit bi as qi. Considering an application with independent outputs,
the nominal reliability can be evaluated by (3.1) [54].
Rnom =
M−1∏
i=0
qi (3.1)
It can be noted that the nominal reliability concept does not differentiate the impact
of each output bit to the final reliability of the circuit. This means that such concept is
based on a pass versus fail paradigm, and therefore does not consider any kind of error
tolerance. In order to allow that, we propose a model for reliability calculation which takes
into account the effective impact of errors on the target application (see Figure 3.3). This
new concept, named effective reliability, can be evaluated by (3.2) or (3.3)
Reff = Rnom +Rack (3.2)
Reff = 1−Rack (3.3)
where Rack is the probability of errors being masked according to the application, that
is, errors that are acceptable for the target application are neglected, and Rack is the
probability of errors not being masked according to the application. Notice that two
different terms are presented in (3.2): Rnom and Rack. The first one is related to the
logical masking ability of the design, while the latter one is related to its application
masking ability. The general procedure to evaluate the effective reliability of a circuit is
represented in Figure 3.3.
One important characteristic of the effective reliability concept is that it is based on
the assumption that for a given application, errors can be classified into two categories:
critical and noncritical. In this context, an error is considered critical if it significantly
impacts the quality of the result, or if it directly causes a circuit malfunctioning. Because
of that, these errors cannot be accepted. On the other hand, noncritical errors have no
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significant impact on the output such that they cannot be perceived by the final user (they
can be tolerated).
Figure 3.3: General scheme for reliability calculation of a bit-vector from a logic circuit
that supplies a target application circuit
The evaluation of Rack or Rack is performed according to quality metrics that are
considered pertinent from the application’s point of view. For example, due to physical
mechanisms presented in human ear, the frequency response of our auditory system is not
linear. As a result, we have a better perception at some frequencies than others; and we
can use this to define a set of errors that are acceptable for our application. Exploiting
this fact, we notice that Reff > Rnom. Thus, reliability constraints for the logic circuit
can be relaxed so that area over cost can be minimized.
The next Section presents two quality metrics that can be used to evaluate the effective
reliability of a circuit.
3.4 Quality metrics
3.4.1 Definitions
Let us suppose that the output of a specific circuit is used to control an application. In
this context, each circuit output result is represented by yi, defined in Section 3.3. Con-
sidering the occurrence of k simultaneous errors, there are CMk =
(
M
k
)
different situations
concerning the locations (indices) of the faulty bits in yi. For instance, if M = 4 and
k = 3, we have 4 different situations (C43 = 4) for the occurrence of 3 simultaneous errors
in yi: {b2b1b0, b3b1b0, b3b2b0, b3b2b1}. Based on that, we can define the following elements:
– wk×1 as a column vector that represents the indices of the k faulty bits in yi.
– Ek×CMk as a matrix created by the concatenation of all possible wk×1 vectors for a
specified k (see Figure 3.4 for an example). Each element of Ek×CMk is represented
by ei,r.
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– γk,r as the probability of occurrence of k errors in yi distributed according wr. This
parameter can be evaluated by (3.4).
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Figure 3.4: Example of matrix E considering 3 errors in yi = b4b3b2b1b0
γk,r = Rnom.
k∏
i=1
(
1
qei,r
− 1
)
(3.4)
In the next Section these elements will be used to define quality metrics to evaluate
the effective reliability of a system.
3.4.2 Quality metric 1: bit significance
The first quality metric proposed in the current work is based on bit significance. In
this case, we consider that any faulty bit located below a specified position is acceptable.
This threshold value, represented by T , depends on the target application. For example,
if we consider T = 2 for a specific application, it means that any faulty bit located in b2,
b1 and/or b0 can be tolerated. With this in mind, we can now evaluate Rack and Rack
by (3.5) and (3.6), respectively. Moreover, the effective reliability can be calculated using
(3.7) or (3.8).
Rack =
T+1∑
k=1
CT+1k∑
r=1
γk,r (3.5)
Rack =
T+1∑
k=1
CMk∑
r=CT+1k +1
γk,r +
M∑
k=T+2
CMk∑
r=1
γk,r (3.6)
Reff =
M−1∏
i=0
qi +
T+1∑
k=1
CT+1k∑
r=1
γk,r (3.7)
Reff = 1−
T+1∑
k=1
CMk∑
r=CT+1k +1
γk,r −
M∑
k=T+2
CMk∑
r=1
γk,r (3.8)
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3.4.3 Quality metric 2: relative error
Relative error refers to an evaluation of a difference between two measures normalized
with respect to the true measure. One approach to calculate the relative error is shown in
(3.9), where yi is the correct measure and y˜i is the erroneous measure.
δ =
|y˜i − yi|
yi
(3.9)
Using this concept, we can define a maximum acceptable value for the relative error
(δmax) based on the target application. In order to do that, let us first suppose a system in
which the input word comprises a vector of H bits. Considering that p(a) represents the
probability of the input to assume a value a, Rack and Rack can be evaluated according to
(3.10) and (3.11), respectively,
Rack =
2H−1∑
a=0
p(a)
kmax∑
k=1
CMk∑
r=1
γk,r.u (δmax − δ(k, r, a)) (3.10)
Rack =
2H−1∑
a=0
p(a)
kmax∑
k=1
CMk∑
r=1
γk,r.u (δ(k, r, a)− δmax) (3.11)
where kmax represents the maximum number of simultaneous errors considered, u(t) is
a step function centered at the origin, and δ(k, r, a) is evaluated according (3.9). The
erroneous measure y˜i in such expression is obtained considering the occurrence of k simul-
taneous errors distributed according to wr.
Finally, we can evaluate the effective reliability using (3.12) or (3.13).
Reff =
M−1∏
i=0
qi +
2H−1∑
a=0
p(a)
kmax∑
k=1
CMk∑
r=1
γk,r.u (δmax − δ(k, r, a)) (3.12)
Reff = 1−
2H−1∑
a=0
p(a)
kmax∑
k=1
CMk∑
r=1
γk,r.u (δ(k, r, a)− δmax) (3.13)
Notice that both expressions (3.12) and (3.13) only provide the same effective reliability
value when considering kmax = M simultaneous errors. This task is computationally
intensive and may be intractable for large circuits. However, this consideration may be
too pessimistic for the specified application. The analysis of both expressions considering
different values of kmax can give us a possible solution to tackle this problem. As a matter
of fact, expressions (3.12) and (3.13) provides a different pair of values for each kmax < M .
The first one gives us a pessimistic value for effective reliability and the other one an
optimistic value. The difference between these two results reduces as kmax approximates
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M . Therefore, expressions (3.12) and (3.13) can be used to produce boundaries in order
to estimate the effective reliability. When both results are closer enough from each other,
we can stop the calculation and estimate the effective reliability for the target application.
3.5 Simulation results
For illustration of the proposed approach, let us consider the design of three circuits
commonly used in digital signal processing applications: a median filter, an 8-bit ripple
carry adder (CRA8), and a 4-bit multiplier (MUL4). For the median filter, the bit signifi-
cance metric will be used, while for the two latter the relative error metric is considered.
3.5.1 Median filter
In the field of image processing, a set of noise reduction algorithms is often required.
These algorithms generally present different properties so that one algorithm is more suit-
able to deal with one type of noise than another. In particular, the median filter is a
nonlinear digital filtering technique commonly used because of its great performance when
coping with “speckle” and “salt and pepper” noise.
Let us suppose for our case of study that we have to implement a median filter to
process images with the following requirements:
– Each image has 256× 256 pixels varying from 0 to 255;
– The system must have an 8-bit input and an 8-bit output;
– The filter’s reliability must be higher than 95%.
Let us now consider that the filter architecture we chose led us to an implementation
in which each output bit has a reliability of 99%. In the following, we can analyze both
the traditional and the proposed reliability evaluation methods as following:
3.5.1.1 Traditional reliability calculation
The traditional reliability calculation that considers independent outputs can be eval-
uated by (3.14).
Rnom =
M−1∏
i=0
qi = 92.27% (3.14)
In this case, it can be seen that the reliability requirement was not fulfilled by our
median filter. Therefore, procedures must be carried out to solve this problem. In order
to respect the reliability requirement stated above, a possible solution is to make use of
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redundancy techniques to increase the reliability of the median filter. Using that, the
system will fit the reliability requirement in exchange for area, cost, and power increase.
Nevertheless, a careful analyze of the median filter application puts in evidence that
this problem could be treated from another point of view. Using the concept of nominal
reliability we do not take into account any application-specific characteristic in order to
evaluate the reliability of the system. However, in systems such as the one used in our
case study, small errors can be tolerated without compromising the system performance.
Unlike the traditional method for reliability evaluation, effective reliability can take into
consideration such characteristics. Therefore, it may give us a fairly evaluation for the
reliability of this circuit with respect to a pertinent quality metric.
3.5.1.2 Effective reliability calculation
As a first step to evaluate the effective reliability for our case of study, we need to define
an acceptable quality metric from the application’s point of view. In this case, we chose
the bit significance approach discussed in Section 3.4.2. The next step is to evaluate the
effective reliability for different error tolerances. As shown in Table 3.1, we can then be
aware of the minimum error tolerance value necessary to meet the reliability requirement.
Notice that one important contribution of the effective reliability concept is to provide a
reliability value that depends on the application masking ability of the circuit. Indeed, the
reliability of a circuit is now characterized not only by the presence of errors in the output
of a circuit, but with the usage profile of the results provided by the circuit. By doing that,
the reliability of a given circuit ‘A’ may be higher for one application than for another.
Table 3.1: Effective reliability evaluation for different error tolerances
T (bit) Reff
b0 93.21%
b1 94.15%
b2 95.01%
b3 96.06%
b4 97.03%
b5 98.01%
b6 99.00%
b7 100.00%
According to Table 3.1, if our application can tolerate any faulty bit localized between
b0 and b2 (i.e., T = 2), the effective reliability of this system is 95.01%. Therefore, the
project requirements are already fulfilled and we do not need to add extra hardware to
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improve the reliability of the median filter. In order to check if this error tolerance is
acceptable for our system, we performed a subjective analyze relative to noisy pictures.
Each picture was contaminated with gaussian noise using the required error tolerance range
(faulty bits localized between b0 and b2). An example of the well-known “Lena” used in
this comparison procedure can be seen in Figure 3.5. As can be noted, the noise is almost
unperceived by humans, and then can be tolerated by our application. As a result of that,
we can conclude that the effective reliability of our system is already greater than 95%,
fitting well the specified requirements, and that no extra hardware is required.
(a) Original “Lena” (b) Noisy “Lena”
Figure 3.5: Comparison between the original and the noisy “Lena” pictures
3.5.2 8-bit ripple carry adder
The ripple carry adder circuit (CRA8) was constructed by cascading 8 FA blocks (see
Figure 3.6), where each logic gate is supposed to have reliability 99.9%. Furthermore, let us
suppose that the CRA8’s reliability must be higher than Rmin = 95% and that the target
application can accept/tolerate errors as high as 2% of the correct result (δmax = 2%).
The reliability of the output bits of the CRA8 circuit can be evaluated by using the
SPR-MP technique proposed in [15] and explained in Section 1.2. The results are shown
in Table 3.2.
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Figure 3.6: Structure of FA (full adder)
block
Figure 3.7: Schema of FA block
Table 3.2: Reliability values for the output bits of the 8-bit full adder (CRA8)
Output Reliability (qi)
b0 99.80%
b1 99.48%
b2 99.31%
b3 99.24%
b4 99.20%
b5 99.18%
b6 99.17%
b7 99.16%
b8(carry) 99.36%
3.5.2.1 Design based on nominal reliability
Using the traditional reliability concept defined in Eq. 3.1 and values in Table 3.2, the
reliability for CRA8 is calculated as shown in (3.15). This analysis leads the designer to
assume that the specifications are not met, and that the use of a fault tolerance technique
is necessary.
R =
8∏
i=0
qi = 94.06% (3.15)
Let us consider TMR (Triple Modular Redundancy) as the fault-tolerance technique
to be applied in order to improve the reliability of this circuit [23]. TMR corresponds to
the triplication of a module (in this case, a FA) and the selection of one among the three
outputs according to a majority vote. Triplication of a FA implies the use of two voters
(one for sum and another for the carry bit). Considering that the relationship between the
voter’s area (SV ) and the FA’s area (SFA) are such that SFA = 2× SV , applying TMR to
a FA implies in triplicating the required area for this block. If we analyze all the possible
architectures with FA modules triplicated, the configuration that can meet the reliability
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Table 3.3: Reff for different error tolerances (CRA8)
Relative Error (δmax) Reliability
0.5% 94.23%
1.0% 94.64%
1.5% 94.96%
2.0% 95.22%
2.5% 95.44%
3.0% 95.62%
3.5% 95.77%
4.0% 95.92%
4.5% 96.05%
5.0% 96.16%
requirement while still minimizing the area overhead is obtained by protecting two FAs
with TMR. In this case, the area overhead is 75%. Let us now analyze the same circuit by
using the effective reliability concept.
3.5.2.2 Design based on effective reliability
Differently of nominal reliability, effective reliability takes into account the usage of the
results produced by the circuit when evaluating its reliability. The main idea is to define
a threshold based on a pertinent quality metric that can be used to classify errors into
critical and noncritical. In order to do that, let us consider the relative error metric stated
in Section 3.4.3. The equations to evaluate the effective reliability value for a given error
tolerance (δmax) are given in (3.2) and (3.10). We have evaluated the effective reliability
for different values of δmax as a mean to illustrate the relationship between this value and
the error tolerance ability of the target application. The obtained results are shown in
Table 3.3. Given that the target application tolerates errors as high as 2%, we notice that
the reliability is over than 95%. Therefore, our system has already met the specifications
and no TMR is required.
3.5.3 4-bit multiplier
The MUL4 was constructed using the architecture shown in Figure 3.8. In this case,
each full-adder FA was built according Figure 3.6 and Fig 3.7. Let us now consider that
this project has a reliability requirement of Rmin = 90%, and that the target application
can tolerate errors as high as 5% (δmax = 5%).
The reliability of the output bits of the MUL4 circuit can be evaluated by using the
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Figure 3.8: Structure of a 4-bit multiplier block
Table 3.4: Reliability values for each output bit of the 4-bit multiplier
Output Reliability
p0 99.90%
p1 99.70%
p2 99.25%
p3 98.43%
p4 97.55%
p5 97.30%
p6 97.89%
p7 99.16%
SPR-MP technique [15]. In order to do that, we have assumed that the reliability of a logic
gate is q = 99.9%. The corresponding results are shown in Table 3.4. Let us now analyze
the results by using the nominal reliability and the effective reliability concepts.
3.5.3.1 Design based on nominal reliability
Using the values presented in Table 3.4, we can evaluate the reliability according the
traditional concept as shown in (3.16). In this case, the designer is also leaded to assume
that the specifications were not met, and that the use of a fault tolerance technique is
necessary.
Rmul =
7∏
i=0
qi = 89.65% (3.16)
Next, we have analyzed the use of the TMR technique to improve the multiplier reli-
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Table 3.5: Reff for different error tolerances (MUL4)
Relative Error (δmax) Reliability
0.5% 89.65%
1.0% 89.67%
1.5% 89.71%
2.0% 89.75%
2.5% 89.81%
3.0% 89.87%
3.5% 89.92%
4.0% 89.98%
4.5% 90.07%
5.0% 90.12%
ability such that the expected requirements are met. Every component, AND gates and
FAs shown in Figure 3.8, was considered as a possible module where we might apply TMR.
The first step was to analyze all possible architectures using TMR in one module. In this
case, there was no architecture that could fit the reliability requirement (Rmin = 90%).
However, by applying TMR into two modules, 27 different architectures can reach Rmin.
Among them, we chose the one with less area overhead. This is obtained applying TMR
into gates AND1 and AND16. Assuming that all logic gates have the same area, the total
area overhead for this architecture is 11.84%. Let us now consider the analysis by using
the effective reliability concept.
3.5.3.2 Design based on effective reliability
We evaluated the effective reliability for different error tolerances as shown in Table
3.5. Analyzing the results presented in this Table, we can conclude that the reliability of
this circuit is over 90% if it can tolerate error as high as δmax ≥ 4.5%. Therefore, assuming
the example presented in this Section, which δmax = 5%, the multiplier has already met
the required specifications without using any fault tolerance technique.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have proposed a new concept for reliability evaluation named effective
reliability. Unlike the traditional concept for reliability evaluation, effective reliability can
take into account specific characteristics of the target application to give us a fairly value
for the reliability of a circuit. Indeed, using pertinent quality metrics, it evaluates the
reliability of a circuit considering that errors below a specified threshold are acceptable.
105
Therefore, effective reliability is not based only on fault tolerance, but also make use of
the error tolerance concept.
In addition, two important quality metrics were also proposed. Both, bit significance
and relative error metrics, may be used in a range of digital signal processing applications.
Simulation results were presented in Section 3.5. Three circuits often used in digital
signal processing applications were considered as the case of studies in order to demonstrate
the importance of the proposed concept. In fact, when we do not consider the application
when evaluating the reliability of a circuit, the calculated value can be too pessimistic.
Then, unnecessary procedures may be carried out in order to fit the reliability requirement
for a specific project, increasing cost and area penalty.
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Chapter 4
Selective Hardening
4.1 Introduction
As discussed earlier, selective hardening techniques offer a good compromise between
reliability improvement and area overhead. Based on that fact, this chapter introduces
two different approaches to apply selective hardening in integrated circuits. The first one,
introduced in Section 4.2, is based on the fact that errors may have different consequences
for different applications. For instance, in a binary output word, errors located in the most
significant bits tend to be more critical than errors located in the least significant bits.
Therefore, the proposed technique drives the effort of reliability improvement to the bits
that will most impact the output of a circuit. In addition, a metric that allows to assign
different weights to different output bits of a system, named practical reliability, is also
introduced. The second approach, introduced in Section 4.3, uses a parameter similar to
a hardening cost in order to allow designers to drive the methodology using accurate cost
values for hardening each gate [103]. Further, two heuristics are proposed as a means to
determine when selective hardening is no longer feasible.
4.2 Avoiding Critical Errors in Integrated Circuits
4.2.1 Nominal reliability
Let y = bM−1bM−2 · · · b1b0 be a vector of M bits representing the output of a circuit.
The nominal reliability [54, 101] of a circuit is defined as the probability that it produces
correct outputs, i.e., the probability that all bi ∈ y are correct 0(s) and 1(s). Considering
that the output bits are independent, this value is conventionally expressed as in (4.1),
where Ri stands for the reliability of bi.
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Table 4.1: Reliability for the output bits of three different architectures of a 4-bit adder
Architecture b3 b2 b1 b0 Rnominal Rpractical
1 99% 99% 99% 95% 92.18% 97.63%
2 95% 99% 99% 99% 92.18% 94.17%
3 98% 99% 99% 95% 91.25% 96.64%
Rnominal =
M−1∏
i=0
Ri (4.1)
Let us now suppose that the circuit’s output is coded using a binary scheme such
that bM−1 and b0 stand for the Most Significant Bit (MSB) and the Least Significant Bit
(LSB), respectively. Error(s) occurring in MSB(s) will result in more remarkable disparities
than in any other bit. By contrast, errors in LSB(s) may even be masked by the target
application [101]. In spite of that, nominal reliability assigns equal reliability costs to the
output bits as can be seen in (4.1). In fact, two different architectures of a logic function
may have the same nominal reliability value, but one may still be more likely to provide
results with greater disparities than the other. For instance, let us suppose that a designer
obtained three different architectures of a 4-bit adder and he has to select one of them by
comparing theirs reliability values. Table 4.1 illustrates the values of the reliability of the
output bits of such architectures.
Analyzing the nominal reliability values for the obtained architectures, Architecture
1 and Architecture 2 are selected as the best solutions. Indeed, no distinction can be
made between these two architectures regarding the nominal reliability value. However, if
the output of this circuit is coded using a binary scheme, it is more likely that the first
architecture will provide better results (smaller disparities) than will the second. Ideally,
the reliability analysis should take into account the amount of information each bit of an
output carries (or its importance) in order to assign progressively great costs to them. In
order to tackle this problem, a new metric to analyze the reliability of a circuit is presented
in Section 4.2.2.
4.2.2 Practical reliability
Practical reliability is a metric that can take into account the importance of each output
bit of a circuit. It can be evaluated as shown in (4.2). The weight factor ki allows a designer
to control the importance of a specific output bit bi to the output of the circuit. Notice
that if ki = 1 for all 0 ≤ i ≤ M − 1, the practical reliability expression (4.2) becomes
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the nominal reliability expression (4.1). Also, by setting ki = 0, the metric does not take
into account errors in bi. This is very useful to circuits that can tolerate some errors
(application masking [101] or application-level resilience [83]). If a simple standard binary
representation is considered, then ki can be calculated as shown in (4.3).
Rpractical =
M−1∏
i=0
Rkii (4.2)
ki =
1
2(M−1)−i
(4.3)
Although the proposed metric does not evaluate the true reliability of a circuit, it
takes into account both the reliability and the importance of an output bit to the system
and merge these information in a single number to simplify the analysis. For instance,
let us analyze the architectures shown in Table 4.1. It can be noted that the practical
reliability values are different from the values obtained with nominal reliability. Actually,
even the order of the best architectures changes with the proposed metric. Architecture
2, which before was considered the best architecture together with Architecture 1, now is
considered as the worst choice. This is due to the low reliability value of its MSB. In fact,
practical reliability “punishes” architectures that present low reliability in critical bits, thus
providing a more realistic result for a given target application. This metric will be used in
Section 4.2.3 as the basis for a method to selectively apply TMR into a circuit.
4.2.3 Selectively applying TMR
Although TMR can provide a great level of protection against faults, the area overhead
required by such technique is quite high. To diminish this drawback, this chapter proposes
a method to selectively apply TMR to digital circuits. The main idea is to rank gates or
blocks to be protected based on critical factors. In the current work, a critical factor takes
into account not only the probability that an error will be introduced by a gate, but also
how critical this error will be for the target application as will be seen in Section 4.2.3.2.
4.2.3.1 Case study
In order to explain and validate the proposed method, a 4-bit fast adder (74283 ) is
used. This fast adder is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
4.2.3.2 Identifying critical gates
Selective TMR is realized by the classification of constituent gates of a circuit [104].
The fast adder has 9 inputs, 5 outputs, and is composed of 40 logic gates. All gates are
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Figure 4.1: 4-bit fast adder circuit
considered as being fault-prone. Further, it is considered that these blocks (gi (i ∈ [0, 39]))
are independent, and that they are labeled as shown in Figure 4.2.
The procedure to detect which are the critical gates of this circuit takes two steps:
first, a fault emulation tool, named FIFA and described in [105], is used to inject bit-flip
faults due to radiation effects; next, critical gates are detected by analysis of errors that
appeared in the outputs.
In the following work it is considered only the occurrence of single faults so that the
tool injects just one per clock cycle. If the occurrence of multiple simultaneous faults is
likely, the tool can be configured to deal with that.
Finally, the results produced by the original and the faulty circuits are compared bit by
bit. If these results are different, it is concluded that the injected fault has been propagated
to the output bits. Otherwise it is concluded that the fault has been masked.
The fault injection emulation is performed in order to detect the critical factors. The
idea is to inject a single fault in a gate gi and analyze the output for all possible input
vectors. Then, for each output bit bz, the number of errors Sz related to a single fault in
gi is evaluated (see Table 4.2). The columns Szw correspond to weighted versions of Sz.
The issue is to define proper weights so that Szw reflects the relevance of each gate to each
output.
In the case of the adder circuit, as the output is given as a binary number, Szw is
obtained as shown in (4.4). Notice that there are 29 possible input logic values for each
faulty gate. All the emulation results for the adder circuit are shown in Table 4.2.
Swz = 2
z · Sz (4.4)
The critical gates are detected according to the results presented in Table 4.2. Notice
that the rightmost column in Table 4.2 gives the critical factor for a gate gi. The higher
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Figure 4.2: 74283 gate-level schematic
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Table 4.2: Error analysis for the gates of the circuit 74283
gi S0 S0w S1 S1w S2 S2w S3 S3w S4 S4w
∑
ew CritFac
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 384 3072 192 3072 6144 36
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 384 3072 320 5120 8192 38
2 0 0 0 0 384 1536 192 1536 96 1536 4608 33
3 0 0 0 0 384 1536 320 2560 160 2560 6656 37
4 0 0 384 768 192 768 96 768 48 768 3072 25
5 0 0 384 768 320 1280 160 1280 80 1280 4608 32
6 384 384 192 384 96 384 48 384 24 384 1920 14
7 384 384 320 640 160 640 80 640 40 640 2944 23
8 512 512 256 512 128 512 64 512 32 512 2560 22
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 320 5120 5120 35
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 288 4608 4608 34
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 272 4352 4352 31
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 264 4224 4224 29
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 272 4352 4352 31
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 512 4096 0 0 4096 27
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 384 3072 0 0 3072 24
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 320 2560 0 0 2560 21
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 288 2304 0 0 2304 20
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 272 2176 0 0 2176 18
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 288 2304 0 0 2304 20
20 0 0 0 0 512 2048 0 0 0 0 2048 17
21 0 0 0 0 384 1536 0 0 0 0 1536 13
22 0 0 0 0 320 1280 0 0 0 0 1280 12
23 0 0 0 0 288 1152 0 0 0 0 1152 10
24 0 0 0 0 320 1280 0 0 0 0 1280 12
25 0 0 512 1024 0 0 0 0 0 0 1024 7
26 0 0 384 768 0 0 0 0 0 0 768 6
27 0 0 320 640 0 0 0 0 0 0 640 4
28 0 0 384 768 0 0 0 0 0 0 768 6
29 512 512 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 512 2
30 384 384 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 384 0
31 512 512 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 512 1
32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 512 8192 8192 39
33 0 0 0 0 0 0 512 4096 0 0 4096 27
34 0 0 0 0 512 2048 0 0 0 0 2048 15
35 0 0 512 1024 0 0 0 0 0 0 1024 8
36 0 0 0 0 0 0 512 4096 0 0 4096 28
37 0 0 0 0 512 2048 0 0 0 0 2048 16
38 0 0 512 1024 0 0 0 0 0 0 1024 9
39 512 512 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 512 3
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Table 4.3: Reliability Analysis of 74283
Reliability No hardening Method in [18] Proposed Method
S0 94.07% 94.97% 94.07%
S1 92.39% 93.26% 92.39%
S2 91.80% 92.65% 92.43%
S3 91.33% 92.17% 93.07%
S4 94.60% 95.51% 97.15%
Rnominal 68.93% 72.24% 72.63%
Rpractical 87.29% 88.89% 90.65%
the factor number is, the more critical the gate will be.
In fact, critical factors are assigned to the gates according to the number of weighted
errors in Table 4.2. If the number of weighted errors equals, gates that are nearer the
primary outputs receive higher priorities. If the number of weighted errors and the distance
to the primary outputs are both identical, gates presenting more reconvergent fanouts are
considered more critical. Gates for which these three parameters are equal receive the same
critical factor.
4.2.3.3 Reliability analysis and comparison
Subsequent to classifying the critical gates, the reliability of the circuit is evaluated
using the SPR analysis [15], which was explained in Section 1.2.3. Let us now consider
TMR as the chosen redundancy technique to harden a gate, and that the area overhead
constraint allows a designer to protect up to 5 gates. According to the critical factors
presented in Table 4.2, gates g32, g1, g3, g0 and g9 are selected by the proposed method as
the five candidates to be protected. The method named STMR presented in [18], under
the same area overhead constraint, applies TMR in gates g32, g36, g37, g38 and g39.
The reliability of the output bits for the original circuit and for the redundant config-
urations can be obtained by the SPR technique. Table 4.3 shows the reliability results for
the respective configurations considering q = 0.99 for the gates not protected by TMR and
q = 1 for the hardened gates.
Analyzing the results presented in Table 4.3, it can be seen the effectiveness of the
proposed approach. Indeed, the proposed method to selectively apply TMR into a circuit
shows a greater increase on the reliability of the most significant bits of the circuit (see
Table 4.3). For instance, the reliabilities of S0 and S1 (LSBs) do not present any increase
compared to the original circuit. Besides, the reliability of S4 (MSB) presents the highest
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Figure 4.3: Simulation results for the 74283 circuit
improvement as expected, once it is considered the most critical bit for this application.
It can be also noted that, under the same area overhead, the nominal reliability increases
by almost the same amount with both methods (see Figure 4.3). In fact, nominal reliability
assigns equal reliability costs to the output bits. In spite of that, practical reliability results
can handle this problem, and can indeed provide a sharper distinction between this two
hardened architectures as shown in Figure 4.3.
4.3 Using a Cost Function to Detect Critical Gates
The reliability of a given circuit is the degree of confidence observed in the outputs of
this circuit, given a scenario in which faults are expected to occur with a given probability.
From the analysis point of view these faults could be either defects or transients induced
by single event effects.
In this work, the SPR algorithm [15] is applied to obtain the reliability figures of a
circuit. As stated in section 1.2.3, SPR uses both the reliability of the gates and signal
reliability computation to determine the cumulative effect of multiple faults. The effort
that is required to evaluate each gate of the circuit (in order to find the best hardening
candidate) is only possible because the complexity of the SPR algorithm is linear with the
number of gates in the circuit.
Let us consider that a given circuit comprises K gates [gi · · · gk]. Each gate has an
associated reliability, given by [qi · · · qk]. The circuit as a whole has a reliability value R.
Then, if we consider any reliability change (i.e., improvement) of a single gate gi brings in
its new reliability to q∗i , the circuit’s reliability becomes R
∗
i . Two different gates, gi and
gj , may have different contributions to the reliability of the circuit, therefore producing
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different values R∗i and R
∗
j .
It is important to note that the SPR algorithm is not 100% accurate. The sources
of inaccuracies come from incorrect evaluation of (multiple) reconvergent fanout branches.
An accurate analysis is possible using the multi-pass algorithm described in [15], referred as
SPR-MP. It is well known that both algorithms produce different values for the reliability
of a circuit. Yet, in [27] it has been shown that SPR is capable of estimating the critical
nodes (from a hardening perspective) with a small degree of error (in comparison with
SPR-MP).
In our methodology we assume that a hardening technique is applied, and such tech-
nique is able to improve the reliability of a gate such that q∗i = 1. This is a simplification,
not a restriction, other values are also possible. Then, for all gates of the circuit we perform
an evaluation run of the SPR algorithm. In each evaluation run we select a gate gi, allow
q∗i to be 1, and obtain the new reliability value R
∗
i .
After all evaluation runs are performed, we obtain an ordered list of R∗i values. At this
point one could select the gate with the highest R∗i to be hardened. This is a common
approach applied in many works [104, 106]. Yet, this approach could be considered naive
since it does not take into account the hardening cost of each gate. Both mentioned works
define a maximum area target that cannot be surpassed.
Thus, the goal of this research is to establish a trade-off between the costs of hardening
a gate against the costs of hardening any other gate. In order to do so, a new parameter
is introduced to express the hardening affinity of a gate, given by Chai. This parameter
defines how easy/hard it is to harden a gate. The Chai value of each gate type is user-
defined and it must be constrained in the interval [0,1]. The higher the value of Chai the
better it is. This parameter is generic and can be used to express any type of hardening
trade-off: area, delay, power or combinations of the previous. The decision of which circuit
characteristic should be used to define Chai falls to the user.
In Table 4.4 we show some of the values that were used in our experiments. These
values are extracted from an actual 90nm standard cell library provided by Synopsys [19].
In our experiments we considered only the area to calculate the hardening affinity. For
each gate we have divided the area of the smallest inverter (INVX0) in the library by the
given gate actual area, in order to normalize all the Chai values. Negated cells benefit
from the CMOS natural inversion and have a higher Chai value.
It is then possible to apply the Chai values in a cost function which takes into account
both the cost and the reliability gain. The reliability gain (or reliability difference) is given
by Rgi, and it is the difference from the circuit reliability before and after a single gate gi
was hardened:
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Table 4.4: Hardware affinity (Chai) parameters for some cells
Cell Area (µm2) Chai
INVX0 5.5296 1
NAND2X0 5.5296 1
NOR2X0 5.5296 1
AND2X1 7.3728 0.75
OR4X1 10.1376 0.55
XOR3X1 22.1184 0.25
Rgi = R
∗
i −R (4.5)
These values are then used in a cost function that is expressed as follows:
Ci = Rgi/Chai (4.6)
Once the value of Ci has been obtained for all gates, these are sorted and the highest
value is chosen. The gate that corresponds to the highest value of Ci is then assumed to
be hardened and the new circuit reliability (R∗i ) is obtained.
In [27] this reliability value is compared against a user-given reliability target ‘T’. If the
reliability is lower than ‘T’, the algorithm starts again and all gates still not hardened are
considered as candidates. Otherwise, if the target is met, the algorithm ends and outputs
the ordered list of gates to be hardened. In the next section, an approach based on two
heuristics is presented as a mean to automatically set a reliability improvement target.
4.3.1 Cost function profiling
The methodology described in Section 4.3 was applied to several ISCAS benchmark
circuits [107]. The profile of the cost function was then obtained for circuits of different sizes
and topologies. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 illustrate the cost function profile for the circuits c432
(a channel interrupt controller) and c499 (32-bit single-error-correcting circuit). These
circuits were chosen particularly because they represent two contrastive profiles that are
of interest.
The illustrations in both figures were obtained using the parameters qi = 0.999 and
q∗i = 1. Other combination of values cause slight changes in the plots, i.e., the profile of
the function remains the same. In other words, the profile of the function is highly related
to the logic masking capabilities and the affinity of each gate. The closer a gate is to the
y axis, the better candidate for hardening it is.
The illustration in Figure 4.4 represents a profile that contains a fast drop in the
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function, observed in the very first gates. Circuits that have some degree of regularity (e.g.,
adders and multipliers) have a profile with some similarities with the one in Figure 4.5,
where a ‘step-like’ pattern is observed. Each ‘step’ or plateau represents a set of gates that
has a similar functionality in the circuit, therefore they can be hardened in any given order.
Taking into account both profiles that were presented, we have defined two heuristics to
decide when selective hardening starts to impose an impractical cost. Those heuristics are
explained in details in the next subsections.
4.3.1.1 Sum of elements heuristic
This heuristic was defined to create a stop point when the sum of the Ci terms from
the elements that were already hardened reaches a threshold. Let C0 be the value of the
cost function for the best hardening candidate. Then the target becomes to find a value j
such that:
j∑
i=2
Ci ≤ K × C0 (4.7)
where K is an empirically chosen constant. In other words, the threshold is defined as
K times the value of the cost function for the first hardened gate. This heuristic can be
interpreted as an integral that sums the area under a curve. For the sake of comparison,
we have set the parameter K = 10 for all the case studies used in this work.
Figure 4.4: Cost function profile for the circuit c432
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Figure 4.5: Cost function profile for the circuit c499
Percent wise heuristic
Sum of elements  
heuristic
Figure 4.6: Both heuristics applied to the circuit c1355
4.3.1.2 Percent wise heuristic
This heuristic was defined to create a stop point at the first Ci value that is lower than
X% of the first term (C0). This heuristic can be interpreted as an horizontal threshold
value. When the function crosses that threshold it is no longer feasible to perform selective
hardening for the remaining gates.
For the sake of comparison, in the following we have empirically set the parameter
X = 50%. In other words, any gate that improves the circuit reliability with a Ci value
that is less than half of C0 should not be hardened, i.e., we only harden cells that are at
least half as effective as the first candidate.
4.3.1.3 Comparing the heuristics
Both heuristics were applied to the circuit c1355 (which is also a 32-bit single-error-
correcting circuit). Figure 4.6 contains the plot of the cost function for all elements of the
target circuit. The dashed vertical lines represent the points where the heuristics decided
that selective hardening was no longer feasible.
Deciding which parameter value is more appropriate for each circuit is a complex task.
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Table 4.5: Results for the sum of elements heuristic, K = 10
Circuit Number Original Hardened Hardened Area
of gates area (µm2) gates area (µm2) increase
c17 6 33.1776 6 99.5328 200%
74283 40 306.5096 20 547.9688 78.7%
c432 160 1134.4672 33 1541.4208 35.8%
c499 202 2155.1680 12 2414.1504 12.0%
c1355 546 3194.7328 11 3316.3840 3.8%
c1908 880 5273.7488 13 5417.5184 2.7%
c2670 1269 8018.0632 19 8233.7176 2.6%
c3540 1669 10855.1824 25 11177.7424 2.9%
c5315 2307 15293.5992 20 15518.4696 1.4%
For instance, for the circuit c1355, the first heuristic would select 11 gates for hardening,
while the second heuristic would select 201 gates. Hardening 201 out of 546 gates (around
36%) might be a hard assignment, since most of the times the area budget will not allow
for such hardening (the total circuit area would become 76% larger).
Nevertheless, selecting 11 out of 546 gates (around 2%) might be a better and more
suitable choice. Along the same lines, applying the percent wise heuristic to the circuit
c432 would result in only 2 gates being selected for hardening, which could left some of
the hardening budget unused.
In the next section, results for other circuits are presented. Also, the discussion regard-
ing which heuristic (and associated parameter) is more appropriate for which scenario is
extended.
4.3.2 Experimental results
The methodology described in Section 4.3 was applied to several ISCAS benchmark
circuits. Each gate from each circuit was set using qi = 0.9999. The results are presented
in tables 4.5 and 4.6. The former table contains the results for the first heuristic defined
in subsection 4.3.1.1 (with K = 10) while the latter contains the results for the second
heuristic defined in subsection 4.3.1.2 (with X = 50%).
In tables 4.5 and 4.6, the meaning of each column is as follows: the column denoted
“Original area” contains the sum of the area of each gate in each circuit (therefore placement
utilization rate and routing overhead are not considered). The column denoted “Hardened
gates” contains the number of gates that are selected for hardening. Then, the column
denoted “Hardened area” contains the circuit area of the hardened version of the circuit,
while the column denoted “Area increase” contains that same value but percent wise.
A fairly simple assumption was made: when hardening a gate its area become three
times larger than before. This metric is inspired by classical Triple Modular Redundancy
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Table 4.6: Results for the percent wise heuristic, X = 50%
Circuit Number Original Hardened Hardened Area
of gates area (µm2) gates area (µm2) increase
c17 6 33.1776 5 88.4736 166.6%
74283 40 306.5096 9 406.0424 32.5%
c432 160 1134.4672 2 1187.5264 4.6%
c499 202 2155.1680 41 2854.6752 32.4%
c1355 546 3194.7328 201 5647.1232 76.7%
c1908 880 5273.7488 119 6611.912 25.3%
c2670 1269 8018.0632 10 8128.6552 1.4%
c3540 1669 10855.1824 8 10963.9312 1.2%
c5315 2307 15293.5992 15 15459.4872 1.1%
(TMR), although other techniques with different metrics might be applied (e.g., hardening
by design). The additional area that would be required for a majority voter, given TMR
is considered, is neglected. Therefore the area figures given in the tables are a minimum
value estimate for TMR.
An analysis of the area increase values in Table 4.5 reveals that the sum of elements
heuristic is not prone for small circuits, causing a large overhead for the circuits 74283
and c432. For the smallest of the circuits (c17 ) the heuristic decides that all gates should
be hardened, which is unacceptable when the goal is selective hardening. Nevertheless,
this can be avoided by using a smaller value for the parameter K (e.g., K = 1 elects 2
cells while K = 2 selects 4 cells for hardening). This is not the case for the area increase
values in Table 4.6. There is no value for the parameter X that will be a good fit for all
circuits or even for a group of circuits. Therefore, it is quite harder to apply the percent
wise heuristic.
4.3.3 Comparison with related works
A straightforward comparison with other methodologies is not simple since the goals
are usually different. If comparing a methodology is hard, it is even harder to compare
the heuristics proposed in this work. A simple solution adopted by related works is to
define a limit or target for hardening. In [108] a simple limit L is defined as the maximum
number of gates to be hardened. In references [106] and [104] a hardening limit in terms of
area increase is applied. In [27] the authors have defined the hardening target as a relative
improvement in the reliability of the circuit. None of the mentioned works perform an
evaluation of how hard it was to reach a hardening limit/target. This is the reason why
we have studied the profile of the cost function.
The work of [109] has a similar target as the one described in this work. The hardening
is achieved by increasing the gate size of some critical nodes in the circuit but no hardening
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against defects is mentioned. Although this is a valid solution, it can be quite complicated
to apply it in a commercial design flow since the choices of logic gates are limited. Thus
the technique presented here is a more general solution since it is library and technology
independent. The overheads mentioned in [109] are not directly comparable.
Nevertheless, in qualitative terms it is easily observed that certain gates have a larger
impact in the reliability of the circuit than others. This observation is highlighted in
[104, 106, 108, 109]. In our experiments this was also observed. There are some particular
cases, like the one illustrated in Figure 4.4, where choosing the correct gate to harden has
a large impact in the overall circuit reliability.
4.4 Conclusion
In a context where defects and soft errors are a growing concern, two methods to
selectively apply TMR to digital circuits were proposed. The first one detects critical
gates by taking into account not only the probability of error occurrence, but also the
impact of such error to the system. Simulation results have shown the effectiveness of
the proposed approach. Although the reliability of the circuit obtained with the proposed
method is only slightly different from the one stated in [18], the reliability enhancement
is most present in the most critical bits of the system. In fact, the ability to drive the
reliability improvement effort to critical bits of a system is of great use for applications in
which some output bits are more critical than others. In addition, a new metric to analyze
the reliability of a circuit with a multiple-bit output is also presented. This metric, named
practical reliability, allows a designer to assign different weights to different output bits
in order to reflect different error costs to a system. It has been shown that the proposed
metric provides additional information to the designer so that he can better analyze the
reliability of a system. The second one is based on some heuristics that provide a better
understanding of the costs related to selective hardening applied for combinational logic
in digital circuits. Furthermore, we have also dealed with multiple faults to determine
the actual reliability of the circuits in our analysis. The results present the use of the
methodology in conjunction with a standard cell library from an actual vendor, where the
trade-off between area and reliability gain is highlighted. Thus, the methodology can be
integrated in commercial design flows in a very straightforward manner.
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Chapter 5
Optimizing Voter Placement for
TMR Systems
5.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces a method to automatically partition a TMR design based on a
given reliability requirement. First, some basics on TMR will be introduced in section 5.2.
Next, a mathematical analysis of TMR partition will be explained in section 5.3, and some
problems regarding the insertion of majority voters will be presented in section 5.4. The
proposed method is explained in section 5.5. Concluding remarks are given in section 5.6
5.2 TMR approach
Triple modular redundancy is a well-known fault-tolerance technique based on a very
simple concept. Three identical logic modules (or black boxes) performing the same task
feed the inputs of a majority voter, which is responsible to evaluate the final output (see
Figure 5.1). Since the outputs of the modules are binary and the number of inputs of the
majority voter is odd, an unambiguous majority opinion can be provided as the output [60].
Module
Module
Module
Majority
Input Output
Figure 5.1: TMR block scheme
If it is considered that the majority voter does not fail, the reliability of a redundant
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circuit protected by TMR (Rcir) can be defined as a function of the reliability of one
module (Rm) as shown in (5.1). Notice that it is also assumed that the failures of the
redundant modules are independent.
Rcir = R
3
m + 3R
2
m(1−Rm) (5.1)
Rcir = 3R
2
m − 2R3m
Further information regarding the use of TMR to improve the reliability of a circuit
can be extracted from (5.1). First of all, it can be seen that if Rm ≤ 0.5, the use of TMR
will not increase the circuit’s reliability Rcir. Next, if Rm ≈ 1, the increase in reliability
achieved is so small that the area penalty required by this technique may not worth it.
Indeed, as shown in Figure 5.2, the gain in reliability (Rcir/Rm) acquired by the use of
TMR depends on the reliability of the block Rm.
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Figure 5.2: Reliability gain using TMR
Despite its simplicity, triple modular redundancy is a fault-tolerance technique that
can yield great results. Circuits protected by TMR can provide correct outputs even if one
redundant module fails. In general, the larger the size of a logic module, the more likely is
the occurrence of multiple errors. However, if two redundant modules produce erroneous
results at the same time in a TMR circuit, the final output is incorrect. Because of that, it
would be a more efficient approach to partition a large logic module into ‘n’ logic partitions
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as shown in Figure 5.3 [110]. In this case, the circuit will provide incorrect outputs only
if two logic modules located at the same logic partition produce erroneous results. Notice
that each logic module in Figure 5.3(a) is protected by three redundant majority voters,
as shown in Figure 5.3(b), because of two main reasons: first, this avoids a single point
of failure if the majority voter fails; and second, three different paths are available to be
connected to the next module.
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(a) TMR scheme with logic partitions
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Figure 5.3: Partitioning a TMR design
Although the reliability tends to increase with the decrease in the module size, the
amount of resources required for the addition of the majority voters may be too costly.
Nevertheless, it has been proved that placing voters only at the final output may be not
sufficient to avoid errors [110]. Because of that, there is a major need to detect the best
amount of voters and the best locations to insert them into the circuit in order to meet a
given reliability requirement. In order to tackle this problem, let us start by performing a
mathematical analysis about partitioning a TMR design in the next section.
5.3 Partitioning a TMR design
Let be C1 a circuit whose reliability is represented by RC1 . Considering that this circuit
is composed of n modules serially interconnected as shown in Figure 5.4, the reliability of
the circuit C1 can be expressed as follows:
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RC1 =
n∏
k=1
(Rmk) (5.2)
Assuming that each module is now implemented as a TMR version of itself, that is the
TMR version of the circuit C1 comprises n partitions, and considering that the voters do
not fail, the reliability of the TMR circuit can be evaluated as shown in (5.3).
RC1TMR =
n∏
k=1
(3R2mk − 2R3mk) (5.3)
Considering the use of n partitions, let us evaluate what is the value of the reliability
of each block Rmk such that (5.3) is maximized. In order to do that, we can use (5.2) and
(5.3) and the method of Lagrange Multipliers as shown below.
g(Rmn , Rmn−1 , · · · , λ) =
n∏
k=1
(3R2mk − 2R3mk)− λ(
n∏
k=1
(Rmk)−RC1) (5.4)
Then, performing a series of partial derivatives, the following system of equations can
be found.

∂
∂Rm1
g = (6Rm1 − 6R2m1)
∏n
k=2(3R
2
mk
− 2R3mk)− λ
∏n
k=2(Rmk) = 0
∂
∂Rm2
g = (6Rm2 − 6R2m2)(3R2m1 − 2R3m1)
∏n
k=3(3R
2
mk
− 2R3mk)− λRm1
∏n
k=3(Rmk) = 0
∂
∂Rm3
g = (6Rm3 − 6R2m3)
∏2
k=1(3R
2
mk
− 2R3mk)
∏n
k=4(3R
2
mk
− 2R3mk)− λRm1Rm2
∏n
k=4(Rmk) = 0
...
...
...
...
...
∂
∂Rmn
g = (6Rmn − 6R2mn)
∏n−1
k=1(3R
2
mk
− 2R3mk)− λ
∏n−1
k=1(Rmk) = 0
By inspection, it can be seen that Rm1 = Rm2 = · · · = Rmn = R1/nC1 is a solution of
such system, and it can be shown that this point is a maximum of (5.2) for 0 ≤ RC1 ≤ 1.
However, the function represented by (5.3) is restricted to the region represented by (5.2)
for 0 ≤ RC1 ≤ 1, and therefore it presents discontinuities. Because of that, we have to
x Module m1 Module m2 · · · Module mn y
Figure 5.4: C1 comprises n modules serially interconnected
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Figure 5.5: Plot of Rm1 =
RC1
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for different values of RC1
proof that there is no point in the boundary of such region that is a maximum of the
function. In order to do that, let us analyze the simple case of n = 2, for which the system
of equations is shown below:
g(Rm1 , Rm2 , λ) = (3R
2
m1 − 2R3m1)(3R2m2 − 2R3m2)− λ((Rm1Rm2)−RC1) (5.5)
RC1 = Rm1Rm2 (5.6)
The behavior of the constraint function (5.6) for different values of RC1 is shown in
Figure 5.5. It can be seen that in order to analyze the boundary of such region, we must set
Rm1 = 1, which leads to Rm2 = RC1 , or Rm2 = 1, which leads to Rm1 = RC1 . In this case,
equation (5.5) becomes (5.7), which is the same as the equation for a TMR circuit with
a unique partition. Considering perfect voters, it is known that the reliability of a circuit
increases with the number of voters. Therefore, (5.7) provides a value of reliability that is
smaller than (5.5), that is the points in the boundary do not represent a maximum of the
function. This result can be generalized for n dimensions since each time we set a Rm value
to 1, the set of equations will correspond to the analysis of a system with n− 1 partitions.
Thus, in order to achieve a maximum TMR reliability, we have to partition the design
into blocks of as nearly reliability as possible, that is Rm1 = Rm2 = · · · = Rmn = R1/nC1 .
The same result can be seen in [60] for the case of imperfect voters. Based on that, (5.8)
represents the reliability of a TMR circuit with n equal partitions, which maximizes the
TMR performance. Notice that (5.8) can be used to evaluate the minimum number of
partitions n required to meet a given reliability RC1TMR .
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g(Rm1 , Rm2 , λ) = (3R
2
C1 − 2R3C1) (5.7)
RC1TMR = (3R
2/n
C1
− 2R3/nC1 )n (5.8)
5.4 Problem of automatically inserting voters
As stated above, TMR is a technique widely used in the construction of fault tolerant
circuits and systems. However, manually apply TMR to a circuit and insert the required
voters is an error-prone task, so the automation of such procedure is an important re-
quirement. Tools such as Xilinx XTMR [111] and BYU-LANL Partial TMR [79] can
automatically apply TMR in case of FPGAs. For instance, XTMR tool provides several
features such as triplicate the inputs, the clock, the majority voters, and yet insert synchro-
nization voters to feedback loops. The last one intends to synchronize the sequential logic
state of the TMR modules when a scrubbing process is performed to correct the effects
of SEEs. In spite of that, not much is provided in order to partition a design and insert
voters such that a minimum reliability requirement is met.
As a matter of fact, in order to design high-reliable circuits, a traditional TMR imple-
mentation may not be enough, and the use of partitioning voters, i.e. voters that intends
to partition a design in order to increase its reliability, may be required. In [112] the
authors have concluded that the number and the placement of voters in a TMR design
directly affect its fault tolerance ability, and therefore cleverly insert voters may be a good
approach to build high-reliable systems. However, the decision of the quantity as well as
the placement of such voters is very complicated since it is governed by several constraints,
such as timing, area and reliability. Further, the insertion of voters in some nodes of a
circuit may not be allowed or desired. For instance, some FPGAs contain dedicated route
connections to implement some specific functions such as a ripple-carry adder that does
not allow the insertion of a voter.
Methods to automatically insert voters generally rely on simple rules such as the in-
sertion of voters after every flip-flop. Although simple, this technique ensures that only
one voter will be inserted per timing path, which reduces the timing penalty caused by the
voter insertion process. On the flip side of the coin, this technique may insert more voters
than the necessary to meet a given reliability requirement. This insertion procedure can be
performed in different levels of a design. For instance, in case of FPGAs the voter insertion
is generally performed using FPGA primitives such as LUTs and flip-flops. In next section
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we introduce a method that can automatically insert voters in a design, whether it be an
ASIC of FPGA, based on a given reliability requirement.
5.5 Proposed method
In order to develop our methodology, let us first analyze the behavior of the reliability
of a circuit as a function of its number of levels. In such context, a level can be defined as a
circuit node with the capability to become the edge of a partition. In practical circuits these
prospective points can be for example registered outputs. A very useful representation for
the reliability of a circuit regarding its number of levels is the signal reliability concept
explained in Section 1.2.3. This is because such concept can provide the probability of a
correct result in any circuit node. The expected behavior of the signal reliability versus
the number of levels can be seen in Figure 5.6. Notice that it usually decreases with the
number of levels.
Reliability
Levels
Figure 5.6: Reliability of a circuit versus its number of levels
When a majority voter is inserted in an arbitrary level of a TMR circuit, an increase
in the signal reliability of such level is expected as shown in Figure 5.7. This is due to
the logical masking ability provided by the voter decision, which, as it is well known, can
correct the occurrence of any single error presented in its inputs.
From these two figures shown above, a very simple idea can be elaborated as a means
to provide the edges of the modules of a TMR implementation, defining then their sizes.
Supposing that a given circuit has a minimum reliability requirement, the edges can be
identified by the levels in which the signal reliability is as close as possible to the minimum
reliability requirement as shown in Figure 5.8.
Although the method lies in a very simple idea, the provided results are very close to
the optimal ones. As shown in Section 5.3, it has been proved that to achieve a maximum
TMR reliability, a circuit must be subdivided into modules of as nearly equal reliability as
possible [60]. Using the proposed approach, only the first and the last modules may not
have the same size. As a matter of fact, two different characteristics contributes to obtain
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Reliability
Levels
Majority Voter
Figure 5.7: Insertion of a majority voter
good results with the proposed method. First, the reliability gain obtained with a TMR
system depends on the reliability of the module Rm as shown in (5.1). Next, the decrease
in signal reliability experienced when a signal passes through a given block is proportional
to the reliability of such block. Therefore, limiting the signal reliability decrease to the
same value leads to the creation of blocks with reliability as close as possible to each other,
thus approaching the optimal solution.
For the sake of illustration, let us consider a simple circuit comprising 10000 inverter
gates with equal reliabilities (Rm = 99.99%) and interconnected in a cascade structure as
shown in Figure 5.9. The reliability of this circuit, represented by Rc, can be evaluated
using the SPR tool, which leads to a result of Rc = 56.7654%. Assuming that the minimum
reliability requirement is Rmin = 99.9%, the proposed method evaluates that 1000 voters
must be inserted in order to meet such requirement. All the created partitions have the
same number of components (N = 10), with exception of the first (N = 11) and the last
(N = 9) ones. Follows from (5.8) that the minimum number of partitions to achieve Rmin
is 961 in this case. However, in order to split the circuit into 961 partitions with the same
Reliability
Levels
Reliability
Requirement
(Rmin)
Level 5 Level 9 Level 12
Figure 5.8: Distributing the voting process of a TMR circuit
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m = 10000
Figure 5.9: Cascade of inverters
size, each partition should contain 10.4058 inverter gates, which is not possible. Therefore,
follows that the best amount of modules in each partition should be 10, which leads to
the result of 1000 voters as well. Figure 5.10 illustrates the results obtained with (5.8)
and with the proposed method for different values of Rmin. Notice that the optimal values
evaluated by (5.8) are not yet rounded such that the division of the circuit into partitions
with the same size can be realized.
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Figure 5.10: Number of voters inserted by the proposed technique
Although the results provided by the proposed method regarding the cascade circuit
shown in Figure 5.9 are very close to the optimal results, this is a special case and its per-
formance regarding more complex circuits must also be analyzed. Thus, let us now consider
a 74283 4-bit fast adder for which the gate-level architecture is shown in Figure 5.11. As
can be seen, this circuit comprises 40 logic gates, 9 inputs and 5 outputs. First of all, let
us consider that the output of any logic gate is a prospective point to insert a majority
voter, and that the reliability of any of such gates is 99%. Remember that the primary
outputs of the circuit have already majority voters. Table 5.1 shows the obtained results
for three different reliability requirements (Rmin). It can be noted that the first two points
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Figure 5.11: Circuit 74283 - Gate level
in which the method inserts voters are the outputs of the gates 33 and 34. As a matter of
fact, these two gates are points in which several signals converge (fanins) leading to a more
accentuated decrease in the signal reliability. Also, as the reliability of the logic gates are
assumed to be the same, paths in which more logic gates are presented tends to contain
more voters. For instance, voters are placed in points in which the signal passes through
at least 3 logic gates for Rmin = 97%.
The results obtained with the proposed method also depend on the reliability of each
logic gate. In the last example, we have considered that any logic gate has reliability
q = 99%. However, let us now remove such consideration and assume that the reliability
of a gate depends on its area. The area of the logic gates are obtained from an actual 90ηm
standard cell library provided by Synopsys [19]. We considered that the reliability of an
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Table 5.1: Placement of the voters for the circuit 74283
Rmin Number of Voters Voter Placement (Output of Gates)
0.96 2 33, 34
0.97 7 14, 20, 25, 29, 33, 34, 35
0.98 11 13, 14, 19, 20, 24, 25, 28, 29, 33, 34, 35
Table 5.2: Reliability of gates based on their area
Gate Area (µm2) Reliability
Inverter 5.5296 0.99
Buffer 5.5296 0.99
2-input NAND 5.5296 0.99
2-input NOR 5.5296 0.99
2-input AND 7.3728 0.9867
3-input AND 8.2944 0.985
3-input NOR 8.2944 0.985
4-input NOR 9.2160 0.9833
4-input AND 10.1376 0.9817
2-input XOR 13.8240 0.975
5-input NOR a 14.7456 0.9733
5-input AND b 16.5888 0.97
a. Built with a 4-input NOR and a 2-input NOR gates
b. Built with two 3-input AND gates
inverter gate is q = 99%, and we derive the other reliabilities based on the relation between
the area of a gate and the area of the inverter. These values are shown in Table 5.2. Based
on such reliability values, we have performed another analysis of the 74283 circuit using
the proposed approach for three different values of Rmin. The obtained results are shown
in Table 5.3. Observe that the placement as well as the quantity of the voters are different
from the results presented in Table 5.1. Now, for Rmin = 96%, 4 majority voters are
inserted into the outputs of gates 13, 33, 34 and 35. For instance, gate 13 is the gate with
highest probability of failure since it has the biggest area, and therefore a majority voter
is now inserted in its output.
Obviously, the 74283 circuit is very small when compared to circuits produced nowa-
days. However, it is just a case study in order to demonstrate the performance of the
proposed method when dealing with non-cascade structures. In fact, this method is based
on the SPR tool, which has some interesting characteristics that allows a very good scal-
ing ability. For instance, the method can be applied to different levels of abstraction of
a circuit such as gate level, block level, among others. Also, the complexity of the SPR
algorithm is linear regarding the number of gates/blocks of a design, and therefore can be
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Table 5.3: Placement of the voters for the 74283 circuit
Rmin Number of Voters Voter Placement (Output of Gates)
0.95 2 33, 34
0.96 4 13, 33, 34, 35
0.97 9 13, 14, 19, 20, 25, 29, 33, 34, 35
applied to relative large circuits. Moreover, the consideration of the signal reliability of a
circuit to decide the points in which we should insert voters allows to deal with circuits
with complex structures and yet provide good results.
5.6 Conclusion
The current chapter presented an automatic method to partition a TMR design. This
is of great interest for systems in which safety is a major concern so that reliability must
be as high as possible. Although the proposed method is based on a simple idea, the
results are very close to optimal. Also, the algorithm is based on the SPR method, which
has a linear complexity related to the number of nodes of a circuit. Therefore, it can
be applied to relative large circuits. In addition, it is important to note that the whole
decision process can be easily automated. In fact, a tool written in C language was already
developed in order to validate the proposed idea. Such implementation can deal with gate
level descriptions of circuit as well as with primitives of FPGAs devices.
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Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks
As electronic circuits shrinks down, methods to analyze and fabricate reliable circuits
are more and more required. The present research provides some new models and tools
that can be used to design reliable circuits such that these circuits can more easily meet
the requirements of the technical standard IEC 62566.
The main objective of this work was to propose methods to analyze and to improve
the reliability of circuits in order to facilitate their qualification according to technical
standards such those useful for EDF. The necessary steps to achieve this goal have been
presented in the chapters of the report. First, several studies already reported in the
literature were reviewed. This reading produced Chapters 1 and Annexes A and B of the
current manuscript.
Concerning reliability analysis, this work proposed the concept of effective reliability,
which provides a model to evaluate the reliability of a circuit taking into account the ability
of a given application to tolerate faults, here called application error masking. The results
have shown the importance of considering such concept when evaluating the reliability of
a circuit. As a matter of fact, effective reliability can provide a more precise result about
the reliability of a circuit so that unnecessary area overhead can be avoided.
An interesting technique that can provide a tradeoff between the amount of redundancy
adding and the reliability improvement is selective hardening, which is based on protecting
only the most critical gates/blocks of a circuit. In this work, two different methodologies
were proposed to deal with that. The first one takes into account that some output bits
are more critical than others for a given application, and that these bits should be more
protected. The other uses a hardware function and some heuristics to automatically detect
the best candidates in a design to be protected.
Concerning critical applications in which the reliability requirement is usually very
high, a method to automatically partition a TMR design based on a desired reliability
level was introduced. The method has shown to provide results very close to optimal, and
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that it can be easily integrated in design tools to be used in VLSI as well as in FPGA
circuits.
Further, a tool based on fault injection, named FIFA, was also developed in order to
analyze and validate fault tolerant designs explored in this work. Although most of the
tests performed with the tool were based on exhaustive analysis, FIFA can be easily used
to inject randomly faults as well as to use just a set of inputs, controlled by the designer,
that are considered more pertinent for the application.
The perspectives of the current work can be explained as follows. Concerning reliability
analysis, the concept of effective reliability can be expanded by the development of new
quality metrics to measure the impact of errors in the output of a circuit. By doing that,
designers can better control the set of errors that can be tolerated by a given application.
The FIFA tool can be upgraded by analyzing and then limiting the amount of nodes to
inject multiple faults. For example, multiple faults could be limited to a region in the
design. Concerning reliability improvement techniques, the idea of drive the reliability
effort to the most critical bits of an application can be extended by implementing other
weight functions that reflect the impact of an error in non-binary output words. Also, the
method to partition a TMR design can be improved if the signal dependencies resulted
from reconvergent fanouts are taken into consideration.
The research performed during this thesis originated several publications as can be seen
bellow. Also, a patent of the method to partition a TMR design is under analysis.
– Effective metrics for reliability analysis [101] - Oral presentation at the 53rd
Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems (MWSCAS) 2010;
– Using error tolerance of target application for efficient reliability improve-
ment of digital circuits [102] - Oral presentation at the 21st European Symposium
on the Reliability of Electron Devices, Failure Physics and Analysis (ESREF) 2010
and published as a special issue of the Microelectronics Reliability journal;
– An approach for efficient reliability improvement of digital circuits - Poster
presentation at Gdr SoC-SiP, Lyon, France, 2011;
– FIFA: A fault-injection-fault-analysis-based tool for reliability assessment
at RTL level [105] - Oral presentation at the 22nd European Symposium on the
Reliability of Electron Devices, Failure Physics and Analysis (ESREF) 2011 and
published as a special issue of the Microelectronics Reliability journal;
– Exploring the Feasibility of Selective Hardening for Combinational Logic [103]
- Accepted for poster presentation at the 23rd European Symposium on the Reliabil-
ity of Electron Devices, Failure Physics and Analysis (ESREF) 2012 and published
as a special issue of the Microelectronics Reliability journal;
– Net Hardening: an Approach for Selective Hardening Concerning Multi-
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ple Faults - Submitted to IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science (TNS).
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Appendix A
Other Methods for Reliability
Improvement of ICs
A.1 Fault detection and correction
A.1.1 Basic principles
This redundancy technique is based on the detection of errors in a circuit in order
to perform a corrective action. The fault detection is usually carried out by internal
mechanisms, as well as the corrective action. A circuit that has the ability to detect an
internal fault is called a self-checking circuit.
Self-checking circuits have received a lot of attention over the years [113,114]. The basic
idea is to encode the information in such a way that errors can be detected. Figure A.1
illustrates a self-checking circuit using fault detection redundancy. In this example, the
error detection mechanism is based on a simple comparison between two copies of the
same module, and is named duplex scheme. It is important to note that this scheme does
not provide intrinsically error correction capability. Thus, when the error flag reports the
occurrence of an error, we must carry out additional procedures in order to resolve the
problem.
Main Circuit
Spare
Comparator
Input Error flag
Output
Figure A.1: Example of a duplex comparison scheme
In order to use fault detection redundancy in a circuit, we must be careful when choosing
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the fault detection technique and the recovery procedure to be used. If a single fault
is presented in such mechanisms, the correct operation of the circuit is compromised.
Section A.1.2 introduces a brief state of the art of fault detection techniques existent in
the literature.
A.1.2 Fault detection techniques
In order to perform a fault detection procedure in a circuit, the addition of redundancy
is a necessary design penalty. This redundant information is generally used to implement
a code technique in which each output data is represented as a codeword. There are two
types of codes that can be used in such procedure: Error Detecting Code (EDC) and Error
Correcting Code (ECC) [115]. EDCs have the ability to identify error(s) in a data word,
but they cannot restore its(their) true value. Therefore, a post processing step is often
required when using such codes. ECCs can do both detect an error in a codeword and
restore the corresponding correct value. Thus, an ECC can be configured to do both detect
and mask the effect of errors in a circuit.
The characteristic of how many erroneous bits can be identified and/or corrected by
a given code is based on the Hamming Distance (HD) principle. The HD of a given code
can be defined as the number of bits in which two codewords differ. Derived from this
principle, the term Code Distance (CD) is often used to define the minimum HD between
any two symbols presented in a given code. In general, if we want to detect d errors in a
circuit, we must have a code with CD ≥ d+ 1. Moreover, in order to detect and correct t
errors, then CD ≥ 2t+1, and to detect d and correct t, or fewer errors, the CD ≥ t+d+1,
where t ≤ d [115]. For example, suppose a system in which the set of codewords allowed
by this circuit is given by C = {000, 111}. In this case, the Code Distance is given by
CD = 3; what means that this code can detect 2, or fewer errors, or correct 1. Indeed, the
code will interpret the received codeword as the most closer word presented in C. As an
example, if the system receives the word 001, it will be corrected to 000. Notice that this
example illustrates the behavior of a TMR system.
A.1.2.1 Error detecting codes
Error detecting codes are often used in techniques based on fault detection redundancy.
These codes provide error detecting capabilities but lack any error correcting capability.
Then, further procedures are required in order to execute a correction procedure.
A.1.2.1.1 Parity code
141
Memory
Data wordParity Bit
XXXXX
Parity Generator Parity Checking
Input Output
Error flag
Figure A.2: Computer memory using parity checking
The simplest EDC is the Parity Checking [114]. The main idea is to append an ex-
tra bit to a binary word in such a way that the number of 1’s is odd or even. When
examining the codeword, a parity checker counts the number of 1’s to verify the presence
of errors. Codes in which codewords are constructed appending check bits are named
systematic codes. They have the advantage that no decoding is required to get the final
output.
The parity code has a code distance CD = 2, i.e., this code allows the detection of
one faulty bit without correction. Figure A.2 illustrates a computer memory that uses the
parity code to detect errors presented in its data. Notice that we just added two blocks to
the basic memory structure: the parity generator and the parity checking. Both circuits
are simple, resulting in a low area overhead.
Because of the aforementioned features, scientists have been researching the use of
parity codes for many decades. The work in [116] proposed a procedure for synthesizing
multilevel circuits with concurrent error detection in which all errors caused by single stuck-
at faults were detected using a parity-check code. The proposed procedure automatically
searches for the parity-check code that will require the least amount of area to implement.
The work proposed in [114] compared the performance of twelve different combinational
circuits implemented into an Spartan-2 FPGA using four different error detecting tech-
niques: duplication with comparison, parity checking, Bose-Lin code, and Berger code.
The results have shown that for an FPGA, the best solution regarding area overhead and
performance decrease is the parity checking technique.
A.1.2.1.2 Berger code
Berger code is a systematic all-unidirectional error detecting code (AUED) proposed
by J. M. Berger in 1961 [117]. Unidirectional errors states for either a (0→ 1) or (1→ 0)
transition, but not both. This type of errors is particularly important to VLSI designs
since Pradhan [118] has shown that a large number of errors presented in such designs are
unidirectional. The main idea of Berger code is to append check bits to the data word.
These check bits are obtained according two encoding schemes: B0 or B1. In the first
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scheme, the check bits are obtained counting the number of 0’s and representing the value
into binary. In the other one, the encoding scheme uses the number of 1’s represented
using 1’s complement. Table A.1 illustrates a 3-bit Berger code with B0 encoding scheme.
Table A.1: 3-bit Berger code – B0 scheme
Data word Check bits Codeword
000 11 00011
001 10 00110
010 10 01010
011 01 01101
100 10 10010
101 01 10101
110 01 11001
111 00 11100
Design of totally self-checking (TSC) circuits based on Berger codes was first introduced
in [119] in 1974. The checker used 2k gates to translate the Berger codewords to 1-out-
of-2k codewords. Therefore, it was impractical and inefficient. Later, a more efficient
design procedure for Berger code was introduced in [120]. The method nevertheless failed
to deliver a 2-output TSC checker for Berger codes with I = 2r−1 information bits [121].
Intending to tackle this problem, the work in [122] proposed the generalized Berger check
partitioning method that allowed TSC Berger code checkers be constructed from TSC m-
out-of-n checkers . However, the proposed approach was not entirely self-testing as shown
by Piestrak afterwards [121]. Meanwhile, Piestrak also proposed the first correct design
approach for such circuits [123].
As stated above, Berger code can detect all unidirectional errors presented in a data
word if there is no error in the check bits. However, the Berger code is not efficient since
it requires a quite large number of check bits. A more efficient solution is the Bose Code
presented below.
A.1.2.1.3 Bose codes
The first Bose code that will be presented in this report is the Bose AUED code. These
code is also an all-unidirectional error detecting code, as the Berger code, but it is more
efficient since it requires fewer check bits. Indeed, it requires exactly d check bits to detect
any unidirectional error presented in a data word comprising 2d bits. Table A.2 shows the
Bose code for a 4-bit data word. Considering the number of zeros in a data word being
represented by No, the rules to be followed in order to encode a data word using the Bose
code are:
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- (No = 0) or (No = 2d) → Complement the first (2d−1) bits and append Cb =
(2d−1 − 1) as check bits;
- (2d−1) ≤ No ≤ (2d − 1) → Append Cb = No to the data word in binary (same as
Berger code);
- 1 ≤ No ≤ (2d−1 − 1) → Append Cb = (No − 1) to the data word in binary.
Table A.2: Bose code for data words comprising 4 bits
Data word Check bits Codeword
0000 01 110001
0001 11 000111
0010 11 001011
0011 10 001110
0100 11 010011
0101 10 010110
0110 10 011010
0111 00 011100
1000 11 100011
1001 10 100110
1010 10 101010
1011 00 101100
1100 10 110010
1101 00 110100
1110 00 111000
1111 01 001101
Although Bose has succeeded to improve the efficient of the Berger’s code, in digital
circuits data can be represented with a large number of bits. Based on that, we can define
a threshold ‘t’ in such a way that we can neglect the probability of occurrence of more than
‘t’ unidirectional errors in an output word. For these scenarios, we can use t-unidirectional
error detecting codes (t-UED) – codes able to detect up to ‘t’ faulty bits – instead of the
codes shown above.
Based on that, Bose and Lin have proposed in 1985 various t-UED codes, known as
Bose-Lin codes, in their work entitled “Systematic unidirectional error-detecting codes”
[124]. Indeed, they developed optimal codes that require 2, 3 and 4 check bits in order
to detect 2, 3 and 6 unidirectional errors, respectively. Considering that No denotes the
number of 0’s in a data word, the check bits (Cb) for each of the optimal codes can be
evaluated as follows:
- 2-UED code → Cb = No mod 4
- 3-UED code → Cb = No mod 8
- 6-UED code → Cb = (No mod 8) + 4
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Subsequently, in 1986, Bose have proposed a burst unidirectional error-detecting (BUED)
code in [125].These codes can detect burst errors with length up to 2r−1 using only r check
bits. The coding format uses the following relation to evaluate the check bits:
- BUED code → Cb = No mod 2r
The codes shown above were extensively used in totally self-checking (TSC) checker
designs [126–129]. In the work presented in [126], easily-testable checker designs for three
different codes were proposed: Bose-Lin, Bose and Blaum code. These checkers were
proved to be TSC under the stuck-at fault model. Later, a modular method for designing
checkers for Bose-Lin and Bose codes was proposed in [127], which resulted in designs more
efficient regarding area and performance than previous approaches. Moreover, in the same
work, these checkers were proved to be TSC under a more realistic fault model including:
stuck-at, transistor stuck-on, transistor stuck-open, resistive bridging faults and breaks.
In 2003, the work in [128] proposed TSC checkers for 3 different codes: Borden, Bose-Lin
and Bose. The proposed checkers can perform well under very weak assumptions, what
makes them perfect for use as embedded checkers. Afterwards, the same authors have also
proposed checkers for the Bose AUED code in [129].
A.1.2.1.4 Borden code
The Borden code is an optimum t-unidirectional error detecting code proposed by Bor-
den in 1982 [130]. This code is defined as follows:
Definition: If C(m,n) is the set of codes of length ‘n’ for which exactly ‘m’ bits
are ones, then the union of all such codes with ‘m’ being the set of values congruent to
bn/2cmod(t+ 1) is known as the Borden (n, t) code [115].
In order to illustrate this concept, let us assume n = 12 and t = 2. In this case, all
values for ‘m’ that are congruent to the expression bn/2cmod(t+ 1) are m = 2, 6, 10. This
means that this code is composed by any word of length 12 of which either 2, 6, or 10 bits
are 1, making these codes non-systematic in nature. The Borden code (n,t) can detect ‘t’
unidirectional errors. Then, for t = 1, the Borden code becomes the parity code.
Several works have been done over the years to benefit from the optimality of Borden
codes. A common way to efficient use such codes is designing self-checking circuits. In
1989, Jha proposed the first design for totally self-checking circuits based on Borden codes,
improving their overall applicability [131]. Later, the work in [132] proposed a method to
efficiently design self-checking circuits based on a class of Borden codes. Checkers designed
with the proposed approach reduced implementation costs up to 98.5%. However, they are
limited to a class of Borden codes. A systematic method of designing totally self-checking
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circuits for a larger class of Borden codes (even code lengths) were proposed in [133].
They significantly reduced the implementation costs compared to Jha’s method. In 2006,
Tarnick presented a self-checking circuit based on Borden codes and AN arithmetic very
suitable for use as embedded checkers [134].
A.1.2.2 Error correcting codes
Unlike EDCs, error correcting codes are codes that provides the ability to detect and
locate n errors presented in a data word. Then, simple procedures can be carried out in
order to correct the faults.
A.1.2.2.1 Hamming codes
Hamming codes were introduced in 1950 [135], and marked the beginning of the coding
theory. The author was a pioneer computer scientist, and during his researches, he found
that computers require error correcting capabilities. In order to do that, he created a
sophisticated pattern based on parity checking that can detect up to two simultaneous bit
errors or correct one, but not both simultaneously.
First of all, Hamming developed during his studies a nomenclature to describe systems
using coding techniques. His idea was to describe this as an (n, k) code where ‘n’ stands
for the number of bits of the codeword and ‘k’ stands for the number of data bits. Based
on that, a system that is composed of words with 7 data bits and 1 parity bit is represented
as an (8,7) code.
A Hamming code is then defined as an (n, k) code that respects the following relations:
k = 2r − r − 1, n = 2r − 1, r ≥ 3, where ‘r’ represents the number of check bits.
Considering that each bit in a codeword is numbered from 1 to n, the parity check bits are
located in positions that are multiple of two. For example, if we have a codeword encoded
with Hamming (7,4), the codeword structure is P1P2D1P3D2D3D4, where P represents a
parity bit and D a data bit.
In order to encode a specific data word using a Hamming code, we must first define
H := (In−k|A) as a parity checker matrix and G := (AT|Ik) as a generator matrix. The
parity checker matrix comprises an identity matrix (In−k) and a matrix (A) that contains
all nonzero binary combinations that do not appear in the columns of the neighboring
identity matrix. For a Hamming (7,4) code, a possible parity checker matrix is shown
below.
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H =

1 0 0 1 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 1 1

The generator matrix G can be evaluated considering that HGT = 0. In this case, the
corresponding generator matrix G is shown below.
G =

1 1 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 1

In order to demonstrate the procedure required to encode a data using a Hamming
code, let us use both matrices defined above. First of all, we multiply the data word by
the generator matrix G. Considering that the data word is w = 1010 and that we use even
parity, the codeword can be obtained as follows:
c = wG = (1010)

1 1 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 1
 = (1011010)
The decoding process starts checking if there is any error in the codeword. This proce-
dure is done multiplying the received codeword byH. The resulting value is called syndrome
and identifies the faulty bit. If the codeword is correct, the syndrome must be zero. In
order to demonstrate that, let us first assume that the received codeword is 1011010. In
this case, the syndrome must be zero as shown below.
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s = cHT = (1011010)

1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
1 1 0
1 0 1
0 1 1
1 1 1

= (000)
Let us now suppose that the received codeword was 1011110, i.e., the received codeword
has one error located at bit 5. Then, we can evaluate the syndrome of this codeword and
next locate the faulty bit using Table A.3. Once an error has been detected, corrective
procedures such as scrubbing are usually carried out [136].
s = cHT = (1011110)

1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
1 1 0
1 0 1
0 1 1
1 1 1

= (101)
Table A.3: Syndrome Table for Hamming (7,4) code [115]
Error Vector Syndrome
1000000 100
0100000 010
0010000 001
0001000 110
0000100 101
0000010 011
0000001 111
Hamming codes are widely used in computer memory (RAM) because of their simplic-
ity. The work in [67] evaluates the area efficiency of this technique, and points to a lower
area increase when compared to TMR for codes capable to correct one bit-flip. Regarding
multiple upsets, a technique based on Hamming code and Reed Solomon code that was
emulated in a Virtex FPGA was introduced in [137]. For a memory composed of 128-bit
rows, the proposed technique requires only 19 parity bits per row. In 2007, a new technique
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to protect memories against multiple errors named Matrix code was proposed in [138]. It
is based on Hamming and parity codes, and the idea is to organize the data bits into a
matrix in such a way that rows are protected with Hamming code, meanwhile columns are
protected with parity code. The results have shown that the relation detection/correction
coverage per cost is better when comparing to both Reed-Muller and Hamming codes.
An important research in reconfigurable computers using Hamming codes was real-
ized in Dassault Laboratories by Maison [139]. This work, called MECRA (Maquette
Expérimentale de Calculateur à Reconfiguration Automatique), consisted in realizing an
ultra-reliable and self-reconfigurable computer. It used a redundant Hamming code that
can detect up to two simultaneous errors and spare blocks to provide a reconfigurability
mechanism to correct errors. The MECRA project has shown a significant increase in the
ratio reliability/cost for the proposed computer.
A.1.2.2.2 Cyclic codes
Cyclic codes are a special type of linear error correcting codes introduced by Prange
in 1957 [140]. These codes were developed in such a way that both encoding and error
correcting procedures can be easily implemented using shift-registers [141].
The main idea behind any code is to add extra bits in order to allow error detection
and possible correction. Regarding cyclic codes, the codeword comprises k binary bits
representing the data and n − k check bits. Then, the codeword can be interpreted as a
polynomial where each bit stands for a polynomial coefficient. As an example, a binary
word such as w = 101011 can be interpreted as w = x5 + x3 + x+ 1.
A cyclic code is based on a generator polynomial P (x) of degree n− k. Any codeword
that is divisible by P (x) is considered as a valid codeword. Thus, in order to encode a data
represented by D(x) using a cyclic code, we must divide xn−kD(x) by P (x), and add the
remainder R(x) to the result as shown in (A.1).
C(x) =
xn−kD(x)
P (x)
+R(x) (A.1)
An important aspect about cyclic codes is that all algebraic operations are done using
module two arithmetic. Then, addition and subtraction provides the same result and the
division operation can be drastically simplified. Indeed, it is well known that the division
operation can be done using just shift registers and modulo two adders (a simple exclusive
or) [141].
The ability of a cyclic code to detect and correct errors depends on the generator
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polynomial used to encode a data word. The simplest polynomial with more than one
term (P (x) = x+ 1) is capable to detect any odd number of errors as shown in [141].
Subsequently to the introduction of the cyclic codes, several works were done based on
it. In 1962, Lars-Henning Zetterberg proposed a family of binary cyclic codes based on
Galois fields, discovered by the french mathematician Evariste Galois, which are capable to
correct multiple errors [142]. Among them, Zetterberg codes with parameters (2u+ 1, 2u+
1 − 2u) deserve special attention due to their large code rate and their high decoding
speed [143]. Indeed, Zetterberg codes with u odd were proved to be able either to correct
all weight-2 errors with a small number of exceptions or become a truly 2-error correctable
code multiplying the generator polynomials by (x− 1) [144].
The most well-known family of cyclic-based codes is the Reed-Solomon family proposed
in 1960 [145]. They are non-binary cyclic codes, which are constructed and decoded using
finite field arithmetic. Reed-Solomon codes can detect up to t faulty bits when adding t
check bits to the data. They are widely used in digital communication and storage systems.
Another important capability of such code is the high reconfigurability. The work in [146]
used this feature to propose a fault tolerant solid state mass memory for space applications.
Using the proposed approach, the system can be reconfigured to deal either with latency
problems (using smaller symbols) or data integrity (using longer symbols).
A.2 Evolvable hardware
Evolvable hardware is a new concept introduced by Adrian Thompson in 1995 [147]
that uses evolutionary algorithms when designing a specific circuit. This technique can
be used either to build circuits with high masking capability or to design reconfigurable
circuits that can perform well in the presence of a fault. In fact, this concept brings together
reconfigurable hardware, artificial intelligence, fault tolerance and autonomous systems.
Evolutionary algorithms are based on the biological evolution process. The main idea
is that a population of different individuals competes among them to participate in the
creation (reproduction process) of the next generation. This competition forms a selec-
tion mechanism equivalent to the natural selection mechanism described by Darwin in his
evolution theory. In the case of circuits, each individual is a different electronic system
attempting to solve the same problem [148]. The selection process is done by a measur-
able number, called fitness, which evaluates the quality of each solution. Then, all the
designs that succeed the selection process are able to participate in the creation of the
next generation of individuals.
Artificial evolution in circuits is generally used regarding two cases: system design
and online adaptation of existing systems. In the first one, evolution algorithms are used
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in order to create a hardware design that can perform a required action, but it stops
changing after a good design is found (evolved hardware). Regarding fault tolerance,
Adrian Thompson in [149] has shown that for some circumstances, the evolution process
will automatically tend to create designs that are insensitive to some faults. The next one,
however, continues the evolution process throughout its existence, allowing the system to
adapt itself when an environmental change or an error occurs (evolvable hardware). One
important point that we must highlight here is that the evolution process improves the
system in a non-monotonic way, i.e., some solutions in generation n can be worse than
solutions in generation n − 1. Therefore, precautions are required in order to keep the
system functioning well during the evolution process.
In the last decade several researches were done regarding evolutionary-based techniques
for fault tolerant systems. In 2000, the work in [150] used GA (genetic algorithm) to derive
a population of different individuals for adaptation of electronic circuits. They compared
two methods to achieve fault-tolerant designs: one based on fitness definition, and other
based on population. In the fitness method, predefined faults are introduced during the
evolutionary process, and the best fit individual is selected as a robust design solution. In
the population-based approach, the evolutionary process is done without injecting errors a
priori. Next, faults are injected in the best fit individual, and its performance is evaluated.
If the fitness is too low for any injected fault, mutants are analyzed. If no mutant can
provide acceptable behavior, the GA is restarted. Their simulation results have shown
that the population-based design outperforms the fitness-based method in both analog
and digital circuits.
In 2001, the work in [151] investigated the properties of messy gates, a model of gate-like
components with added random noise, using evolutionary algorithms. The random designs
created by these algorithms exploited redundancy in such a way that the evolved circuits
exhibited implicit fault-tolerance to stuck-at-faults. In [152], the authors examined the
ability of evolutionary techniques to include fault tolerance into the evolutionary process,
and how it reacts in respect to real life faults. In 2003, the work presented in [153]
applied repair techniques based on evolutionary algorithms into four circuits implemented
using an FPGA: quadrature decoder, 3-by-3-bit multiplier, 3-by-3-bit adder, and 4-to-7
decoder. The fault simulation used was “hard-wiring” the individual LUTs values in order
to simulate either stuck-at-0 or stuck-at-1 errors. The experimental results have pointed out
evolutionary repair techniques as a great replacement or a supplement to traditional fault
tolerance techniques such as TMR. Moreover, the increase in circuitry using evolutionary
algorithms remains almost constant relative to the number of electronic components, unlike
TMR that requires a linear increase in circuit area.
The work in [154] have introduced a method to take into account the correlation of
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circuits during the fitness analysis of the evolutionary algorithm. Using this, it is possible
to design an ensemble of circuits in such a way that the correlation in the fault pattern
is reduced. They have shown that when using these uncorrelated circuits combined with
an NMR approach, the reliability of the ensemble is increased. Later, the work in [155]
reported the results of a comparison between the population-based and the correlation-
based methods. The study points out the size of the ensemble of circuits required by the
population-based method as a practical disadvantage when compared to the correlation-
based method. Indeed, the fitness function used in the population algorithm leads to a set
of circuits comprising one circuit performing well without faults and others performing well
in respect to each detectable fault. In the worst case, the number of circuits can be N + 1
where N is the number of detectable faults. In the case of the correlation based-method,
every circuit will provide an acceptable level of performance whether faults are present or
not, leading to a much smaller size of the ensemble of circuits.
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Appendix B
Basics on FPGAs
An FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array) is an integrated circuit comprising con-
figurable blocks and configurable interconnects. These configurable structures allow the
designer to program the device in order to perform a desired function after the manufac-
turing process (field-programmable). FPGAs can be classified into two types:
– OTP (One-Time Programmable) FPGA: the device is designed in such a way that
it can be programmed only one time.
– Reprogrammable FPGA: the device can be reprogrammed through software to per-
form another task.
In order to be able to program a circuit after manufacturing, certain mechanisms are
required. In this chapter, examples of these mechanisms will be reviewed, and their prime
characteristics will be revealed. First of all, technologies related to OTP devices will be
introduced. Next, mechanisms that allow the fabrication of reconfigurable devices will be
presented.
B.1 FPGA technologies
To explain the concepts related to FPGAs’ technologies, a simple circuit, shown in
Figure B.1, will be used. This figure represents a configurable circuit with potential links
that can be used to define the circuit function.
B.1.1 Fusible link technology
The fusible link technology was one of the first mechanisms that allowed a designer to
configure a circuit after manufacturing [156]. As shown in Figure B.2, the main idea is to
use fuses to establish the connections between the elements. In the beginning, all the fuses
are intact. In order to configure a device, a high voltage is applied in the desired fuses
154 B. Basics on FPGAs
A
Output
B
Potential Links
Figure B.1: Programmable circuit concept
to burn them out. An example of a programmed circuit is shown in Figure B.3. In this
example, two fuses were burned out and the output provided now is Y = A+ B¯.
It can be noted that devices using fusible link technology are OTP (One-Time Pro-
grammable) because after burning a fuse out, there is no way to return to its original
state.
A
Output
B
Fusible Links
Figure B.2: Programmable circuit with intact fusible links
A
Output
B
Fusible Links
Figure B.3: Programmed circuit with output Y = A+ B¯
B.1.2 Antifuse
The antifuse technology emerged as an alternative choice to fusible link technology. It
operates in an opposite way in respect to the fuses [45, 156]. The antifuses present a high
resistance when not programmed and they can be interpreted as an open circuit, as shown
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in Figure B.4. After a high voltage is applied, the resistance decreases and a link is formed
in such a way that the device can be one-time programmed by the designer. An example
of a programmed device with output Y = A+ B¯ can be seen in Figure B.5.
A
Output
B
Antifuse Links
Figure B.4: Programmable circuit with intact antifuses
A
Output
B
Antifuse Links
Figure B.5: Programmed circuit with output Y = A+ B¯
B.1.2.1 Actel antifuse technology - PLICE R©
PLICE R© (Programmable Low-Impedance Circuit Element) is an antifuse-based technol-
ogy designed by Actel and available in some families of FPGAs. Each antifuse is constituted
by a dielectric between an n+ layer and a poly-Si layer [157]. The behavior of these el-
ements is to present a high resistance (normally bigger than 100 Megaohms) when not
programmed and a low resistance (200-500 ohms) when programmed [158].
The configuration of these devices is done by applying a programming voltage in the
desired antifuses in such a way that the dielectric is ruptured. Thus, a conductive link
between the n+ and poly-Si layers is created. Notice that once programmed, an antifuse
cannot be recovered to its original state. In other words, an antifuse FPGA is an one-time
programmable device.
Nowadays Actel also uses metal-metal antifuses in some FPGA families. This type
of antifuse mainly has two advantages over a poly-silicon antifuse. The first one is that
poly-silicon devices require extra space to connect wiring layers, creating additional para-
sitic capacitance. The connections in metal-metal antifuses are stablished direct to metal
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(the wiring layers). The second virtue of metal-metal antifuses is that they have smaller
programming resistance (of approximately 25 ohms) [159].
B.1.2.2 Quicklogic antifuse technology - ViaLink R©
ViaLink R© is also an antifuse-based technology that uses an amorphous silicon layer
to provide low resistances (of approximately 30 ohms) [160]. In order to programme this
element, a voltage is applied to the top electrode and the bottom electrode is grounded.
Thus, a conductive link is created by moving electrode material into the amorphous silicon
[161]. A ViaLink R© device offers a superior level of security, concerning intellectual property,
when compared to SRAM-based FPGAs, ASICs or gate arrays [162]. Using this technology,
the vendor assures that even if the FPGA is decapped, it is not possible to determine the
location of programmed antifuses and relate this to design functionality [162]. This high
level protection is provided mainly by the following characteristics:
– There is no serial data stream on power up, avoiding unauthorized copies of the
program during boot up.
– Each antifuse contains a top similar to metal, making hard to distinguish whether
or not an antifuse was programmed;
– QuickLogic devices contain a large number of elements, and the relationship among
the programmed antifuses is proprietary information. Thus, if even just one antifuse
is identified incorrectly during the reverse engineering process, the perfect function-
ality is compromised;
– The JTAG port available on the device has a security bit to avoid unauthorized
access to the flip-flop values by thirds.
B.1.3 Static memory technology
Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) is a semiconductor memory widely used in
FPGAs devices. The term static states that this type of memory do not need to be
periodically refreshed in order to maintain its contained data, unlike dynamic memories.
SRAM technology is based on static memory cells, such as the one shown if Figure B.6,
that provide the reconfigurability mechanism. These cells are mainly used in multiplexers,
in order to interconnect signals, and in LUTs (lookup-tables), used to implement logic
functions in SRAM-based FPGAs [45].
Nowadays, the majority of FPGAs are based in static memory technology. Memory
elements in SRAM-FPGAs can be divided as follows:
– Configuration memory : used to map a circuit into an FPGA. In other words, con-
figuration bits are used to define interconnections, combinatorial functions, among
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Figure B.6: Static Memory Cell
others. This memory comprises more than 99% of memory bits in an FPGA and is
supposed to remain unchanged during execution [48].
– User memory : responsible for the current state of a circuit, i.e., the runtime infor-
mation. The content of this memory is supposed to change during execution.
One of the foremost advantages in using SRAM-based devices is that it can be pro-
grammed in an indefinite number of times [45,156]. Besides, these cells are compatible with
CMOS technology and no special circuit is needed. There are some drawbacks, however,
presented in this technology that must be highlighted [45]:
– Size: The actual size of SRAM cells is bigger compared to techniques such as anti-
fuses. A typical cell generally requires 6 transistors.
– Volatility : SRAM-based cells lose data information when power is down. Therefore,
external devices, such as EEPROM or flash memories, are required to store the
information when the FPGA is powered down, and then load it again when powered
up.
– Security : Devices based on SRAM cells, when powered up, require a boot up pro-
cess to perform their functionality. During this process, the information can be
intercepted and stolen by unauthorized people. Thus, techniques such as encryption
must be used to diminish this risk.
– Electrical properties: Multiplexers in SRAM-based FPGAs are implemented using
transistors. Each transistor has significant resistance and capacitance that need to
be considered when designing a circuit. Higher resistances and capacitances result
in higher delays, thus reducing the system performance.
B.1.4 Flash technology
Flash memory technology emerged as a mix of EPROM and EEPROM technologies.
The main difference is that in flash devices a large chunk of memory can be erased at one
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time, while in EPROM/EEPROM devices only one bit is erased individually (so the term
“flash” devices) [163].
Flash memory cells are made from floating gate transistors, a special type of transistor
in which the gate is electrically isolated. This isolation creates a floating node in DC, which
allows the transistor to keep the charge contained in it for long periods of time. Indeed,
these cells do not lose their content even when the cell is powered down (nonvolatile
memory). Using phenomena such as Fowler-Nordheim tunneling and hot carrier injection,
it is possible to program the memory cell modifying the charge contained in the floating
gate.
Flash-based memory cells can be used as programming elements in FPGAs in order to
provide nonvolatility and reconfigurable programming, such as in Actel’s ProASIC3 [164].
The programming cell of these devices comprises two transistors sharing a floating gate,
which stores the programming information (see Figure B.7). The transistor located at the
left side, named sensing transistor, is smaller and is responsible for writing and verification
of the floating gate. The other transistor is named switching transistor, and it’s used in 3
situations: to connect or separate routing nets, to configure VersaTile logic, and to erase
the floating gate.
Floating
Gate
Control
Gate
Switching
Transistor
Programming
Transistor
FPGA
User Signal
Programming
Signals
Figure B.7: Flash memory cell - ProASIC3
As mentioned earlier, flash-based technology provides nonvolatility to FPGAs. There-
fore, flash-based FPGAs do not need external resources to store and load configuration
data in contrast to SRAM-based devices. Indeed, a flash-based device is ready to perform
its function upon power-up. Flash-based memory cells are also more area efficient than
an SRAM-based cell, since the last one requires up to six transistors to implement the
programmable storage.
Despite the virtues of flash-based FPGAs, some disadvantages are also presented in
such devices. Perhaps the most important drawback is that they cannot be reprogrammed
an infinite number of times. In fact, flash-based FPGAs such as the Actel’s ProASIC3 have
an endurance of 500 programming cycles and a program retention of 20 years for correct
operating conditions [165].
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B.1.5 Summary
The most important technologies used in FPGAs are: SRAM, Antifuse, and Flash.
Table B.1 summarizes the prime characteristics of such technologies. It is important to note
that an ideal technology would be a nonvolatile, reprogrammable, providing low resistance
and parasitic capacitances, and using a standard CMOS process. None of the existent
technologies can satisfy such requirements [45].
Table B.1: Programming technology properties summary [45]
SRAM Flash Antifuse
Volatile Yes No No
Reprogrammable Yes Yes No
Storage Element Size High Moderate Low
Manufacturing Process Standard CMOS Flash Process Special Antifuse Process
In-System Programmable Yes Yes No
Switch Resistance ∼500 – 1000Ω ∼500 – 1000Ω ∼20 – 100Ω
Switch Capacitance ∼1 – 2 fF ∼1 – 2 fF < 1 fF
Programmable Yield 100% 100% > 90%
B.2 FPGAs architectures
In this Section, some FPGAs architectures from the most known vendors will be dis-
cussed.
B.2.1 Altera
B.2.1.1 Stratix R© family
The Stratix R© family is the high-end line of Altera FPGAs and is designed to achieve a
high performance with low power consumption. In order to obtain this, important features
were added over the generations of this family [166]:
– Adaptive Logic Module (ALM): Each ALM contains two 6-input LUT (Look-Up
Table) that can be configured to work as an 8-input LUT. A high level block diagram
of an ALM can be seen in Figure B.8.
– Programmable Power Technology : The new version of Stratix R© FPGAs allows the
configuration of speed paths. In other words, some blocks may run in higher speeds
than others. This allows to speed up critical paths and slow down paths that do not
need to run in high speeds, improving performance and power consumption;
– Design Security : Stratix R© FPGAs use SRAM cells to store the configuration memory.
Thus, each time the system is powered up, the data must be loaded. In order to
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protect the intellectual property of the implemented design, it is possible to define a
128-bit or 256-bit key to encrypt the bitstream and avoid unauthorized copies.
– Configurable High-Speed I/Os: The I/O set can be configured according to a defined
application, changing, for example, the electrical characteristics.
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Figure B.8: ALM High-Level Block Diagram [166]
B.2.1.2 Arria R© family
The Arria R© Family is the midrange line of Altera FPGAs. It is designed as a cost
and power sensitive device aiming transceiver-based applications. In order to provide fast
interface connections for applications, Arria R© FPGAs offer PCI Express, Gigabit Ethernet
and Serial RapidIO interfaces. Other important features are available in this family [167]:
– Logic Array Block (LAB): Each LAB consists of 10 ALMs and other resources as
carry chains, local interconnect and shared arithmetic. These FPGAs also dispose
of MLABs that are basically LABs with SRAM-memory capability. These blocks
allows a reduction in required routing, thus improving performance;
– SEU Mitigation: A built-in circuit may be used to detect data corruption due to soft
errors in the configuration memory. Single Event Upsets (SEUs) were discussed in
Section 1.2.2.
B.2.1.3 Cyclone R© family
The Cyclone R© Family is the low-cost FPGAs series offered by Altera. It was designed
to provide power and cost savings as a result of features presented in its architecture as
shown above [168]:
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– Logic Element (LE): Logic elements use 4-input LUT to implement the logic func-
tions. Each LE, illustrated in Figure B.9, can be configured to operate in two modes:
– Normal Mode: Used for combinatorial functions and logic applications;
– Arithmetic Mode: Used for implementing adders, counters, accumulators and com-
parators.
– I/O Features: The inputs and outputs of a Cyclone R© FPGA can be configured
according to the application. It can be chosen parameters such as bus hold, delay,
pull-up resistors and even control the slew-rate to optimize signal integrity.
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Figure B.9: LE Block Diagram [168]
B.2.1.4 HardCopy R© family
HardCopy R© are mask-programmable devices, called structured ASICs, that emerged
as a midterm between FPGAs and ASICs. These devices use metal connections that are
substantially smaller than that used in FPGAs, thus improving performance and reducing
power consumption. Besides, unused logic blocks and clock trees are not powered up.
The HardCopy R© architecture was designed in such a way that it is totally compatible
with Stratix R© FPGAs [169]. Moreover, the design tool is the same for HardCopy R© and
Stratix R© devices, so allowing the use of reprogrammable FPGAs to design and test the
circuit before make a "hard copy". The typical design flow can be resumed as follow:
– User develops and verifies a design using a Stratix R© device;
– A netlist is created and sent to Altera;
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– Altera sends the HardCopy R© device using almost the same architecture of the initial
design. Notice that the new device has smaller hard connections, thus improving
performance and reducing power consumption.
B.2.1.5 Devices comparison
Table B.2: Altera Devices Comparison
Family Logic Elements Embedded Memory Technology
(KLEs) (Mbits) (nm)
Stratix IV Up to 813.1 Up to 22.6 40
Stratix III Up to 338.0 Up to 15.9 65
Stratix II Up to 179.4 Up to 8.9 90
Hardcopy IV Up to 813.1 Up to 20.2 40
Hardcopy III Up to 338.0 Up to 15.9 40
Hardcopy II Up to 179.4 Up to 8.4 90
Cyclone IV Up to 149.8 Up to 6.3 60
Cyclone III Up to 198.5 Up to 7.8 65
Cyclone II Up to 68.4 Up to 1.1 90
Arria II Up to 256.5 Up to 8.3 40
Arria Up to 90.2 Up to 4.3 90
B.2.2 Xilinx
B.2.2.1 Virtex R© family
Virtex R© Family is the high-end line of FPGAs from Xilinx. It provides a high perfor-
mance while keeping the power consumption low. The architecture used in this family of
FPGAs is called ASMBL (Advanced Silicon Modular Block) [170] and it was first intro-
duced in 2003. It allowed Xilinx to fast and cost-effectively assemble multiple platforms
targeted to different application domains, providing the right choice of capabilities for a
specific design. Thus, developers can select a platform with optimal features for a target
application.
The ASMBL is a column-based architecture where each column represents a sub-system
with specific capabilities, e.g., memory, I/Os, DSP, etc. Therefore, a domain-specific chip
can be accomplished choosing the columns according to the desired functionality, as shown
in Figure B.10. For example, a chip for speech processing must have more columns de-
voted to DSP functions than a chip targeted for an application in the logic domain. This
architecture also alleviates problems such as:
– I/O and Array Dependency : The ASMBL architecture uses a flip-chip packaging
process. It allows bonding pads to be located anywhere on the chip, not just on
the periphery. Thus, a chip can accommodate more I/O pads just by devoting more
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column to I/O functions [171];
– Power and Ground Scaling : In order to improve the power-grid distribution and to
reduce the on-chip parasitic voltage drop, a chip design requires additional power
and ground pads. The ASMBL architecture simplifies the task of uniform power
distribution allowing to place the pads anywhere in the chip.
– Hard-IP Scaling : The Intellectual Property (IP) scaling problem is reduced from two
dimensions to one dimension by the use of a column-based architecture.
Aplications
of Domain B
Aplications
of Domain A
DSP
Logic
Memory
Processing
Figure B.10: Example of devices using the ASMBL architecture
B.2.2.2 Spartan R© family
The Spartan R© series of FPGAs from Xilinx are built as a low-cost and low-power device.
The main resource for implementing combinatorial and sequential logic is the configurable
logic block (CLB). A CLB comprises two vertical slices that can transfer data using a switch
matrix as shown in Figure B.11. Each slice includes miscellaneous logic, eight flip-flops
and four 6-input LUTs. There are three types of slices in Spartan-6 devices [172]:
– SLICEM : Each SLICEM can be used as LUTs (one 6-input or two 5-input), as
memory (one 64-bit or two 32-bit RAM) or as shift registers (a single 32-bit or
two 16-bit). Besides, for arithmetic operations, there is a high-speed carry chain to
propagate the signals;
– SLICEL: Contains all the features of SLICEMs except the memory and shift register
functions;
– SLICEX : Contains all the features of SLICELs except the arithmetic carry option
and the wide multiplexers.
The clock management in Spartan-6 FPGAs is done by six Clock Management Tiles
(CMTs). Each CMT has two Digital clock management (DCM) and one Phase-Locked
Loop (PLL) that can be used individually or concatenated. Thus, digital designers can use
either digital or analog clock management in Spartan-6 devices.
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Slice(1)
COUT
CIN
Slice(0)
CLB
Figure B.11: High-level block diagram of a CLB in Spartan FPGAs [173]
B.2.2.3 EasyPath R© family
EasyPath R© devices are a midterm between FPGAs and ASICs that provide significant
cost reduction with low-risk. The idea is to use Virtex R© FPGAs to design and test a
circuit and use the EasyPath R© as an option to reduce its cost. This migration between
devices can be done without additional design constraints. Both architectures are totally
compatible and the cost savings are achieved by the reduction in the effective die size. In
other words, unused gates, abundant routing and programmable multiplexers available in
Virtex R© FPGAs are removed [174].
The EasyPath-6 is the high-end device in this family and there is no minimal order
quantities. After the submission of the compiled design files to Xilinx, the user will receive
the EasyPath R© devices in six weeks.
B.2.2.4 Devices comparison
Table B.3: Xilinx Devices Comparison
Family Logic Cells Embedded Memory Technology
(KCells) (Mbits) (nm)
Virtex-6 Up to 760 Up to 38 40
Virtex-5 Up to 330 Up to 18 65
Virtex-4 Up to 200 Up to 10 90
Spartan-6 Up to 150 Up to 4.8 45
Spartan-3 Up to 75 Up to 1.8 90
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B.2.3 Actel
B.2.3.1 IGLOO R© family
The IGLOO R© family of FPGAs from Actel is well known due to its low power con-
sumption. Basically, two technologies can be highlighted that reduce the amount of power
consumption [175]:
– Flash*Freeze: This technology turns off I/Os and clocks to reduce the power con-
sumption. When this mode is activated, the device consumes as little as 5µW and
can rapid recovery to operation mode.
– Low Power Active Capability : The device remains completely functional while con-
suming just 12µW .
An IGLOO R© FPGA is a reprogrammable device that uses flash memory. Since this
technology is nonvolatile, IGLOO R© FPGAs do not need to load the information at power-
up, avoiding unauthorized copies of the bitstream. Besides, it also includes a technology
called FlashLock to hide its content until a host controller is able to authenticate itself
through a 128-bit key.
The hardware architecture used in IGLOO R© FPGAs is basically composed of Versa-
Tiles. Each VersaTile can be configured as a 3-input function (3-input LUT), a D-type
flip-flop or a latch.
In order to manage the clock signal, the IGLOO R© device provides six CCCs (Clock
Conditioning Circuit). One CCC has a PLL and the other five allow clock spine access
and clock delay operations.
B.2.3.2 Fusion R© family
Fusion R© FPGAs are devices designed to mixed-signal integrated circuits, i.e., circuits
that has both analog and digital on a single semiconductor die [176]. It also uses flash-
based technology and its architecture is similar to the IGLOO R© one. Fusion R© FPGAs
include analog components such as:
– Configurable ADC : it supports 8-, 10- and 12-bit modes;
– 32:1 Input Analog MUX : channels 0 and 31 are dedicate. They can be used to
monitor the core power supply and the device temperature, respectively.
– Analog Quad I/O Structure: Each structure can be used as one of various built-in
circuit combinations.
B.2.3.3 ProASIC R© family
The ProASIC R© family was designed to provide a reprogrammable device with a cost
per unit similar to an ASIC device. It uses nonvolatile flash technology and its architecture
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is also similar to the IGLOO R© one [177].
B.2.3.4 Axcelerator R© family
Actel’s Axcelerator R© family was designed to provide high performance and high density.
It uses an antifuse-based technology, denominated PLICE R©, in which the programmable
interconnect elements are located between two layers of metal. An important feature
included in such devices is denominated FuseLock technology as a reference to the security
level that is provided.
The Axcelerator R© series uses the AX architecture that provides two types of logic
modules [178] shown in Figure B.12:
– Combinatorial Cell (C-Cell): Each C-cell can be configured to perform more than
4000 combinational functions up to 5-inputs.
– Register Cell (R-Cell): Each R-cell contains a flip-flop with asynchronous clear and
preset. Moreover, it features a programmable clock polarity that can be configured
in a register-by-register basis.
C-cell
A[1:0]
B[1:0]
D[3:0]
DB
CFN
FCO
FCI
Y
PSET
CLR
D
E
CLK
Q
(Positive Edge Triggered)
C-Cell R-Cell
Figure B.12: AX C-Cell and R-Cell [178]
The AX architecture is organized into Core Tiles. A Core Tile is composed by an array
of 336 SuperClusters and four SRAM blocks. Each SuperCluster comprises two Clusters.
A Cluster is a block that contains two C-cells, a single R-cell and two Transmit (TX)
and two Receive (RX) routing buffers. Superclusters are arranged in such a way that two
combinational modules are side-by-side. This pattern, shown in Figure B.13, minimizes
the delay for two-bit carry logic, thus improving arithmetic performance.
Relative to the I/O structure, every Axcelerator R© device supports a range of operation
voltages (1.5V , 1.8V , 2.5V and 3.3V ). The Axcelerator R© I/Os are organized in banks and
it is possible to configure the I/O structure according to at least 14 different standards.
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Figure B.13: AX SuperCluster Arrangement [178]
B.2.3.5 MX family
Actel MX family offers a cost-effective design solution at 5V. It uses antifuse technology
and its capacity ranges from 3,000 to 54,000 gates. The architecture of MX devices are
composed basically by [179]:
– Logic Modules: Each MX device contains three types of logic modules:
– Combinatorial (C-module): this block can be configured to implement a combina-
torial logic function;
– Sequential (S-module): an S-module can implement a combinatorial logic function
with the addition of a sequential element;
– Decode (D-module): these modules contain wide-decode circuitry and are arranged
around the periphery of the device.
– Dual-Port SRAM Modules: the SRAM modules of MX devices contain independent
read and write ports with independent clocks. As a result, these modules may be
used to implement high-speed buffered applications. Unused modules can be used to
implement other user logic.
B.2.3.6 Devices comparison
Table B.4: Actel Devices Comparison
Family System Gates Embedded RAM Technology
(x1000) (Kbits) (nm)
IGLOO Up to 3000 Up to 504 130
ProASIC3 Up to 3000 Up to 504 130
Fusion Up to 1500 Up to 270 130
Axcelerator Up to 2000 Up to 295 150
MX Up to 54 Up to 2.5 450
B.2.4 Lattice
B.2.4.1 EC R© family
Lattice EC R© family of FPGAs was designed using SRAM technology to provide de-
vices with high performance while keeping the cost as low as possible. Its architecture is
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composed basically by [180]:
– Logic Modules: EC R© devices contain logic blocks organized in a two-dimensional
array. There are two kinds of logic modules:
– Programmable Functional Unit (PFU): it can be configured to perform logic, arith-
metic, RAM and ROM functions. Each PFU contains 4 slices. The first three slices
are composed of two 4-input LUTs and a register. The remaining one comprises
only two 4-input LUTs. A typical PFU is depicted in Figure B.14;
– Programmable Functional Unit Without RAM (PFF): it contains building blocks
for logic, arithmetic and ROM functions.
– sysMEM EBR Blocks: A sysMEM Embedded Block Ram can implement either a
single port, a dual port, or a pseudo dual port memory. It is a dedicated memory
block that can be configured as RAM or as ROM.
– sysDSP Slice: this slice allows the implementation of typical functions for digital
signal processing applications such as Finite Impulse Response filters, Fast Fourier
Transform, among others. Each DSP slice supports different data widths to provide
highly parallel implementations for DSP functions.
– Serializer and Deserializer Channels (SERDES): each SERDES module contains
independent 8bit/10bit encoder/decoder that allows to serialize and/or deserialize
data.
Slice 0
LUT4 &
CARRY
LUT4 &
CARRY
D D
Slice 1
LUT4 &
CARRY
LUT4 &
CARRY
Slice 2
LUT4 &
CARRY
LUT4 &
CARRY
Slice 3
LUT4 LUT4
D D D D
FF FF FF FF FF FF
Figure B.14: PFU block diagram [180]
B.2.4.2 XP R© family
Lattice XP R© family provides devices with a flash-based architecture denominated flexi-
FLASH. As a result, these devices are instant-on, i.e., they do not need to load data during
the boot-up process.
The flexiFLASH architecture is arranged in a similar manner in respect to the EC R©
architecture shown above.
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B.2.4.3 Devices comparison
Table B.5: Lattice Devices Comparison
Family LUTs Embedded RAM Technology
(x1000) (Mbits) (nm)
ECP3 Up to 149 Up to 6.8 65
ECP2 Up to 95 Up to 5.3 90
XP2 Up to 40 Up to 0.9 90
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